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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various 
philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of 
judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending 
Hume from criticism regarding the naturalistic credentials of this program, I argue that 
Hume’s science of man, along with the conception of judgement which is integral to it, is 
appropriately understood as a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science. Despite this, I 
contend that Hume’s conception of judgement prompts a problem regarding the intentionality 
of judgement – a problem which he does not adequately address.   
In the second part of my thesis I show how the intentionality problem which Hume 
grapples with is also crucial, constituting a point of departure, for Kant’s transcendental 
undertaking. Following Kant’s reasoning, I illustrate how an original concern with this 
intentionality issue leads Kant to a distinct conception of judgement, according to which 
concepts only exist in the context of a judgement. Having arrived at Kant’s conception of a 
judgement, the remainder of the thesis is devoted to the issue of judgement forms. Kant’s 
postulation of these forms is closely related to his conception of judgement, and I seek to 
establish both how these forms ought to be understood and how they might be derived. In 
relation to this latter issue, I suggest that there may a role for contemporary work in 
Generative Grammar. Specifically, I suggest that it may be viable to understand the forms of 
judgement as grammatical in nature, thereby securing an interdisciplinary connection 
between a philosophy of judgement and the empirical investigation of grammar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First thanks must go to Wolfram Hinzen. From the outset, his energy, enthusiasm and 
unalloyed passion for grammar have been infectious. He has been an exceptional supervisor 
in every respect and what’s more, a good friend.  Elisabeth Schellekens was instrumental in 
the early stages of this process in helping me clarify what it was I wanted to say. Thanks also 
to the Arts and Humanities Research Council who generously funded this thesis. 
Doctoral life can be a lonesome business, but the company of the Language and Mind group 
in Durham saved me from this fate. Thanks to Tom, Jimmy, Andrew, Pallavi, Alex and Uli 
for tolerating my rather abrasive style, and for your feedback on my disparate collection of 
thoughts. Our meetings were a real highlight for me: it was fortunate indeed that we spoke 
the same language.  
The originality of John Mikhail’s work has been an inspiration for me, and I am indebted to 
him for his willingness to discuss it with me, as well as for the encouragement he has offered 
me with respect to my own. Thanks also to Nirmalangshu Mukherji for guiding my early, 
tentative steps towards a PhD proposal, to Nick Zangwill for taking the time to meet with me 
when I was struggling, and to Emma Borg and David Landy for both reading over essay 
drafts. I have benefitted from discussions with Beatrice Longuenesse, Paul Pietroski, John 
Collins, Anders Holmberg, Noel Burton-Roberts, Noam Chomsky and Amanda Taylor-Aiken. 
Finally, the support of my family has sustained me throughout this process. The 
understanding my wife has shown has gone far beyond what I could have hoped for, while 
her constant willingness to lend a sympathetic ear has been all the more extraordinary given 
that she seldom understood what I was talking about.  
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
Table of Contents                                                                                                                             
 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 2 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 3 
List of Figures and Tables...................................................................................................... 7 
Notes on Sources and Abbreviations ..................................................................................... 8                                                            
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 9 
 
I. A Science of Man: The Genesis of Judgement .............................................................. 15                                               
 
1. Hume’s Naturalistic Approach ................................................................................ 16  
1.1 Aims and method ......................................................................................... 16 
1.2 Fundamentals ............................................................................................... 21 
1.3 Against judgement-as-predication ............................................................... 25 
1.4 A worry about the theory of ideas................................................................ 29 
1.5 Another worry about the theory of ideas ..................................................... 34 
2. Applying Hume’s Naturalistic Approach ................................................................ 45 
2.1 Causation...................................................................................................... 45 
2.2 External bodies............................................................................................. 53 
2.3 The thread from Hume’s science of man to the Critique of Pure Reason ... 61 
3. Cognitive Science .................................................................................................... 65 
3.1 Picking up humean strands .......................................................................... 65 
3.2 Grammaticality judgements ......................................................................... 73 
3.3 Moral judgements ........................................................................................ 75 
 
II.  Kant: The Intentionality of Judgement ......................................................................... 83 
 
4. The Nature of Experience ........................................................................................ 85 
4.1 From synthetic a priori judgements to the possibility of experience ........... 85 
4.2 Relation to an object  ................................................................................... 91 
4.3 The discursivity thesis.................................................................................. 98 
4.4 Global experience  ..................................................................................... 108 
5. Rules and Normativity ........................................................................................... 111 
5 
 
 
 
5.1 The normativity of the intentional ............................................................. 111 
5.2 The priority principle ................................................................................. 125 
5.3 Objecting to Conceptualism: concepts and schemata ................................ 132 
5.4 At the crossroads: meta-concepts ............................................................... 147 
6. The Forms of Judgement ....................................................................................... 152 
6.1 The guiding thread of the Metaphysical Deduction ................................... 152 
6.2 Reappraising the forms of judgement ........................................................ 156 
6.3 Why Kant needs judgements of perception ............................................... 162 
6.4 There are no judgements of perception ...................................................... 164 
7. The Role of Grammar: Sketching a Research Program ......................................... 177 
7.1 Identifying the forms of judgement ........................................................... 177 
7.2 Linguistic variation .................................................................................... 182 
7.3 Un-Cartesian linguistics ............................................................................. 187 
 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 200 
 
References .............................................................................................................. 202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
I confirm that no part of the material contained in this thesis has previously been  
submitted for any degree in this or any other university. All the material is the  
author’s own work, except for quotations and paraphrases which have been  
suitably indicated.  
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be  
published without his prior written consent, and information derived from it  
should be acknowledged.  
 
David James Kirkby 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 ................................................................................................................................ 41 
Figure 2 ................................................................................................................................ 41 
Figure 3 ................................................................................................................................ 81 
Figure 4 .............................................................................................................................. 100 
Figure 5 .............................................................................................................................. 103 
Figure 6 .............................................................................................................................. 119 
Figure 7 .............................................................................................................................. 129 
Figure 8 .............................................................................................................................. 154 
Figure 9 .............................................................................................................................. 188 
 
Table 1 ............................................................................................................................... 118 
Table 2 ............................................................................................................................... 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
Notes on Sources and Abbreviations  
 
Works of Hume 
References to the Treatise will include the book, part and section number, along with the 
relevant page number of the cited edition e.g. ‘Treatise: 1.2.III, 10’. 
Treatise  A Treatise of Human Nature. 1739. (New York: Barnes & Noble Inc., 
2005). 
Enquiry An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 1748. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
 
Works of Kant 
In keeping with Kantian scholarship, references to the Critique of Pure Reason will mark the 
1781 edition with the letter ‘A’, and the 1787 edition with the letter ‘B’. Paragraph number 
will follow letter. 
Corr Philosophical Correspondence. 1749-1800. ed. and trans. A. Zweig. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
CPR Critique of Pure Reason. 1781. trans. W. S. Pluhar (Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1996). 
FS  The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures Proved. 1762. ed. and trans. 
D. Walford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922). 
Logic Logic. 1800. trans. R. S. Hartman and W. Schwarz (Indianapolis: Bibbs-
Merrill Company Inc., 1974). 
Meta Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 1786. trans. E. B. Bax (London: 
George Bell and Sons, 1909). 
Prol Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be Able to Come Forward 
as Science. 1783. trans. E. B. Bax (London: George Bell and Sons, 1909). 
9 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Suppose one wants to reflect upon the nature and character of judgement. As we might say, 
suppose one is interested in providing a philosophy of judgement. Where must such an 
inquiry begin? As Wayne Martin observes in the opening to his Theories of Judgement, what 
is required, it seems, is a conception of judgement. That is, what is required is some way of 
determining what one is reflecting upon and about: “to embark on an investigation of these 
matters we require some initial characterisation of judgement” (Martin, 2006: 1). This 
determination is supplied by a concept of judgement.  
For Martin, the relevant concept of judgement is a commonly held, pre-theoretical 
‘folk concept’: the range of phenomena falling within the purview of an inquiry into 
judgement is determined by our common sense intuitions and ordinary language. On this 
basis, Martin announces (2006: 1-2) that judgement is “everywhere in human life”. For 
example, it is involved in everything from salting one’s soup and sorting the mail to looking 
for a book on a library shelf and adjusting one’s course when cycling at night as obstacles 
appear in the headlight. As Sluga (2008) approvingly notes, for Martin, judgement is a “hyper 
complex” domain in the Wittgensteinian sense.  
However, the problem with hyper complex domains is that, well… they are hyper 
complex! Part of what it means to call a domain hyper complex is that it resists a 
philosophical distillation of its nature and character. Yet this is precisely what the inquiry was 
supposed to be aiming at. The point here is not the completely general one that our folk 
concepts are open textured. Rather, it is that if we adhere to our common sense intuitions, 
judgement is utterly pervasive, rendering it intractable to reflective codification. Worse, not 
only does a philosophy of a hyper complex domain appear hopeless, it is also rather pointless. 
For instance, consider Martin’s (2006: 1) programmatic assertion that: 
“…we can hope to understand something important about ourselves (perhaps 
ultimately about the kind of being we are) if we can understand what it is to judge” 
It is hard to know what to make of this. If judgement is everywhere in human life then this 
assertion is not far short of tautologous. That we can learn about human being by learning 
about the character and event of human life is no doubt true, but it is hardly informative. 
10 
 
 
 
More to the point, if judgement is everywhere in human life, we would do just as well to 
investigate human life outright and be done with it. The concept of judgement does not seem 
to add anything. 
As such, if we adhere to our folk intuitions and ordinary language, the domain of 
judgement seems far too nebulous, expansive and unwieldy to be the object of philosophical 
inquiry. Perhaps this is why the concept of judgement is, philosophically, a little antiquated 
(Glock, 2010: 1). Perhaps a thesis on judgement is not a good idea.  
On the other hand, conceptions of judgement have played a prominent role in various 
philosophical and scientific traditions. For example cognitive scientists commonly speak of 
investigating subjects’ judgements. Furthermore, the claim that experience is fundamentally 
judgemental is one of the central claims made by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. Notice 
however, the plural marking: conceptions of judgement. There are two tightly related points 
here. Firstly, where conceptions of judgement have been prominent or theoretically 
significant, their contours have not been determined by recourse to a common pool of 
ordinary language and folk intuitions. These conceptions of judgement are not 
interchangeable with, and have not been intended to be interchangeable with, a folk concept. 
As such, although our folk or pre-theoretic conception of judgement may indeed denote a 
hyper complex domain, generally speaking, philosophical conceptions of judgement have not 
converged upon this domain. Instead, and this brings me to the second point, where 
conceptions of judgement have been prominent, judgement has been understood as 
performing a function or role relevant to the theoretical undertaking in question. Conceptions 
of judgement have been prominent where they have captured a theoretically salient function 
of this kind. As such, far from being determined by common sense intuitions, judgement has 
been understood in technical or theory-laden terms - motivated by, and answerable to, the 
cluster of problems and questions constitutive of the inquiry at hand. As a consequence 
however, different philosophical undertakings and approaches have yielded different 
conceptions of judgement. Not only do conceptions of judgement not converge upon a hyper 
complex domain, they do not converge at all.1 
                                                           
1
 Of course, this does not entail that conceptions of judgement have been completely unrelated to our pre-
theoretic conception of judgement. Were this the case, it would beg the question as to why the term ‘judgement’ 
is being used at all. The important point however is that as technical concepts, they are not answerable to or 
determined by our common sense intuitions and ordinary language. For instance, consider the relation between 
the technical concept of language employed by generative linguists and the folk concept of language. Although 
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For this reason, speaking of theories or philosophies of judgement is misleading, 
since it implies that ‘judgement’ is un-problematically univocal, denoting a fairly uniform 
range of phenomena which is the subject matter of various and competing theories. This 
implication is precisely what I am here denying. In this thesis therefore, it is not my aim to 
provide a theory of judgement, but rather, to situate conceptions of judgement within the 
theoretical contexts within which they make sense and against which they can be evaluated. 
Specifically, I shall concern myself with two distinct conceptions of judgement, central to 
Hume’s science of man and Kant’s transcendental philosophy respectively. The challenge 
will be to show how these fit into the relevant philosophical and scientific undertakings, and 
the role they play therein.  
Unfortunately, while this approach succeeds in eschewing an inherently nebulous and 
unwieldy object of inquiry in favour of much more tractable subject matter, it comes at a 
significant cost. Specifically, insofar as we are dealing with two disparate conceptions of 
judgement, in what sense is a discussion which moves from one to the other philosophically 
continuous? What ensures that such a discussion is more than fragmented, juxtaposed, 
descriptions of how judgement has been variously understood? Something must serve to unite 
or bind together the relevant conceptions of judgement if a discussion of them is to be 
philosophically continuous. Yet, short of casting ourselves back into a domain of hyper 
complexity, it cannot be judgement which imparts this unity. Perhaps a thesis on judgement is 
really not a good idea. 
 This issue strikes at the heart of this thesis. From its most nascent beginnings, the 
overarching aim of the thesis has been to explore new possibilities for bringing philosophy 
and the empirical sciences of the mind to bear upon each other, new ways in which each 
could inform the progress of the other. Since conceptions of judgement feature both in 
cognitive science and in various philosophical traditions as the bearer of epistemological and 
alethic properties, it originally appeared to be a promising commonality in this respect: a 
prism through which connections could be drawn between the two disciplines. However, as I 
realised that the conceptions of judgement being utilised were theory-laden, these prospects 
dimmed as a result. For example, if the conception of judgement utilised by cognitive 
scientists suffices for and serves the explanatory goals definitive of the field, what is the 
relevance of, for example, Kant’s pronouncements regarding judgement, bound up as they are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
as a technical concept, it is unconstrained by common sense intuitions about what ‘language is’, the use of the 
term implies a certain amount of overlap. 
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with his transcendental method? Well, prima facie, arguably none. Insofar as Kant’s 
conception of judgement is shaped by very different issues and problems from those 
concerning cognitive scientists, it is hard to see how this could constitute a productive 
engagement of philosophy and cognitive science. Of course a juxtaposition of these 
conceptions of judgement could still be interesting, and each could still be assessed according 
their own standards of evaluation; yet juxtaposition falls short of comparison, and in the 
absence of comparison, it is hard to see how such a discussion could illuminate and/or 
strengthen the relationship between cognitive science and philosophy.  
So far, so discouraging, and were this the end of the matter, I would have had to either 
discard the topic of judgement altogether or curtail my philosophical ambitions. Fortunately 
however, the matter does not end there. What I noticed is that the conception of judgement 
central to cognitive science is intimately bound up with a challenge regarding the possibility 
of being in an intentional state. This challenge is more accurately described as a problem, I 
call it the ‘intentionality problem’, since it follows directly from cognitive scientists’ own 
conception of judgement, and is thorny indeed. From the perspective of this thesis, the reason 
this is significant is because this intentionality problem is also central to another conception 
of judgement: Kant’s. In fact, Kant’s conception of judgement is only comprehensible in 
relation to this problem: they are inextricable entwined. It follows from this that a discussion 
of these two conceptions of judgement will be philosophically continuous after all. Insofar as 
one conception inevitably runs up against this problem, and the other is inextricably bound up 
with it, intentionality serves to impart unity upon the discussion. 
The chapters of this thesis are divided into two parts. Part I, encompassing chapters 
one to three, concerns a conception of judgement which I trace back to Hume, identifying it 
as integral to a naturalistic tradition which, following Hume, I label a ‘science of man’.  
Chapter One outlines the philosophical foundations of Hume’s science of man, identifying 
the conception of judgement integral to this approach. 
Chapter Two describes some philosophical results of Hume’s naturalistic approach. I show 
how the relevant conception of judgement inevitably leads to the intentionality problem (or as 
Hume puts it, the problem of how we come to believe in external objects). I argue that one of 
Hume’s greatest failures in the Treatise is his attempt to grapple with this problem, proffering 
as he does a completely circular account.  
13 
 
 
 
Chapter Three explains how Hume’s science of man is nowadays pursued by cognitive 
scientists. Importantly, this continuity is marked by a conception of judgement common to 
that of Hume.   
Part II, encompassing chapters four to seven, broadly concerns Kant’s conception of 
judgement. Specifically, it is claimed that Kant’s conception of judgement only makes sense 
in light of his concern with the intentionality problem (or, in his terms, the possibility of 
objective cognition or relation to an object). 
Chapter Four locates the intentionality problem within the context of Kant’s overarching 
transcendental philosophy. 
Chapter Five discusses Kant’s response to, or account of, the intentionality problem. 
According to Kant, intentionality presupposes rules, and rules presuppose judgement. As 
such, Kant’s conception of judgement is inextricably bound up with the role it plays in 
making intentionality possible. 
One way of (rather drastically) simplifying the dialectic up to this point would be as 
follows: I begin with the science of man conception of judgement and then show how this 
conception gives rise to a problem regarding intentionality; subsequently, I turn to Kant’s 
recognition of this intentionality problem and then show how Kant’s conception of judgement 
is part of the solution to this problem. In other words, while two conceptions of judgements 
are discussed, they are not directly related. Rather, they are related mediately, by both being 
bound up with the problem of intentionality.  
In the final two chapters of the thesis, chapters six and seven, I seek to develop, or 
rather, amend a central element of Kant’s conception of judgement: the nature and role of the 
forms of judgement. While in one respect these two chapters are absolutely continuous with 
what goes before – the conception of judgement which is being amended is largely outlined 
in the preceding chapters – they do stand somewhat apart from the primary, sweeping 
dialectic of the thesis, concerned as it is with connecting two disparate conceptions of 
judgement via the intentionality problem. By contrast, chapter six and seven have a more 
narrow and focused topic: how one aspect of Kant’s conception of judgement, specifically, 
the role of judgement forms, ought to be understood. I argue that although Kant was right to 
think that there are such forms, and although he was right to think that they are of 
14 
 
 
 
philosophical significance, he mistakes their philosophical significance and has no sound 
means for identifying them.  
Chapter Six concerns the philosophical significance of the forms of judgement. I argue, 
against Kant, that any such forms are appropriately understood as meta-concepts, and as such, 
as foundational for objective cognition. 
Chapter Seven addresses the issue of how the forms of judgement are to be identified. I argue 
that these forms ought to be derived from our best theories of grammar. That is, grammar (a 
universal and uniform property of the human species) provides the table of judgement forms, 
understood in Kant’s sense. Although this claim is not decisively established, requiring as it 
would a thesis in its own right, I nevertheless seek to show that it is both plausible and 
attractive: amounting to a viable research program.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
Part I 
 
A SCIENCE OF MAN: THE GENESIS OF 
JUDGEMENT 
 
 
If I were to judge that Sellars was the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century in a room 
full of philosophers, controversy is likely to ensue. Possibly, some of my interlocutors would 
agree; probably, many would disagree, citing the brilliance of Wittgenstein, the importance of 
Frege, or, indeed, the opacity of Sellars’ own writing. Irrespective of the precise arguments, 
the controversy would turn upon the question of whether I judged well or not.  
Suppose that this debate were witnessed by a passive observer, passive in the sense 
that she is utterly disinterested in Sellars’ philosophical credentials. Instead of following the 
debate, what she is observing is me: what I do, what I say etc; she observes my behaviour 
because she wants to understand why I behave in the ways that I do.2 As such, what interests 
her is not the correctness of the judgement, but the judgement itself or rather, the fact that I 
made it. In her eyes, my judgement is part of the data set which her theory needs to 
accommodate, in the same way that it must accommodate other behavioural qualities which I 
exhibit.  
This part of my thesis is concerned with a tradition, beginning with David Hume and 
upheld in the modern era by cognitive scientists, in which judgement is understood and 
treated as by the passive observer. Having observed the judgements people make in the same 
way that one might observe other behavioural qualities, the challenge, according to this 
tradition, is to explain these judgements by tracing their genesis. Following Hume’s lead, I 
shall call this tradition the science of man. 
 
                                                           
2
 That such a theory is plausibly beyond the reaches of human understanding – it would amount to what Noam 
Chomsky calls a ‘theory of everything’ – is irrelevant to the point.  
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Chapter 1. Hume’s Naturalistic Approach 
 
My aim in this chapter is not to vindicate a naturalistic reading of Hume – alternate 
interpretations will be addressed only indirectly – but to work ‘within’ this reading of Hume. 
In particular, I shall underline the internal consistency and coherence of Hume’s naturalism 
by (a) distinguishing it from different philosophical enterprises, and (b) defending it from 
some common objections.     
 
1.1. Aims and method 
Hume begins A Treatise of Human Nature by stating his intention to pursue a science which 
will “introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects”.3 ‘Moral subjects’ 
here denotes simply human beings, rather than a morally praiseworthy subset thereof (Flew, 
1986: 2). In explicitly targeting human beings, Hume means to demarcate the explananda of 
his inquiry from those of other natural sciences which have a much broader purview. Biology 
or physics, for example, provide descriptive laws and generalisations which are applicable 
across the natural world and, for that reason, have nothing specifically to do with moral 
subjects. Of course, physics stipulates the rate at which a man will accelerate having stepped 
off the edge of a cliff, but it does so in the same way for any object, animate or inanimate. In 
contrast to this, Hume is interested in “those respects in which they [human beings] differ 
from other ‘objects of nature’” (Stroud, 1977: 2). The inquiry is directed at those qualities 
which are unique or specific to human beings, or at least those which appear to be so. Rate of 
acceleration is not such a quality. Instead, Hume chooses to focus on certain beliefs in 
matters of fact which people form. The beliefs he targets are fundamental to our day to day 
activity and reasoning, and are apparently human universals. Although Hume tends to speak 
of belief, he finds no distinction between this and judgement and uses the terms 
interchangeably (Treatise: 1.3.VII, fn. 1; cf. Owen, 2003: 17 & fn. 2). My discussion of his 
views shall follow him in this respect. 
While Hume’s inquiry has a much narrower subject matter from that of other natural 
sciences, it adopts the same experimental method of reasoning. Clearly, this method was 
                                                           
3
 My discussion of Hume will be mostly based upon and drawn from the Treatise, particularly Book 1. 
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shorn of the benefits that technological advancement has brought to experimentation in the 
current age. Nevertheless, at the heart of all experimentation is the careful observation of how 
phenomena co-vary in systematic ways with changes in relevant circumstantial and 
situational factors. Such careful observation, Hume hoped, would reveal the formation 
mechanisms responsible for our judgements. The task was to trace the genesis of as many 
judgements as possible back to as few causes as possible, thereby delivering a principled or 
explanatory account of the explananda.  
This model of explanation or intelligibility is perfectly familiar. Ensuring that “all our 
principles are as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and 
explaining all effects from the fewest and simplest causes” (Treatise: intro., xxvi) is integral 
to any scientific inquiry, and it is no coincidence that Hume called his investigation simply a 
‘science of man’. Ever since Smith’s famous papers (1905 &1905a), readings of Hume that 
have placed this science of man at the heart of his philosophy have been labelled 
‘naturalistic’.4 According to this naturalistic reading, Hume is first and foremost interested in 
instigating a positive, scientific program of inquiry rather than propounding sceptical 
conclusions or advancing empiricist theses.5 In other words, it takes seriously Hume’s 
opening statements at the beginning of the Treatise about wanting to apply the experimental 
method to moral subjects, taking this to be the touchstone of his whole philosophy; his 
naturalistic approach is his science of man. Key to this science is a distinction between 
explanation and justification: 
“Hume’s recommendation is to replace endless and fruitless “cogitating” in an 
attempt to give a philosophical justification of our beliefs, with an attempt to find a 
scientific explanation of their origin.” (Biro, 1993: 44-5) 
Just as the passive observer seeks to account for why I make the judgement ‘Sellars is the 
greatest philosopher of the twentieth century’ without concern for whether the judgement is 
correct, so too Hume wants to know why we form the judgements that we form, not whether 
they are correct or not. As a consequence of this, a science of man proceeds in abstraction 
from any normative assessment of our beliefs. By dispensing with the question of the 
                                                           
4
 There is (at least) one other respect in which Hume is commonly said to be a naturalist. Hume argues that 
many of our beliefs are natural in the sense of being inevitable and indispensable (Smith, 1905: 152; Norton, 
1982: 15-19). Nature has not left us a choice in these matters. Although this is absolutely compatible with the 
naturalism of a science of man, neither type of naturalism entails the other, and so they should be held apart. 
5
 Of course, this reading of Hume is perfectly consistent with the presence of empiricist or sceptical arguments 
in the Treatise; these elements are simply viewed as secondary to his naturalistic aims.  
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correctness of our judgements, so too Hume dispenses with the evidential or justificatory 
standards according to which such correctness is established. The justificatory basis of our 
judgements is a matter left to others. For example, when Hume famously asks of inductive 
inferences “whether we are determined by reason to make the transition, or by a certain 
association and relation of perceptions” (Treatise: 1.3.VI, 73), he is posing a question of 
cognitive psychology, not a normative one about their epistemic warrant (Allison, 2008: 
112).6  
It is salutary in this respect that Hume includes in the Treatise a chapter on the reason 
of non-human animals. Indeed, he declares that “when any hypothesis, therefore, is advanced 
to explain a mental operation, which is common to men and beasts, we must apply the same 
hypothesis to both” (Treatise: 1.3.XVI, 138). This is actually a very strong claim and it is far 
from clear that Hume is entitled to it. Setting this aside however, the quote serves to illustrate 
the parity of aims and explanatory standards Hume sees between his science of man on the 
one hand, and sciences of non-human animals on the other. Consider a couple of well 
catalogued facts about frogs. Frogs will attack any object the size of an insect or a worm, its 
natural prey, provided that the object is made to move in a sufficiently convincing manner. 
Similarly, frogs reflexively extend their tongue towards both flies, and objects resembling 
flies. These are distinctive characteristics and ones which any science of the natural 
dispositions and behaviour of a frog would need to target. Scientists are interested in 
explaining this behaviour and this is achieved, at least in part, by investigating the kind visual 
image generated from light striking the retina. Essentially, the challenge is to explain “what 
the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain” (Lettvin, et al., 1959). Crucially however, this 
explanation is distinct from an assessment of when, if at all, a frog’s behaviour is correct or 
successful. Of course, criteria for such an assessment quickly suggest themselves. For 
example, a frog’s act is a success if it catches an insect (still though, will any insect do? what 
if frogs are unable to digest some insect species?) and unsuccessful if it catches an object 
which merely resembles an insect. The point, however, is that such assessment need not be 
addressed by an investigator targeting the causal genesis of the behaviour: a scientist of a frog, 
or of any other animal, can construct adequate explanatory accounts of the relevant behaviour 
without deigning to consider whether the behaviour is successful. So too in the case of 
                                                           
6
 Of course, there is a relationship between the kind of explanatory cognitive psychology Hume is interested in 
and the justificatory considerations an epistemologist might cite. After all, attributing a belief to certain 
formation mechanisms may help determine whether it is justified or not. However, the point is that this question 
of justification is something over and above the explanation itself and one can investigate the latter whilst 
remaining neutral with regards to the former. 
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humans, establishing the origins of our judgements can be addressed without determining 
whether they are correct: 
“…belief-producing processes were [for Hume] neutral with respect to whether the 
beliefs produced are true or false” (Hatfield, 1990: 26; cf. Norton, 1982: 201-208).  
Hume is not at all reticent when it comes to stating the inestimable value of this naturalistic 
approach. It is extraordinary, he says, that this matter has not received more attention given 
that all other sciences rely, to some extent, upon the powers and faculties which underlie 
mans’ capacity for understanding, reasoning and judging. Although some of the “late 
philosophers in England” may have had a hand in its development (Treatise: intro., xx-xxi), 
Hume clearly feels that it has not received anything like the attention that it deserves, 
claiming that the foundation of this science will be “almost entirely new” (Treatise: intro., 
xvi). 
The neglect of this science of man was largely a product of the traditional way of 
conceiving human beings. Ever since the ancient Greeks, man had been understood as a 
fundamentally rational creature. In both the practical and theoretical spheres, human activity 
was thought to be governed, primarily, by the apprehension of relevant reasons.7 Judgements, 
the ‘behavioural qualities’ which would interest Hume so much, were delivered by the 
intellect and relied upon rational insight. Whether or not this was deemed to mark the 
metaphysical essence of man or not, it had significant implications for what a philosophy of 
man could be. In contrast to beasts who, acting only according to the dispositions of their 
organs, could be studied as complex machines (Descartes, 1952: 20), man would not admit of 
such an inquiry. Human beliefs and actions were a matter of the reasons available to the agent 
at the time and so “purely intellectual” (Smith 1905: 165). As Stroud nicely puts it, “any 
‘explanation’ of the beliefs or actions of a distinctively rational agent could therefore do no 
more than show that, on the evidence then available to him, those beliefs or actions were the 
most reasonable ones for that agent to adopt” (Stroud, 1977: 13). Such an ‘explanation’ 
however, would rest upon a philosophical account of what a good reason is, not upon the kind 
of descriptive generalisations delivered by an experimental approach. This foreclosed the 
possibility of a science of man.  
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 This is an oversimplification. It ignores important issues like the possibility of a weak will: can a man fail to 
will what he recognises he has (sufficient or overriding) reason to do?  
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Indeed, this partly accounts for the pre-eminence of epistemology in the work of 
Hume’s predecessors, both empiricist and rationalist alike. Philosophical work was required 
not to explain why men behave in the ways that they do – an unfeasible task - but to establish 
secure epistemic ground for such behaviour. That is, how can reasons be secured as good 
reasons? For example, Descartes begins Rules for the Direction of the Mind with the 
programmatic assertion that “the end of study should be to direct the mind towards the 
enunciation of sound and correct judgements on all matters that come before it.” The main 
prong of this enterprise consisted of showing that thought is appropriately related to the 
external world and given this it was all but inevitable that scepticism would be a threat which 
demanded attention and rebuttal.  
Now, it is not the case that adopting the experimental method with respect to moral 
subjects presupposes, either conceptually or methodologically, that the vision of man as a 
rational being is false.8 It is perfectly possible to establish empirically that people adopt the 
beliefs that they do according to reflection upon relevant reasons.9 Although this finding 
would not show that these reasons are valid or correct – a ball that is only ever in the 
epistemologists’ court – it would reaffirm the rationalistic picture of man governed by the 
apprehension of reasons. What marks out a science of man is not that it assumes the falsity of 
this picture, but that it refuses to accept its accuracy a priori. Everything should be subjected 
to careful observation and experimental method, including how our judgements are delivered. 
Our judgements may be produced by the apprehension of reasons, but on the other hand they 
may be produced via “secret springs and principles” of the mind (Enquiry: 1.15, 93), 
analogous to the ‘occult’ forces Newton had reintroduced to nature. Moreover, since it is 
possible that reason be efficacious with respect to some judgements, but not others, this 
method will have to be applied on a case by case basis.10 As such, Hume’s naturalistic 
approach involved a disavowal of any claim about the essence of the mind (Hatfield, 1990: 
26).  
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 I think that this point is often lost amidst the numerous remarks Hume famously makes regarding the 
subordinate role of reason: that it is a slave to the passions etc. However, such remarks ought to be understood 
as a conclusions or even findings of Hume’s inquiry, rather than bound up in the nature of the inquiry itself. 
Adopting a science of man does not entail that the rationalist vision of man is false, though it may lead to such a 
conclusion. 
9
 Kohlberg’s psychological account of moral judgement is an example of an empirical approach supporting 
rationalism in this way (Kohlberg, 1981) 
10
 Indeed, although Hume is renowned for concluding that, in matters of belief, reason is subordinate to our 
natural propensities, even he accepts that reason produces some of our beliefs: arithmetic relies upon 
demonstration i.e. proofs. In the Enquiry he includes also geometry under this heading. Whether reason is also 
responsible for those relations of ideas which are intuitive as opposed to demonstrative, e.g. ‘white is not black’, 
I set aside (Smith thinks that they are, calling them the products of “rational necessity” (1905: 157)). 
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1.2. Fundamentals 
The theory of ideas states that to be in a particular mental state is to have a mental particular 
or an array of such particulars ‘in mind’. Any type of experience which is continuous over 
time is constituted by a succession of these reified mental objects. Allison calls this model of 
thought that of ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ (Allison, 2008: 6). This model was adopted by 
Hume’s empiricist predecessors such as Locke and Berkley, and it is clear that he followed 
them in this respect. 
 “We may observe... that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its 
perceptions or impressions and ideas and that external objects become known to us 
only by those perceptions they occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all 
this is nothing but to perceive.” (Treatise: 1.2.VI, 56)  
In the context of Hume’s science of man, his theory of ideas is a “fundamental assumption” 
(Smith, 1905: 159, fn. 2). This is because it constitutes the theoretical framework within 
which he seeks to explain our judgements. ‘Establishing their genesis’ means tracing them 
back to their origins within this mental domain.  
Hume calls all constituents of the mental domain “perceptions”. All perceptions, with 
the exception of the passions, have content; that is, they have accuracy or veridicality 
conditions (Garrett, 2006: 302-306). The most prominent classificatory divide amongst them 
is that of impressions and ideas. Impressions form a very broad category, including 
sensations, emotions and passions. The essential mark of an impression, that which properly 
distinguishes it as an impression, is the force or liveliness or violence (Hume uses the terms 
interchangeably and, following Allison, I shall abbreviate them to ‘FLV’) with which they 
impose themselves upon consciousness.11 Impressions constitute that part of our mental life 
called ‘sensing’ or ‘perceiving’. For example, that I find myself confronted by a laptop, with 
a fragment of a PhD thesis on the screen is determined by the array of impressions I have ‘in 
mind’. In other words, impressions constitute that sensory stream to which a subject is only a 
                                                           
11
 Martin (2006: 27-28) notes that Hume’s use of FLV is ambiguous. It could denote either a phenomenological 
quality of how percepts ‘appear to the mind’s eye’ i.e. vividly or clearly etc, or it could denote the psychological 
‘momentum’ of the percepts, which better fits the use of the term ‘force’. David Landy (2008) urges that FLV 
should be understood in the latter sense: functionally, as concerning the behaviour of perceptions. My view is 
that the most natural way to read Hume is that while percepts with greater FLV do function in a certain way, this 
is because they exhibit especially vivid phenomenological qualities.   
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passive recipient. In Kantian terms, the capacity for impressions is purely receptive. Short of 
closing my eyes or turning around, I cannot dispel the impression of my laptop and, in turn, if 
I do close my eyes, I cannot conjure the impression through my own volition. What I would 
conjure in this case would not an impression, but the idea of a laptop. Ideas, for Hume, are 
images which are utilised in thought, reasoning and language (Treatise, 1.3.X).12 As the 
essential mark of impressions is the amount of FLV they exhibit, so, correlatively, ideas are 
distinguished by their relative lack of FLV. They are images which are ‘fainter’ or ‘less vivid’ 
than impressions. 
 There are three important points to make about Hume’s distinction of impressions and 
ideas. Firstly, although they are distinguished, they are not so on the basis of type or kind; the 
difference resides only in the ‘amount’ of FLV they exhibit. Indeed, Hume notes that 
although the line between impression and idea is generally a clear one, “in particular 
instances they may very nearly approach to each other” (Treatise: 1.1.I, 7). Secondly, since it 
is impressions and ideas which characterise sensing and thinking respectively, this means that 
the difference between sensation and thought is similarly one of degree, not kind. Thirdly, 
while Hume’s characterisation of perceptions in terms of FLV was not an innovation (e.g. 
Berkeley, 1710: 78), what did set Hume’s view apart was how the FLV of a perception was 
taken to be no guide as to its correctness. At no point do we find Hume claiming that the 
more lively/vivid/clear a percept is the more assured we can be of its veridicality. The 
temptation to draw epistemic conclusions (or even indications) from the clarity of a percept 
was one which Hume assiduously resisted – as would be expected of a philosopher primarily 
interested in a science of man. By contrast: 
“I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which 
we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true.” (Descartes, 1637: III, 52) 
Alongside the impression/idea dichotomy, Hume employs another which cuts across 
it. Both impressions and ideas can be either simple or complex. Simple impressions and ideas 
admit of no distinction or separation because they have no constituents. For example, one 
might have an impression of an apple, but it must be complex for it can be separated into 
components pertaining to its taste, colour and smell etc. Similarly for ideas, they are complex 
if they can be broken up into constituents, and simple if not. In other words, a percept is 
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 Arguably, Hume also allowed for a small class of non-imagistic ideas – ‘relative ideas’ (see Flage, 1990: 42-
51).  
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complex if and only if it is decomposable, otherwise it is simple. This atomistic account of 
mental particulars is governed by what is called in the literature Hume’s ‘copy principle’: 
“...all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, 
which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent”  (Treatise: 1.1.I, 
9)  
This principle involves two theses: 
(i) Every simple idea resembles an impression  
“The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our 
impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and 
vivacity.” (Treatise: 1.1.I, 8) 
For every simple idea there is a resembling impression. For example, my idea ‘red’ resembles 
an impression ‘red’ which I have experienced.  
(ii) Every simple idea is causally dependent upon a simple impression  
That some simple impressions and some simple ideas resemble each other naturally suggests 
a dependency relation holding between them. Hume argues that for any resembling 
impression-idea pair, the impression always appears in experience prior to the acquisition of 
the idea i.e. the impression ‘red’ precedes the resembling idea. This temporal ordering 
establishes that it must be the impression which causes the resembling idea and not vice 
versa.13  
It is critical to underline that the copy principle is restricted to simple ideas and 
impressions. Hume realises that people can have complex ideas for which there has not been 
any resembling complex impression. For example, people can entertain complex ideas such 
as spiteful giraffes and golden mountains without having had any resembling impression. The 
distinction between those complex ideas which are copied from complex impressions and 
those which are not maps onto the distinction of the two faculties which are responsible for 
our ideas: the memory and the imagination. Hume takes it as evident that ideas of the 
memory have greater FLV than those of the imagination, but the most significant difference 
resides in this copying issue. Complex ideas of the memory are copied from corresponding 
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 This view places Hume firmly in the empiricist camp, since it is equivalent to the claim that there are no 
innate ideas (cf. Allison, 2008: 20-21). 
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complex impressions. Although we can recognise the simple parts of the idea, the memory 
does not have the liberty to separate or reorder them in ways contrary to the impression from 
which it was copied anymore than a historian can rearrange past events. The ideas of the 
memory are cast in the stone of the original impression. In this respect, the imagination could 
not be more different:  
“…all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in 
whatever form it pleases” (Treatise: 1.1.IV, 13).  
What for the memory are unbreakable bonds, the imagination is able to dissolve ‘as it 
pleases’, decomposing any complex idea into its simple parts. From this, it is at perfect 
liberty to compound and recompose these materials into complex ideas of any form or order. 
Notice that this liberty does not amount to creating new simple ideas, an impossibility given 
that all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions, but has to do only with the way they 
are put together. It is this power that enables us to entertain the ideas of winged horses and 
monstrous giants, of which we have had no corresponding impressions. A useful metaphor 
for this account of the imagination is a child playing with building blocks. All complex 
structures are composed of simple blocks which the child can transfer from one structure to 
another, detach from a given structure or break up entirely and reconstruct in an original way. 
The only limitation is the blocks the child has to play with.  
This is not a complete account of the imagination. The liberty of separating any 
simple ideas and reuniting them in any form, does not explain the regularity of our ideas. 
Were our ideas entirely loose and unconnected, it would be mere chance that would move us 
from one to the other. Hume finds it obvious that this cannot be correct: 
 “...even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay, in our very dreams, we 
shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that 
there was still a connection upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each 
other” (Enquiry: 3.1, 101) 
There must be principle(s) of the imagination which ensure the cohesiveness or regularity of 
our ideas. Although they cannot be so strong as to make two ideas inseparable, for this would 
violate the liberty of the imagination, there must be a “gentle force” or “a kind of attraction” 
which pushes certain ideas together. The force is that of association. The qualities of ideas 
which trigger their association in the imagination are: resemblance, contiguity (spatial and 
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temporal) and cause and effect, which Hume characterises also as ‘natural relations’. These 
qualities prompt the associative connection of ideas in the imagination, serving to tie together 
what would otherwise be disparate objects of the mind.  
 
1.3. Against judgement-as-predication 
If the theory of ideas provides the theoretical framework for Hume’s naturalistic program, a 
crucial supplement to this framework is Hume’s conception of judgement. Nor should this be 
surprising given that an investigation of the genesis of a judgement can only be regarded as 
successful insofar as there is some prior apprehension of what the investigation is tracing the 
genesis of.  
Hume’s predecessors had understood judgement to be the separation or combination 
of multiple ideas. For example, Locke (1690: IV.XIV, 334) considered judgement to consist 
of “putting ideas together or separating them from one another in the mind”, which is a 
matter of how “the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree” (Ibid).  For instance, the 
judgement ‘white is not black’ is a matter of recognising or “seeing” that the ideas ‘white’ 
and ‘black’ do not agree, in a certain respect, and so separating them.14 Locke proposed four 
relations of agreement/disagreement betwixt ideas: identity, necessary entailment, 
coexistence, and real existence (Locke, 1690: IV.I, 255).15 To recognise that two ideas agree 
or disagree in one of these respects i.e. that they are related in a certain way, is to unite or 
separate them in a judgement. Similarly, the Port-Royal logicians considered that after 
forming ideas, “we unite those which belong together by affirming one idea of another; we 
separate those which do not belong together by denying one idea of another. To judge is to 
affirm or to deny.” (Arnauld, 1662: 108) [my emphasis]. This uniting or separating of ideas 
corresponds to the contemporary notion of predication. For example, in the judgement, 
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 Locke’s identification of ‘uniting or separating ideas’ and ‘recognising/perceiving ideas to agree or disagree’ 
is confusing since the former seems to imply an activity on the part of the agent, apparently lacking in the latter 
case. Nevertheless, they are interchangeable for Locke. To unite two ideas is to recognise a relation of 
agreement holding of them and to recognise such a relation is to unite them.   
15
 In Locke’s terminology, strictly speaking, only the relation of ideas by means of coexistence and real 
existence would be a judgement. This is because Locke draws an epistemic distinction between judgement and 
knowledge. As Owen (2003: 17) puts it, “judgement is the admitting or receiving of any proposition as true, 
without certain knowledge that it is so.” Essentially, judgement concerns those relations between ideas that can 
only be probable (coexistence, real existence), and so lack the epistemic security of demonstrative or intuitive 
knowledge (identity, entailment). However, in the context of Hume’s discussion, what is of interest is the 
difference between conception and judgement and consequently, it should be clear that by ‘judgement’, I denote 
also Lockean knowledge.   
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‘ducks can fly’ the idea, ‘can fly’ is predicated of ‘ducks’. According to Hume’s predecessors, 
judgement is a matter of predicating one idea of another (cf. Anderson, 2008: 92-94). Call 
this the predication theory of judgement. Hume, however, vehemently opposed this theory of 
judgement. 
“We may here occasion to observe a very remarkable error which... is universally 
received by all logicians. This error consists of the vulgar division of the acts of the 
understanding into conception, judgement and reason, and in the definitions we give 
of them. Conception is defined to be the simple survey of one or more ideas: 
judgement to be the separating or uniting of one or more ideas: Reasoning to be the 
separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others.” (Treatise: 
1.3.VII. fn. 1) 
Hume provides two arguments against the predication theory of judgement. The first 
concerns the matter of existential judgements. Hume argues that we do not have a clear 
notion of ‘existence’ as a distinct idea. In an insightful passage in which he largely pre-empts 
Kant’s more renowned discussion of the matter, Hume argues that to conceive of an object as 
existing does not add any extra quality to it (Treatise: 1.3.VII). It follows that in case of 
existential judgements, e.g. ‘God exists’, ‘God is’, ‘It is raining’, there is only one idea 
involved. Given that we can judge of single ideas, judgement cannot be a matter of separating 
or uniting ideas.  
 Secondly, Hume argues that even where a judgement clearly does involve multiple 
ideas it cannot be their predication which distinguishes it as a judgement. The reason for this 
is that the predication theory cannot adequately explain the difference between incredulity 
and judgement. Incredulity, for Hume, includes both the denial of a proposition, and the mere 
conception or supposition of a proposition and I shall treat these topics separately. Consider a 
case where John and Bill disagree over whether Caesar died in his bed; John judges that he 
did and Bill denies it. Hume points out that despite his denial, Bill clearly understands the 
relevant proposition and forms the same ideas as John: that Caesar died in his bed; were this 
not the case, it would not be a case of genuine disagreement, but of two interlocutors talking 
past each other. There must be some content, ‘Caesar died in his bed’, which both John and 
Bill converge upon, and which can be fixed independently of John’s believing it and Bill’s 
denying it. Wayne Martin (2006: 35) calls this ‘Hume’s identity condition’. Consequently, 
the possibility of disagreement shows what the difference between incredulity and judgement 
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is not: it cannot be a matter of the content grasped. As such, a distinction can be drawn 
between:  
(a) The content of a possible judgement/denial 
(b) A judgement16  
Although judgement or denial obviously presupposes a grasp of whatever content is being 
judged or denied, the critical point is that it is no feature of the content which determines 
whether it is judged of or denied; these are separate issues: (a) is independent of (b).  
However, this distinction is impossible on the predication theory of judgement. 
According to this, by judging that Caesar died in his bed, John is predicating ‘died in his bed’ 
of ‘Caesar’. On the other hand, by denying the proposition, Bill is separating the ideas ‘died 
in his bed’ and ‘Caesar’. However, this means that there is no common content shared by 
both John and Bill, no combination of ideas apprehended by both. In other words, the 
difference between judgement and incredulity is explained in terms of a difference in content: 
(a) and (b) are run together. Yet, this is precisely what the possibility of disagreement shows 
cannot be correct.  
A parallel argument, one which does not involve disagreement, can be developed with 
respect to the difference between the supposition of certain content and judgement. Imagine 
that I begin a lecture by announcing the thesis to be defended: ‘Sellars is the greatest 
philosopher of the twentieth century’. It is surely possible for someone in the audience to 
begin by merely entertaining or supposing this thesis and then come to believe it over the 
course of the lecture (presumably due to the eloquence of my arguments). Yet, according to 
the predication theory of judgement, this is impossible. Since judgement is simply the 
combination of ideas, either the audience member predicates ‘is the greatest philosopher of 
the twentieth century’ of ‘Sellars’ at the beginning of the lecture – in which case she judges it 
rather than merely entertains it – or she does not, in which case there is nothing for her to 
entertain. As in the case of disagreement, the problem is evidently that the predication theory 
obliges us to view the difference between judgement and supposition as one of the content 
formed or grasped. Once these two issues are confounded, there are no means by which to fix 
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 There is clearly a sense then, in which Hume propounded an early version of Frege’s famous distinction 
between (1) the apprehension of a thought and, (2) the recognition of the truth of a thought – judgement (Frege, 
1956: 294). Nevertheless, Rodl (2009: 438-439) is right to argue that this should not be overstated. For Hume, 
the distinction applies only to judgements of matters of fact, not those concerning relations of ideas (essentially, 
he preserves a predicational account of judgements concerning relations of ideas: a nuance I have set aside here).  
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a notion of content which can at t1 be merely supposed and at t2, judged. Indeed, in Locke’s 
account, the notion of judgement is explicitly built into the mechanism of content formation. 
As already noted, for Locke, the combination or separation of ideas (predication) is a matter 
of perceiving or recognising that they agree with each other. Yet, in this context, ‘perceiving 
a relation of agreement’ just seems to mean ‘assent or judge that ideas agree’. So judgement 
is entwined with predication from the outset: 
“… predication isn’t [for Locke] distinct from affirmation or denial; understanding 
propositional content isn’t distinct from knowing or judging it to be true” (Owen, 
2003: 17) 
What Hume realised is that the difference between incredulity and judgement cannot be one 
of content. This essentially presented him with a wholly original question, one necessarily 
neglected by his judgement-as-predication predecessors: “wherein consists the difference 
betwixt incredulity [i.e. predication] and belief?” (Treatise: 1.3.VII, 77-78). 
Hume’s answer to this question is disarmingly simple. Since the difference between 
judgement and incredulity cannot reside in the content of ideas, Hume concludes that it must 
only be the manner in which ideas are conceived which separates belief from incredulity. A 
belief is simply a strong and lively idea. To believe that the sun is shining is to ‘vividly’ 
picture the sun shining.17 In this way, judgement is not a distinctive product of the 
understanding, but is properly resolved into conception (Treatise: 1.3.VII, fn. 1). 
“When I am convinced of any principle, ‘tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly 
upon me.” (Treatise: 1.3.VIII, 83) 
This theory of judgement is significant since it determines the criteria which a successful 
explanation of a judgement must meet. In particular, since a judgement or belief is simply a 
very lively and vivid idea, an adequate tracing of the genesis of such a judgement must 
determine: 
1.  How is the relevant idea acquired? 
2. What confers the requisite FLV rendering the idea a judgement?  
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 This conception of belief/judgement has been subject to a barrage of criticism from commentators (e.g. 
Bennett, 1966: 54-5; Stroud, 1977:70-72), although Zangwill (1998) points out that the alternatives appealed to 
by critics are problematic also. 
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1.4. A worry about the theory of ideas  
There can be little doubt that advances in philosophy and science over the past two hundred 
and fifty years have left Hume’s account of the mental furnishings of moral subjects looking 
desperately simplistic. Such a fact is neither surprising nor, it seems to me, especially 
interesting. What is interesting however, is the validity of the general theoretical framework 
of which Hume’s specific proposals are an example: the theory of ideas. Specifically, is it 
legitimate, given naturalistic aims and method, to explain the genesis of judgements in terms 
of a succession of mental particulars and relations holding of them? The answer generally 
given to this question in the literature is no. In fact, it has been common for commentators to 
see a deep inconsonance between Hume’s science of man on the one hand, and his theory of 
ideas on the other. It is widely asserted that Hume’s theory of ideas and his naturalism are 
incompatible in the sense that the former distorts, warps, and is generally inimical to 
naturalistic inquiry. The theory of ideas is a fetter upon Hume’s naturalism, something which 
a purely naturalistic approach would be free of.18  
“One thing that works against a consistent and comprehensive naturalism in Hume’s 
own thought is his unshakable attachment to the Theory of Ideas.” (Stroud, 1977: 224) 
Call this the inconsistency thesis (IT). In this section and the following section, I shall 
address, in turn, the two main arguments which have been proposed in favour of IT and aim 
to refute them both. Far from being inimical to his naturalism, I think that Hume has good 
reasons for adopting the theory of ideas and utilising it as the theoretical framework within 
which the genesis of judgements is framed. Specifically, the theory of ideas can and should 
be interpreted simply as a thesis about how human beings are to be understood if they are to 
be understood at all and as such, it is integral to Hume’s science of man. 
 
The first argument which has been advanced in favour of IT concerns the nature or 
metaphysics of ideas. Specifically, some commentators have thought that the mentalistic 
character of theory of ideas renders it naturalistically unpalatable. For example, Howard 
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 Stroud, (1977, 2006); Mounce, (1999); Rupert Read (2000: 170) talks sweepingly of Hume’s “(on almost any 
reading we are used to) ‘unfortunate’ methodology centred around his so-called ‘theory of ideas’”. The only 
philosopher I am aware of who has actively argued the contrary is Fodor (2003). 
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Mounce, in an otherwise positive assessment of Hume’s science of man, laments the 
“mentalism” which the theory of ideas imposes upon the inquiry: “Hume treats an idea as a 
kind of object, differing only in that it occurs in the mind.” This is said to be a “difficulty”, 
the problem apparently being that “the empiricist reduces the mental to what is in the mind... 
In short, he dissociates it from the public realm and associates it with the private” (Mounce, 
1999: 29) 
According to Mounce, a naturalistic account of man will not admit of a murky, 
unobservable realm of mental particulars in ‘peoples’ heads’, but will replace these with 
publically observable phenomena. Specifically, rather than thinking of an idea as a private 
image before the mind’s eye, ideas should be understood as capacities to do certain things in 
certain circumstances. What exactly these capacities are is open to debate. One possibility is 
that they are recognitional in character. In this case, to possess the idea of a fox is to possess 
the ability to distinguish or sort foxes from non-foxes. Another possibility is that to possess 
an idea is to be able to draw certain inferences e.g. if x is a fox, x is a mammal etc. However 
this ‘doing’ is construed, the crucial tenet is that idea possession is to be identified with the 
ability to function or act in certain ways in certain contexts: that is, it is a dispositional 
property. As Pears (1990: 25) puts it:  
“When a concept manifests itself as a particular image occurring in a person’s mind at 
a particular time, it cannot be just identified with that image... [Rather, we] have to 
add that it is only the image with its special function.” 
Equally, Stroud (1977: 227) insists that we do not have any clear sense of what an idea is 
unless it is identified with a unique “function, or point” (see also Flew, 1986: 25).  The 
significance of this functionalist proposal can be sharpened by contrasting it with an alternate 
and, prima facie, appealing way to understand the relationship between the possession of an 
idea and the performance of a certain function. For example, one might think that just as a 
lumberjack is able to cut down a tree due to his possession of a chainsaw, so too one is able 
to perform a function, such as sorting foxes from non-foxes, precisely because one possesses 
the requisite idea (for instance, a mental image of some sort). In this case, the possession of 
the idea enables a function, but is no more constituted by that function than the lumberjack’s 
possession of a chainsaw is constituted by his ability to cut down trees.  
It is precisely this picture which Mounce and others find pernicious and want to 
replace. According to their functionalist proposal, idea possession should be likened to 
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knowing how to ride a bike. An agent knows how to ride a bike if they can perform certain 
acts: can peddle without losing balance, can accelerate and brake in appropriate situations etc. 
To be able to perform in these ways simply is to know how to ride a bike; there is no extra 
question of ‘knowledge possession’ to be answered over and above the ability to so act; the 
function constitutes the possession. Similarly for ideas, the functionalists argue that to 
possess an idea simply is to be able to act or function in certain ways. Possession and function 
are not merely conditionally connected, but identified. This identification forces ideas from 
the private confines of the mind and into the bright light of the public domain. If to possess 
an idea is to be able to do certain things, idea possession can be subject to third party 
observation and verification. 
This functionalist proposal is persistently recommended as a way to save Hume’s 
science of man from the perfidious spectre of mental particulars. The underlying premise is 
that if these theoretical constructs are not, at some point, traded in for an ‘act-based’ or 
‘function-based’ coinage then they are naturalistically unacceptable. However, why should 
we accept this premise? Despite the popularity of the functionalist alternative in the literature, 
it is hard to find explicit discussion of why or how Hume violates his naturalism by 
postulating mental particulars. For example, Flew (1986: 25) suggests that Hume never fully 
recognised that “the keys [to understanding] lie in abilities and dispositions to speak and 
behave”, persisting instead with mental imagery. However, Flew offers no explanation of 
why the keys lie in abilities and dispositions. Similarly, Mounce says that:  
“On the empiricist view, an idea is an image, which occurs ‘in the mind’. Only later 
do we give it outward expression in language. The process evidently runs the other 
way. Certainly I can think to myself, without expressing my thoughts; but then I have 
already learned to express myself in language.” (Mounce, 1999: 29) 
Since ‘language’ here denotes something like the ability to engage in a type of publically 
observable behaviour i.e. produce utterances or marks in appropriate circumstances, this is a 
(linguistic) formulation of the functionalist thesis. Yet, as far as I can see, there is nothing 
“evident” about this at all and Mounce makes only the briefest of attempts to support this 
assertion. He argues that even though it is possible to read silently, reading aloud is the 
“primary activity” since this is how everyone learns to read. Similar points are said to apply 
in the case of ideas. However, in what sense reading aloud is supposed to be ‘primary’, and 
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why, besides, it is a suitable analogy for ideas (many people cannot read, all people form 
ideas), he does not comment upon.  
I think that this functionalist critique has been underpinned, at least partly, by a 
mistaken conception of what Hume’s naturalism amounts to. Specifically, it is conflated with 
a naturalism of a more contemporary philosophical hue. Nowadays, naturalism in, say, the 
philosophy of mind or language typically involves a commitment to the ontological primacy 
of a certain scientific vocabulary, usually physics i.e. it is closely tied to some form of 
Physicalism (Cabrera, 2011: 46-47). The great challenge for the philosophical naturalist is 
whether our ordinary thought and discourse can be reconciled with this ontological 
commitment. That is, people talk and think, or at least appear to talk and think, about things 
like value, modality, meaning, mental properties. The defining problematic of this naturalism 
is whether these domains of speech, thought and practice can be accommodated or, as Huw 
Price puts it, ‘placed’,  in a world which is solely comprised of a physical ontology (Price, 
2004).19 How can these vast tracts of human experience be shown to be legitimate without 
relying upon an implausible ontology of entities? Or does a ‘naturalistic’ ontology render 
much of our day to day practice and common sense thought erroneous? 
Now, if this were the type of naturalism inherent to Hume’s science of man, there 
may be good reason to suppose that his postulation of mental particulars is unacceptable on 
ontological grounds and should be replaced with descriptions of behaviour or dispositions to 
behave.20 However, the difference between Hume’s science of man and this type of 
naturalism should be evident. For one thing, Hume’s eschewal of epistemic concerns means 
that he is quite immune to this ‘placement’ challenge. He is not questioning how our 
everyday talk and practices involving, for example, causal necessity can be ‘placed’ in the 
world (see, for example, Treatise: 1.3.XIV). More crucially, there is no trace of an 
ontological commitment in the Treatise. Indeed, in positing laws of association Hume was 
tacitly repudiating the Physicalism of the day which was founded upon the idea of contact 
mechanics (Hinzen, 2006: 6-9). Just as Newton had reintroduced ‘occult’ forces to explain 
the behaviour of bodies in nature, Hume was pursuing analogous “secret springs and 
principles” of the mind which determine the behaviour peculiar to moral subjects (Enquiry: 
1.15, 93). At best, Hume was agnostic about whether these secret springs could be reduced to 
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 To be clear, although the terminology is Price’s, it is not a problem he endorses or accepts.  
20
 Or indeed, something else altogether e.g. neural activity. 
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a more primitive scientific vocabulary. He says that they are “original qualities of human 
nature, which I pretend not to explain” (Treatise: 1.1.IV, 15).  
Hatfield (1990: 16-17) demarcates the naturalism of Hume’s science of man by 
labelling it ‘methodological naturalism’, and contrasts it with the ‘metaphysical naturalism’ 
of the contemporary philosophical scene.21 For Hume, something is naturalistic if it is 
motivated by the naturalistic method: one of careful observation and experimentation. That is, 
what is natural is what features in our best scientific theories. It follows that if Hume’s theory 
of ideas is to be shown to be inconsistent with his science of man, it is naturalism of the 
methodological kind, not the metaphysical which must be targeted.22 Yet, it is clear that 
perceptions do explanatory work for Hume. For example, Hume was keenly aware that we 
are capable of a vast number of thoughts, many of which, maybe most of which, we have had 
no experience of e.g. golden mountains, spiteful giraffes. He accounted for this by saying that 
while our experience is indeed limited and fixed, it supplies us with atomistic mental 
elements with which we can construct the most bewildering array of thoughts. Similarly, our 
stream of thought adheres to a certain order or regularity which is a product of our experience. 
If my mother always used to feed me pomegranate and apple slices for dessert, the thought of 
one will naturally prompt the thought of the other. This is surely not because there is special 
link between pomegranates and apple slices, but only a link between my ideas of them. 
Furthermore, according to Hume, a framework of this sort enables one to make substantive 
insights into the origins of our beliefs (some examples of which I shall discuss in Chapter 
two). Ultimately, the plausibility of the theoretical framework Hume adopts “rests upon the 
success of his explanatory program” (Flage, 1990: 36).23  
Given this, Hume’s postulation of mental particulars can be understood in abductive 
terms, as an inference to the best explanation of certain facts about human beings. Insofar as 
they play an explanatory role in a science of man, they are as natural as any other 
unobservable entity postulated by a scientific theory. More generally, this aspect of the theory 
of ideas is just a claim about how human beings are to be understood if they are to be 
understood at all, and consequently, cannot be used as an argument in favour of IT. As Fodor 
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 Alternatively, adopting Price’s (2004) distinction of ‘subject naturalism’ and object naturalism’, we can say 
that Hume’s science of man is subject naturalist but not object naturalist (a selection Price himself recommends). 
22
 From here on in, ‘naturalism’ will refer to methodological naturalism, except where otherwise specified. 
23
 These explanatory considerations bear more than a passing resemblance to many of those appealed to by 
Fodor in support of his Representational Theory of mind, according to which thought involves the manipulation 
of mental particulars. For example, in order to account for the productivity of thought (pace Hume), Fodor 
(2003: 135) argues that it is necessary to postulate a realm of mental particulars which compose.  
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(2003: 8) puts it, “Hume saw that accepting... the “Theory of Ideas” is central to constructing 
an empirically adequate account of cognition”. 
Two clarifications are in order. Firstly, none of this entails that the theory of ideas 
really is central to an empirically adequate account of cognition. Hume, not to mention Fodor, 
might just be wrong about this; perhaps an empirically adequate account of cognition need 
not make reference to mental particulars, but can rely instead of the kind of dispositional 
traits so commonly recommended by Hume commentators. However, it should be clear that 
this amounts to no more than the virtual truism that any scientific thesis is open to doubt, is 
never epistemically necessary, and is always at risk of being displaced by alternate theories; 
none of this renders a theory non-naturalistic, and nor can it do so with respect to the theory 
of ideas. Secondly, I stated at the outset of this section that I wanted to defend not the details 
of Hume’s theory of ideas, but the consistency of this kind of theoretical framework with his 
naturalism. Crucially, nothing I have said entails or rests upon the legitimacy of Hume’s 
specific conception of ideas as images.24  
 
1.5. Another worry about the theory of ideas 
Even if Hume’s metaphysics of ideas is naturalistically acceptable, this does not address the 
most prominent objection to the theory of ideas. This objection concerns the empiricist model 
of perception enshrined in the theory. According to the theory of ideas, being in a mental 
state is to have a particular mental atom or arrays of atoms before the ‘mind’s eye’ and this 
includes perceptual states. On this view, to be in such a state, it is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition that one have a certain kind of mental object, a lively and vivid image or 
impression of sensation, ‘in mind’. As such, Hume’s model of perception is a type of sense 
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 There are a whole cluster of related problems for this view. One especially pertinent problem concerns the 
possibility of abstract ideas. Roughly, images seem too fine grained to allow for abstract ideas. For example, it 
is hard to see how the thought ‘A killed B’ could be a complex image, because an image would necessarily 
depict the manner of killing. What would a thought ‘A killed B’, unspecified for manner of killing e.g. stabbing, 
shooting, etc., look like (Jackendoff, 1996: 10-11)? Recognising this problem, Hume does propose a theory of 
abstract ideas which is clearly aimed at addressing this difficulty. Hume’s theory of abstract ideas states (a) 
there is no idea which is truly abstract, i.e. unspecified with respect to certain properties of the idea, e.g., the 
colour of a cat, since “’tis utterly impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without forming a precise 
notion of its degrees”, and (b) instead, there are resemblance classes of particular ideas which, linked by a 
common name, are ‘revived’, though not all actually present before the mind, by the utterance of the term 
(Treatise: 1.1.VII, 19). Even setting aside the difficulty regarding abstract ideas however, there are numerous 
other problems with the view that ideas are images, such as how to explain logically complex representations, or 
the representation of numbers. 
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datum theory. It is widely agreed that Hume accepts this model unquestioningly, as a 
foundational premise of his inquiry: 
“...Hume never seriously considers any evidence for or against the theory of ideas” 
(Stroud, 1977: 111; see also, Flew, 1986: 14-29) 
In the context of IT, the crucial issue is not merely whether this model is plausible or 
implausible, but whether it is inconsistent with a naturalistic inquiry. In other words, does it 
affect or determine, in some significant sense, the contours of Hume’s naturalism? Such a 
determination is suggested by Stroud’s comment that in Hume’s science of man, 
“Flesh and blood human beings as they walk the earth do not come into the story at all. 
Nor does the earth for that matter, or any of the objects that naturally exist in it.” 
(Stroud, 2006: 346) 
Hume goes to great lengths detailing the character and properties of our perceptions. But of 
non-perceptual objects, events and properties, Hume has almost nothing to say. Hume talks of 
impressions of chairs, but not of chairs; of impressions of apples, but not of apples. For 
example, nearly a third of way the way into the Treatise Hume springs the question, ‘why do 
we attribute to objects an existence distinct from our mind and perception?’ This is despite 
spending the previous hundred pages freely discussing our impressions of letters, fires and 
billiard balls. Similarly, all positive discussion of relations is limited to those which hold only 
between perceptions. Ideas are copied from impressions; ideas can be compared by means of 
resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity, quality, contrariety and causality (Treatise: 
1.1.V). Yet, of relations between impressions and non-perceptual objects e.g. a causal relation, 
Hume is strikingly silent. It is hard to overstate the significance this eschewal of non-
perceptual objects has upon the overall character of Hume’s naturalistic enterprise. Hume is 
interested in a “descriptive – and explanatory – science” (Biro, 1993: 38), but the only thing 
which does any describing or explaining are our own perceptions. Our judgements are 
explained by tracing their genesis back to our ideas and their association. In turn, ideas are 
copied from impressions. Yet, here the explanatory buck stops. Impressions comprise a 
primitive level of theoretical analysis for Hume. Call this Hume’s constraint (HC).  
“Nothing in nature is called on to explain our beliefs. Or rather... nothing beyond 
momentary and fleeting perceptions and those principles of the imagination that hold 
in the mental realm of the comings and goings of perceptions.” (Stroud, 2006: 345) 
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HC seems to deprive Hume of the resources which an adequate science of moral subjects 
surely requires. For example, my current behaviour presumably has something to do with the 
fact that there is a desk with a computer on it in front of me. Yet, all Hume could say is that I 
have the complex impression of a desk with a computer atop it. Surely a more complete 
naturalistic account would make reference to the desk itself and achieve greater explanatory 
depth thereby!  
This constraint upon Hume’s naturalism is attributed to his theory of ideas, or more 
specifically, the model of perception which derives from it. To say that perception is simply a 
matter of mental impressions being ‘before the mind’s eye’, is to say, so goes the objection, 
that moral subjects are only ever directed or non-inferentially acquainted with their own 
perceptions. Knowledge of anything non-perceptual can only be achieved via inference from 
these perceptions.25 However, once non-inferential epistemic access is restricted to our own 
perceptions, we can never get in ‘behind’ or ‘underneath’ them to make direct contact with a 
non-mental reality. According to this picture, instead of our perceptions affording us an 
opening unto the world, they screen our thought from it.  This is, of course, the famous veil of 
appearance. According to this objection then, call it the epistemic objection, it is Hume’s 
theory of ideas which limits Hume’s naturalism to the perceptual domain. The theory comes 
at the expense of the objects we ordinarily take ourselves to encounter in experience: the kind 
of objects which, prima facie, we would expect a science of man to appeal to. HC is simply a 
consequence of Hume’s model of perception which is, in turn, an unjustified presumption on 
Hume’s part. As Stroud (2006: 345) puts it, theory of ideas is a “troubling constraint upon 
Hume’s naturalism. It is not a constraint upon naturalism as such, or naturalism in every 
form, but on Hume’s naturalism in particular.” A complete naturalistic program would make 
reference to such objects and therefore a complete naturalistic program is inconsistent with 
the theory of ideas. Indeed, this was essentially how Reid saw the matter. According to Reid, 
the theory of ideas is a poisonous element which inevitably corrupts Hume’s conclusions: “it 
[the theory of ideas] had a specious appearance of both innocence and beauty; but ... carried 
in its belly death and destruction” (Reid, 1764: 75-76). Reid’s proposed solution was to 
dispense with the theory of ideas and pursue a naturalistic approach which, most notably, 
appealed to the everyday objects of common sense (cf. Norton, 1982: 192-200; Williams, 
2004: 295). 
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 Hume is often said to have taken the empiricist views of his predecessors to their logical and sceptical 
conclusions by arguing that there is no epistemic grounds for moving from our perceptions to what is non-
perceptual.  
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I think that this objection completely misconstrues the relationship between Hume’s 
model of perception and his naturalism. I will begin my argument with reasons to think that 
the relation, as portrayed by the epistemic objection, is mistaken. Subsequently, I shall 
develop an alternate interpretation.  The point of departure for this argument is some 
comments Hume makes in the Treatise. Although, as I have noted, Hume does not engage in 
any positive discussion of non-perceptual objects, he does make some ‘negative’ remarks 
which are very important:  
 “Tis certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere, and that since 
the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, 
which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. As these depend 
upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them wou’d lead me too far 
from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy.” 
(Treatise: 2.1.I, 213) 
Furthermore, he elsewhere reinforces this theme, suggesting that questions regarding the 
origins of impressions or sensations are properly left to “anatomists and natural philosophers” 
(Treatise: 1.1.II, 12). These statements are highly indicative. Firstly, they are incompatible 
with the idea that Hume’s model of perception constrains naturalistic inquiry in the sense of 
foreclosing epistemic access to non-perceptual objects. If this were really how Hume 
understood the ramifications of this model, we would not expect him to advise us that 
anatomists can investigate the causes of our impressions. After all, if this model of perception 
precludes reference to the causes of our perceptions for the moral philosopher, it does so for 
the anatomist also.  
Secondly, Hume expresses in these remarks a very interesting attitude towards the 
topic of non-perceptual objects: the topic is portrayed as being essentially orthogonal to the 
kind of inquiry he is undertaking: “the examination of them wou’d lead me too far from my 
present subject”. As Marjorie Grene (1994: 164) puts the matter: 
“There is surely a real world we are living in, and are a part of. Only we are treating 
that world here in terms of moral rather than natural philosophy; we are starting with 
our perceptions, not with the anatomy or physiology that would attempt to describe 
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their causes... the bodily events, movements of the spirits and the like, that 
presumably cause our perceptions can indeed be studied - elsewhere and by others.” 
The suggestion here is that limiting inquiry to the mental domain of perceptions is not 
imposed upon a science of man, but is something which follows or derives from the character 
of the inquiry itself. Scientists of man concern themselves solely with perceptual objects, 
because this is the appropriate subject matter for such an inquiry, in the same way that other 
sciences have their own distinct subject matter. It follows from this that what I earlier called 
‘Hume’s constraint’, is not really a constraint at all, at least not in the sense of being 
externally dictated. Rather, Hume portrays it as an ‘internal’ feature of the kind of naturalistic 
inquiry he is engaged in. But then, evidently, if there is no constraint, Hume’s model of 
perception cannot be its source.  
However, if Hume’s model of perception does not constrain his naturalism, what is 
the relationship between this model and his naturalism? Consider an observation Fodor 
makes about empiricist or sense data theories of perception. Fodor points out (1975: 42-53) 
that such theories have, historically, generally performed a “double duty”. On the one hand 
they are meant as accounts of how beliefs can or ought to be justified. They state what it is 
subjects have direct or secure epistemic access to, and then show how our beliefs can (or 
cannot) be built upon such a foundation. On the other hand however, empiricist models of 
perception have also acted as psychological accounts of perception: purporting to depict what 
is involved in perceptual processing as a matter of fact. Now, evidently, these two duties are 
related; how one is met is likely to have implications for the other. Nevertheless, there is 
question as to which of these duties is dominant or primary and this is particularly important 
with respect to Hume. Commentators have almost universally assumed that Hume’s model of 
perception principally serves the epistemic duty, virtually equating it with the veil of 
appearance. If it is understood in this way, as being, first and foremost, about what we do and 
do not have epistemic access to, then it is easy to see how this constrains naturalistic inquiry 
in the way Hume scholars have claimed. However, commentators have neglected the 
possibility that it should be understood as principally answering to Fodor’s psychological 
duty. In this case, far from being inconsistent with a naturalistic approach, the model would 
be something which emerges from this approach and is premised upon it. Rather than being 
an unquestioned presupposition, it would be something which naturalistic considerations lead 
him to, answering to whatever standards of empirical adequacy are relevant. What I want to 
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claim is that this is how Hume’s model of perception should be interpreted: an attempt to 
provide a psychologically accurate account of what is involved in perception. Although such 
a view certainly raises epistemic questions (see fn. 31), these are secondary. That is, they are 
consequences of an account justified on psychological grounds.    
It is worth underlining from the outset the appeal and attraction of pursuing this 
interpretation of Hume’s model of perception. Even setting aside the noted incompatibility of 
the epistemic reading with many of Hume’s remarks, a psychological reading promises to be 
a far more charitable option in at least two respects.  Firstly, if the model is read as an 
epistemic claim about what we do and do not have cognitive access to, then Stroud is correct 
that Hume never considers any evidence for it. Secondly, on the epistemic reading, the model 
is inconsistent with Hume’s overarching philosophical program: his science of man. Now 
clearly, taken alone, such considerations do not prove anything: it may just be that we have to 
attribute these philosophical aberrations to Hume. Nevertheless, these considerations do 
justify an exegetical preference for an alternative interpretation which does not indict Hume 
in these ways. This is what the psychological interpretation promises to be and insofar as it 
can be coherently developed it should be preferred in any charitable reconstruction of 
Hume’s science of man.26 To this interpretation I now turn. 
 One of the most striking facts about perceptual or experiential states, and one which is 
especially important from the perspective of a science of man, is that they play a causal role 
in the behaviour of moral subjects, including of course their judgements. For example, 
consider how people make judgements about unobserved matters of fact on the basis of what 
is observed, a phenomenon which Hume is uncommonly interested in (see Section 2.1). If I 
peer out of a window and observe that the street is covered in puddles, I may well judge that 
it has been raining. Now, what is significant about this is not merely that perceptual states 
play a causal role in producing judgements, but that what is causally efficacious is the 
specific character or content of a perceptual state. If I peer out of a window and observe a 
thick layer of snow covering the road, I would presumably be led to quite a different 
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 It might be quite reasonably pressed whether I am offering an exegetical interpretation of Hume’s intentions, 
or whether the argument is really a philosophical one, i.e. that there is a way to reconcile Hume’s theory of ideas 
and his naturalism, irrespective of whether he in fact saw it this way. The idea of a ‘charitable reconstruction’ is 
ambiguous in this respect. On the whole, I am primarily interested in offering a philosophical argument rather 
than an exegetical account. However, this account is motivated by remarks Hume himself makes. Consequently, 
it might be accurate to say that the argument here is inspired by Hume, even if ultimately he would not have 
endorsed it (after all, in order to establish this latter thesis, a much wider consideration of his related remarks 
would be required – something I shall not be attempting). 
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judgement. In other words, the judgements moral subjects produce depend upon the content 
of their perceptual states. Consequently, we are immediately confronted by the challenge of 
stating what determines the content of perceptual states, such that different content can play 
different causal roles. This is a challenge for any science of man which purports to explain 
the behaviour of moral subjects.   
In Section 1.4.II of the Treatise Hume discusses certain ‘experiments’ and I think that 
these have a crucial bearing upon how perceptual content is to be understood. Each of these 
experiments indicate the dependence of perceptual content upon the dispositions of our 
organs. For instance, when we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all 
objects to become double. Similarly, qualities such as colour and figure change also in line 
with our “sickness and distempers”. These and an “infinite number of experiments of the 
same kind”, prove “that our perceptions are dependent upon on our organs, and the 
disposition of our nerves and animas spirits” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 162-163). Essentially, Hume is 
appealing to the kind of illusion and hallucination considerations which are commonplace in 
philosophy of perception literature.  
 These experiments have generally failed to impress commentators. Stroud 
immediately dismisses them on the grounds that “it of course does not follow from this that 
what we perceive is a ‘momentary’, ‘fleeting’, ‘internal and perishing’ thing which depends 
for its existence on the mind that perceives it” (Stroud 1977: 111; cf. Flew, 1986: 33). 
However, while Stroud is right to dismiss the idea that these experiments establish that we are 
only ever directed acquainted – where acquaintance is an epistemically loaded concept - with 
our impressions, i.e. the idea that they establish a veil of appearance, these experiments can, I 
think, reasonably be taken to indicate a different conclusion: that the content of our 
perceptual states is not fixed or individuated by features of the physical or social 
environment.27 Roughly, these experiments show that features of the external environment 
can be held constant while perceptual content varies, as in illusions, and even that perceptual 
content can remain constant despite variance in the external environment e.g., as in 
hallucinations. In other words, there is no deep individuation relation holding between 
perceptual content and nature of a subject’s environment.  
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 That is, I am essentially attributing to Hume the view that perceptual content is narrowly individuated (cf. 
Kriegel, 2008).   
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There is a sense in which there is nothing particularly revelatory about this; a similar 
thesis is widely acknowledged by cognitive scientists: “all physical events are intrinsically 
ambiguous, in the sense that they are subject to various interpretations” (Pylyshyn, 1980: 
112).28  Consider two simple, but illustrative, examples. Firstly, Wittgenstein’s well known 
rabbit-duck illusion. 
Figure 1. 
 
The image can be perceived as a rabbit or a duck, but not both at the same time and as such, it 
is associated with two incompatible perceptual contents. It follows from this that even for 
such a relatively impoverished visual experience, the relevant stimulus, or ‘facts about the 
physical and social environment’, cannot fix perceptual content. Since the stimulus, can 
remain constant while the perceptual content of the subject varies, the latter cannot be 
individuated on the basis of the former. Alternatively, consider the Muller-Lyer illusion. 
Figure 2. 
 
Subjects perceive the top line to be longer than the bottom line, despite their being equivalent 
in length. Now, evidently there is no ambiguity here as there is in the duck-rabbit case. But 
the example serves to generalise the relevant notion of ambiguity: namely, as that according 
to which the nature of the relevant environmental stimulus underdetermines or is too coarse 
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Hume’s science of man and cognitive science e.g. Biro (1993), Fodor (2003), Garrett (1997:40). In Section 3.3, 
I discuss how this underdetermination thesis is a standard assumption in moral psychology. 
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grained to individuate the content of a subject’s perceptual state. This is a completely general 
phenomenon. As Fodor puts it: 
“...if you want to know how the organism will respond to an environmental event, you 
must first find out what properties it takes the event to have” (Fodor, 1975: 55)     
There is no property of the stimulus in the Muller-Lyer case which determines that the lines 
are perceived as they are. But then, it follows that a subject’s perceptual content, while 
elicited by the visual stimulus, cannot be fixed or specified by it; the content is 
underdetermined. For this reason, Fodor (1975: 55) draws a principled distinction between  
‘distal stimulus’, whatever features of the environment may elicit a perceptual state, and 
‘proximal stimulus’, which determines the content of such a state.29 It seems to me that it is 
exactly this distinction which Hume is appealing to when he says: 
“The table which we see seems to diminish as we move further away from it; but the 
real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration.” (Enquiry: 12.9, 201) 
So the content of a perceptual state is not fixed or individuated by objects in the environment. 
But then what is it fixed by? What is Fodor’s ‘proximal stimulus’? The natural alternative 
here is that it is individuated on the basis of the intrinsic properties of the subject. This is 
essentially what Hume concludes, postulating a domain of particulars in the mind of every 
subject, impressions of sensation, which fix the content of a perceptual state. These mental 
atoms have their content essentially,30 and serve as the foundation for all other mental 
content. Although impressions are not publically observable, they are available to 
introspection.  
“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure.” (Treatise: 1.4.VI, 193) 
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 This thesis is, for example, standard in moral psychology (see Section 3.3). Similarly, consider Chomsky’s 
claim (2000: 23) that “in the study of determination of structure from motion, it is immaterial whether the 
external event is successive arrays of flashes on a tachistoscope that yield the visual experience of a cube 
rotating in space, or an actual rotating cube, or stimulation of the retina, or optic nerve, or visual cortex. In any 
case, “the computational investigation” concerns the nature of the internal representations used by the visual 
system and the processes by which they are derived.” 
30
 Although the idea of mental atoms having content essentially may sound tendentious, it is not clear to me that 
it is anymore tendentious than saying that propositions have truth conditions essentially – a widely held and 
apparently respectable philosophical thesis (though for a critique, see King, 2009).  
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Moreover, and more importantly, impressions can be postulated in the minds of every person, 
despite being private, insofar as they play an explanatory role in our best account(s) of their 
behaviour. That is, the characterisation of perceptual states in terms of array of mental 
impressions resembles the kind of ‘inference to the best explanation’ that I argued in the 
previous section Hume’s account of ideas should be understood as. Hume’s model of 
perception is, first and foremost, a psychological thesis, not an epistemic one about what we 
do and do not have cognitive access to.31 It is an attempt to answer a question central for a 
science of man: what determines perceptual content such that it plays a causal role in the 
judgements of moral subjects? As such, the model is justified insofar as it is necessary for (or 
plays a role in) an empirically adequate science of man. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
this line of reasoning and conclusion is by no means alien by contemporary lights: 
 “I have been saying sometimes that attention is drawn by an object in the world, 
sometimes that it is drawn by a percept in the head. Which is right? If we want to be 
precise, we have to say a percept. Attention is a process going on in the brain - so it 
cannot be directed at things moving out there in the external world.” (Jackendoff, 
1996: 22) 
Crucially, nothing about this position precludes there being non-perceptual stimuli which 
elicit our impressions. In the case of the diminishing table, Hume explicitly contrasts the 
image present to the mind with the real table. In fact, as far as I can see, the view is 
consistent with the claim that any impression of sensation must have a non-perceptual cause(s) 
(Fodor’s distinction between proximal and distal stimulus presupposes as much). The point is 
rather that since these causes do not fix the content of a perceptual state, they are not the 
appropriate subject matter for a science of man. Since, ex hypothesi, it is the array of 
impressions moral subjects find before their mind’s eye which fixes perceptual content, the 
scientist of man is justified in ‘starting’ with these.    
                                                           
31
 This is not to say that this model does not raise interesting epistemological questions. The classic problem 
with individuating content non-relationally, solely on the basis of the intrinsic properties of the individual, is 
that it does not guarantee that said content puts subjects in ‘cognitive contact’ with the world (see Kriegel, 
2008). Indeed, Hume persistently warns us that there is no good reason to suppose that objects are as we take 
them to be. Nevertheless, these considerations can be separated from the core justificatory basis of the model. 
As Norton (1993: 8) puts it: “Hume gave the “way of ideas” a kind of phenomenological turn. That is, his 
primary concern... is with our perceptions, qua perceptions, with perceptions as, simply, the elements or objects 
of the mind and not as representations of external existences”. In other words, Hume was primarily interested in 
the way in the causative properties of perceptual content can be understood, and only secondarily interested in 
the way in which, if at all, such content puts us in cognitive contact with the world.  
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“Hume has declared at the outset that our perceptions are caused by things or events 
other than themselves; as moral philosophers we are just not asking about this 
relation.” (Grene, 1994: 171) 
 By way of summation for this rather lengthy section, consider what I have sought to 
establish and what I have not sought to establish. Taking the positive component first, I have 
argued that Hume’s theory of ideas, more particularly, the model of perception it entails, is 
consistent with Hume’s naturalism, contrary to what is widely claimed. Breaking with the 
standard interpretation of this model, I have argued that there is good reason to interpret it as 
a psychological account of perception, one which addresses a question central for a science of 
man: what is perceptual content such that it plays a causal role in the judgements of moral 
subjects? In this sense, whatever problems may arise for Hume’s model of perception (see 
Section 2.3), it is not only perfectly naturalistic, but integral to his naturalistic program.  
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Chapter 2. Applying Hume’s Naturalistic 
Approach 
 
Hume believed that his theory of ideas enabled him to draw the kind of conclusions a science 
of man aims at: why moral subjects form certain judgements. In this chapter, I shall examine 
in turn two cases Hume discusses: causal judgements and judgements of the existence of 
external bodies. In the final section, I shall argue that inadequacies with his account of our 
judgements of external bodies are indicative of a very serious shortcoming for his science of 
man, one which strikes at the heart of how judgements are conceived of and treated in this 
tradition. 
 
2.1. Causation 
There is perhaps no topic, says Hume, which has prompted more disputes amongst both 
ancient and modern philosophers than that of the efficacy of causation, and significant 
portions of both the Treatise and the Enquiry are devoted to it. That moral subjects judge 
objects to be causally related is a trait of fundamental importance to their day to day 
reasoning and behaviour. In particular, all of our beliefs regarding unobserved matters of fact 
rely upon causal relations.   
“If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for 
instance, that his friend is in the country or in France; he would give you a reason; and 
this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge 
of his former resolutions and promises.... it is constantly supposed, that there is a 
connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there 
nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious.” (Enquiry: 
4.4, 109) 
So, the causal judgements Hume is interested in are those whereby, on the basis of something 
observed, we come to believe an unobserved matter of fact. If I observe the sun low on the 
horizon, I am moved to believe that the surrounding buildings are casting shadows. Or if I 
observe that the bread bin is empty, and remember that it had contained a loaf of bread, I am 
led to believe that someone ate the bread. These transitions from what is observed to belief in 
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that which is unobserved are “founded on the relation of Cause and Effect” (Enquiry: 4.14, 
113). That people make causal judgements of this form is the datum Hume wants to explain. 
“We must enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect” (Enquiry: 4.5, 109) 
[my italics]. Although causation was an old philosophical topic, debate had been speculative 
or metaphysical in character: about the existence of causal relations holding of objects 
irrespective of how they are conceived. What is, in many ways, the more modest 
investigation into the origins of our causal judgements had been neglected and it is this Hume 
wants to redress: “this is what I principally find wanting in their reasoning, and what I shall 
here endeavour to supply” (Treatise: 1.3.XIV, 123). He is concerned with “the cause of our 
causal beliefs” (Flage, 1990: 92) 
Hume begins his investigation by examining two things which would be considered 
causally related and asking what impressions we receive when we experience them. The aim 
here is to uncover some perceptual quality from which we copy the idea of causation. For any 
two objects said to be causally related, we find that there are certain relations which hold of 
them. Firstly, the objects are contiguous in time and space. Admittedly, on occasion, a certain 
distance may separate cause and effect, but here we quickly find that they are linked by a 
chain of causes which are themselves contiguous. For example, consider ‘cause to die’ 
debates where an action causes a patient’s death, though the death occurs at a later time. 
Despite the temporal distance, we find a chain of contiguous causes linking the original 
action to the death. Secondly, temporal contiguity is always of a certain order. Cause and 
effect cannot be simultaneous and the order is always from cause to effect.  
 This, however, exhausts our inspection of impressions and it is one which fails to 
yield the sought for result. Objects can be contiguously and successively related to another 
without being considered cause and effect. If a fly lands on my computer screen, and then my 
screen saver starts, I do not consider them causally related, despite the contiguity and order of 
the two events. Causation entails that there is a necessary connection also. By ‘necessary 
connection’, Hume means that an object causes another only if it can be said to produce it, or 
that without the first object, the second would not have appeared. ‘Necessity’ is synonymous 
with ‘power’ or ‘production’. It is this quality which appears to be absent from our 
impressions.  
 Here, there is something of an interlude in Hume’s thought, and it is a significant one. 
The copy principle states that all our simple ideas are copies of simple impressions. Yet, at 
47 
 
 
 
least after an initial inspection, there seems to be no impression corresponding to our idea of 
necessity. This should suggest two possibilities: 
1. The copy principle is false (in which case, thoroughgoing empiricism is untenable) 
2. Humans do not have an idea of necessity. 
Despite considering the copy principle to be the ‘first principle of the science of human 
nature’ and too well established to be dispensed with, Hume still comes closer to accepting (1) 
than (2): 
“Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possest of an idea, which 
is not preceded by any similar impression?” (Treatise: 1.3.II, 64) 
Hume’s refusal to consider the possibility that we have no idea of necessity is instructive. It 
reinforces the explanatory, as opposed to epistemic, aims of the investigation. After all, if the 
question was whether our causal judgements are justified, having inspected our impressions 
and found no grounds for the idea of necessity, we might expect Hume to contemplate the 
possibility that our causal beliefs are not justified precisely because we lack the requisite idea 
of necessity. The reason Hume does not contemplate this possibility – even though the 
alternative may be that he needs to abandon the copy principle – is that that we have the idea 
of necessity is a presupposition of his inquiry. Our causal judgements are the explananda for 
Hume, and insofar as a causal judgement presupposes an idea of necessity, to admit that we 
have no such idea would be to conclude that a naturalistic study of our causal judgements is 
misguided or mistaken. That is why Hume never doubts that we have the idea of necessity; he 
is aiming to explain our causal judgements by tracing their genesis, not establish their 
epistemic merit.32  
 Having failed to find an impression corresponding to our idea of necessity, Hume 
adopts a more indirect approach, pursuing the question: “why we conclude, that such 
particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects, and why we form an inference 
                                                           
32
 Although this point may seem obvious, at least in the context of this thesis where I have persistently stressed 
the explanatory, as opposed to epistemic, character of Hume science of man, it is persistently neglected in the 
secondary literature. In keeping with the well established practice of appropriating the support of long-dead 
philosophical luminaries to one’s position, it was common for logical positivists to interpret Hume as advancing 
a kind of conceptual scepticism: that is, claiming that distinctively philosophical topics (such as causal necessity) 
correspond to no aspect of experience and should therefore be dispensed with as cognitively meaningless (see 
Williams, (2004: 269-270) for overview and Stroud, (1978) for a rebuttal). Similarly, Landy (2009: 9) seems to 
argue that since Hume doubted the legitimacy of concepts such as necessity, persistence (they cannot be 
founded upon sense data), Hume denied we possess such concepts at all. This is a non sequitur and is 
inconsistent with the reading defended here.  
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from one to another?” (Treatise: 1.3.III, 68). This move amounts to an inversion of his 
methodological strategy. Instead of searching ‘bottom-up’ for the idea of necessity, Hume is 
proposing that we approach the matter ‘top-down’: beginning with the transitions we make 
from what is observed to a causally related unobserved matter of fact in the hope that these 
will provide a clue as to how the idea is acquired.  
It is easy to see, according to Hume, that these transitions are not matters of 
demonstrative reasoning. The litmus test for such reasoning is whether it is possible to 
conceive of one object without conceiving of the other. Yet, no object, considered alone, ever 
supplies a demonstrative reason to infer the existence of any effect distinct from itself, since, 
as has already been stated, no simple ideas are inseparable. Any cause can be coherently 
conceived without its typical effect, or with a different effect altogether or none at all. When I 
see a billiard ball moving towards a motionless one, I can imagine countless scenarios 
resulting. Although I may conceive that the contact of the two balls will produce motion in 
the second, I can just as easily conceive both balls coming to absolute rest, or the first ball 
leaping over the second, or both balls being annihilated altogether.   
Far from being a demonstrative matter, it is only by experience that we infer the 
existence of one object from the observation of another. To be precise, we only pronounce 
two objects as causally related if we have witnessed instances of their contiguous and 
successive conjunction in the past: constant conjunction. For example, in the past, a noisy 
rumbling sound has been constantly conjoined with a large lorry driving past my house, a 
regularity of experience. One morning I hear such a rumbling sound. Although I am not 
standing at the window and so cannot see whether there is a lorry driving past my house, I 
infer its existence anyways as the cause of the sound. As Hume puts it, I “infer the existence 
of the one from that of the other” and “without farther ceremony call the one cause and the 
other effect” (Treatise: 1.3.VI, 71). Moreover, the confidence with which we declare this 
relation corresponds to the wealth of relevant experience available to us. This fact essentially 
forecloses the possibility we form causal judgements on the basis of our impressions or sense 
data. This is because experiencing a constant conjunction of resembling impressions does not 
yield any extra impression over and above the single experience of such a conjunction:  
“From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will 
arise any new original idea.” (Treatise: 1.3.VI, 72) 
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Given this, the question is whether it is reasoning which moves us from constant conjunctions 
to causal judgements, or the imagination. It is here that reason receives its most important 
hearing. Can it be that people judge two objects to be causally related due to reasoning about 
their past experience of constantly conjoined objects? If so, what would such reasoning look 
like? Hume assumes that such reasoning would be based on a ‘uniformity principle’ (UP), 
stating that future coordination of objects must resemble past coordination of objects. The 
syllogism would then be: 
(1) In the past, A and B have been constantly conjoined 
(2) The future must resemble the past (UP) 
(3) A 
 ∴         B   
UP is crucial to the validity of the argument, and so itself needs to be shown to be justified or 
reasonable. Hume quickly dismisses the idea that UP can be demonstrated, for we can easily 
conceive of a change in the course of nature and to form a conception is “an undeniable 
argument” that it is non-demonstrative. The second possibility is that UP is secured on the 
basis of probable reasoning i.e. inductive reasoning. Such reasoning would presumably be of 
the form: in the past, the future has resembled the past, and this makes it probable that the 
future will resemble the past also. However, Hume points out that such reasoning simply 
presupposes that the course of nature will not change, and so to use it to justify UP would be 
circular.  
Few topics have received more attention than Hume’s critique of inductive reasoning. 
An influential criticism of this argument is that Hume is wrong to think that reasoning from 
cause to effect on the basis of past experience of constant conjunctions is possible only if one 
accepts UP. True, UP is necessary for the deductive validity of the inference, but reasoning 
need not be deductive in order to be warranted.  
“...to ask whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedures is like 
asking whether it is reasonable to proportion the degree of one’s convictions to the 
strength of the evidence. Doing this is what ‘being reasonable’ means in such a 
context.” (Strawson, 1952: 257) 
In other words, reasoning can be perfectly legitimate without reaching the heights of 
deductive certainty. It is not my intention here to enter into this debate, but rather to ensure 
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that this objection does not obscure the central point which Hume, in my view, wishes to 
extract from his critique of inductive reasoning. This view is explicit in the Enquiry when 
Hume announces that he shall content himself with showing that “our conclusions from that 
experience [constant conjunctions] are not founded on reasoning or any process of the 
understanding” (Enquiry: 4.15, 113). Hume supposes that if our causal judgements were 
founded upon reasoning, it must be possible to discover the argument thereby employed. The 
point of his sceptical argument is not that there is no sense in which we might consider causal 
judgements to be warranted or reasonable, but is rather that the apparent absence of such an 
argument speaks against the view that our causal judgements are formed on the basis of 
reasoning: 
“[Hume] is arguing that we do not adopt induction on the basis of recognizing an 
argument for its reliability, for the utterly sufficient reason that there is no argument... 
that could have this effect.” (Garrett, 1997: 92) 
As such, inductive scepticism is used to support the broader conclusion Hume wants to draw, 
paving the way for an alternate account of our causal judgements: one which does not trace 
their genesis to reasoning. Williams (2004: 268) calls this approach ‘methodological 
scepticism’ since scepticism is utilised as a methodological tool rather than a conclusion in its 
own right. 
This is by no means the only evidence which can be used to support this position. 
Hume constantly stresses how we seldom reflect upon reasons when we draw causal 
inferences. Instead, past experience operates on our mind “in such an insensible manner as to 
be never taken notice of, and may even in some measure be unknown to us” (Treatise: 
1.3.VIII, 83) and “the custom operates before we have time for reflection” (Ibid). Similarly, 
the fact that our day to day causal inferences are unaffected and unimpaired by sceptical 
argument, even when those arguments are explicitly endorsed, confirms that these inferences 
are not delivered by reason. Regardless of whether it is possible to show that our causal 
inferences are reasonable and legitimate in a non-deductive sense, Hume’s conclusion that 
the source of our causal judgements is not reason is not significantly threatened.   
Instead, Hume decides that we make the transition from observed to unobserved due 
to the imagination. In particular, the appearance of one object naturally transports us to the 
idea of its usual attendant because these two ideas have been united in the imagination. The 
effect of the repetition of resembling instances is a “determination” of the mind to pass from 
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one object to its usual attendant due to the associative force of the imagination. Consequently, 
constant conjunction does produce something which single experience of conjunction does 
not, explaining why experience is so important to our causal judgements: this determination 
of the mind is produced only by the constant conjunction of resembling objects. By 
“determination” Hume means a feeling of inevitability which accompanies the transition 
from cause to effect and it is this which is the key to our idea of necessity (Treatise: 1.3.XIV). 
Hume claims that this feeling is a particular type of impression, an impression of reflection.33 
It is from this impression that the idea of necessity is copied.34 In this sense, rather than our 
causal judgements being determined by the prior possession of the idea of necessity, the 
inverse is correct: the idea arises from the natural propensity or custom of the imagination to 
move the mind from one object to another. 
This still leaves a critical element of our causal judgements unaddressed. Hume takes 
himself to have shown how, from an idea A, the imagination leads one to the idea B and so 
on. However, no conditional of this form, even an infinitely long one, can explain why in 
causal judgements people are led to beliefs about unobserved matters of fact.  
“…if flame or snow be presented anew to the sense, the mind is carried by custom to 
expect heat or cold and to believe, that such a quality does exist” (Enquiry: 5.8, 123) 
Notice that no idea of the imagination can induce a belief in an unobserved matter of fact. 
While there may be a union in the imagination between my idea of the sun low in the horizon 
and buildings projecting shadows, the idea of the former cannot alone prompt belief in the 
latter. It is only an impression or a memory that can produce such a belief. For example, 
consider the conditional, if the lawn is neat and trim then someone cut the grass (A→B). If 
this is to produce the belief about the unobserved matter of fact, that someone cut the grass 
(B), it is necessary to detach from the conditional, (A). Evidently, only an impression or a 
memory of the lawn being neat and trim will suffice in this respect. To simply imagine the 
lawn to be neat and trim will not. This observation holds the key to Hume’s explanation of 
why we believe in the unobserved matter of fact, rather than merely supposing or conceiving 
it. Recall that according Hume, impressions and memories differ from ideas of the 
imagination in their force or vivacity.  
                                                           
33
 An impression of reflection is an impression which is caused by something appearing before the mind. 
34
 As such, I think that Landy (2009: 9) simply misreads Hume’s position when he says that: “They are the 
concepts (e.g. necessity, persistence, etc.) that Hume argues we cannot possibly have because they do not 
resemble any of our impressions.”  
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“…when any impressions becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to 
such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force 
and vivacity” (Treatise: 1.3.VIII, 79) 
Where two ideas are united in the imagination, the force of the impression or memory is 
communicated or transposed to the associated idea. Yet, a belief simply is a lively and 
forceful idea. In the case of causal judgements then, the force of the impression or memory is 
transposed onto the associated idea, rendering it a belief in an unobserved matter of fact.  
Hume’s position is that our causal judgements derive from a habit or custom of the 
mind to associate objects which are constantly conjoined. Unfortunately, Hume’s arguments 
have often been interpreted as aiming to establish a very different conclusion: that there is no 
physical necessity in the universe:  
“Hume is confident that there are and can be no objective physical necessities... in the 
universe around us.” (Flew, 1986: 5; see also, Kukla, 2011: ii) 
Flew notes the “embarrassing consequences” which follow from this, given that many of 
Hume’s own theories rely upon the notion of causal necessity (Ibid). Were this really the 
conclusion Hume drew from his arguments, the consequences would be very embarrassing 
indeed. After all, the very idea of a science of man is premised upon explaining qualities of 
moral subjects by tracing their causal genesis. Had Hume really concluded that there are no 
physical necessities in the universe, he would have had no choice but to condemn his own 
naturalistic approach as misguided. Fortunately however, this is not Hume’s position: it is not 
entailed by his conclusion that our causal judgements are the product of custom. Moreover, 
he explicitly warns against sliding from this psychological conclusion to the metaphysical 
one Flew critiques:  
“I am, indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several qualities, both in material and 
in immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted; and if we please to call 
these power of efficacy, it will be of little consequence to the world.” (Treatise: 
1.3.XIV, 131) 
As Norton (1982: 201) puts it, “[Hume] does not suppose that reality must be of a certain 
form because a belief that it is so cannot be shaken off, nor does he suppose that there is no 
reality of a particular sort because the evidence that is available to us falls necessarily short of 
proving the existence of this particular kind of things”. 
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2.2. External bodies 
If we turn from the issue of causality to Hume’s investigation of another fundamental belief, 
the existence of external bodies, we find the same basic method and aims present.35 Hume 
begins the relevant section of the Treatise (I.4.II) with the announcement that: 
“The subject, then, of our present enquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to 
believe in the existence of the body.” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 146) [my italics] 
That is, the investigation falls within the purview of the science of man. The task is to explain 
a certain quality of human beings, our belief in external bodies, by tracing its causal genesis. 
As to the normative credentials of this belief: 
“We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? But it 
is in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for 
granted in all our reasonings.” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 146) 
Hume advises that the question of whether our belief in external bodies is correct, whether 
there really are external bodies, is not a topic worthy of consideration given that we have no 
choice in the matter.36 Irrespective of whether he is right to think this, it clearly signals the 
anti-epistemic character of his endeavour.  
According to Hume, belief in external bodies should be analysed in terms of two ideas 
which are “commonly confounded”: the continual existence of objects unperceived and the 
existence of objects distinct from their being perceived. These two ideas are to be examined 
apart. However, such is the intimate connection between them that an answer to why we 
believe objects to continue to exist unperceived will be an answer to why we believe that they 
have distinct existence, and vice versa.37  
As in the case of causation, there are three possible sources of belief to be considered: 
the senses, reason and the imagination. That the senses cannot give rise to the idea of the 
                                                           
35
 By ‘bodies’, Hume means simply those things which comprise the external world. Given this, I shall use the 
terms ‘external bodies’, ‘external world’ and ‘external objects’ interchangeably. 
36
 Evidently, Hume is here pre-empting his conclusion that the belief is a natural belief. 
37
 Strictly speaking, this ‘vice versa’ is false. While, from the incontrovertible premise that our perceptions are 
not continuous, continuity entails distinctness, distinctness does not entail continuity. As Allison (2008: 231) 
points out, it is conceivable that objects be distinct, and yet be perpetually created. Nevertheless, since the 
strategy Hume pursues moves from continuity to distinctness, this is not material to the argument. 
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continual existence of objects is apparent, for this would require the perception of something 
unperceived. Furthermore, there is little prospect of the senses supplying us with the idea of 
distinct existence: “a single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence” 
(Treatise: 1.4.II, 147). Double existence could only derive from some inference of reason or 
the imagination beyond our sensory impressions. Hume reinforces this claim by pointing out 
that not all of our impressions are ascribed distinct existence. There seem to be three distinct 
classes in this respect: (a) primary qualities, (b) secondary qualities, and (c) pains and 
pleasures. Both philosophers and the vulgar (the common man) take primary qualities to have 
a distinct existence. The vulgar, but not philosophers, take secondary qualities to have distinct 
existence. And neither the vulgar nor philosophers take pleasures and pains to have distinct 
existence. Hume is not, at this point, making a claim about the correctness of these 
classifications, only that (a-c) enjoy parity as impressions, and so our beliefs about distinct 
existence cannot be simply a matter of having sense data.  
Building upon this observation, Hume quickly dismisses the possibility of beliefs 
about external bodies being derived from reason. While philosophers devise arguments 
supporting their position: 
“…’tis obvious these arguments are known but to very few, and that tis not by them 
that children, peasants and the greatest part of mankind are induced to attribute 
objects to some impressions and deny them to others” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 150) 
By a process of elimination, these meditations leave only the imagination unscathed. Hume’s 
discussion of how the imagination gives rise to belief in external bodies is exceptionally 
dense, and in order to keep my discussion as focused as possible, I shall set aside some 
avenues of inquiry which he broaches only to discard. Following Hume’s own exposition, the 
skeleton of his argument will be presented first, with the steps explored subsequently.  
One of the qualities of the impressions to which external existence is attributed is 
constancy: resemblance to other impressions over a temporal distance. For example, we find 
that the perception of the sun or the ocean returns to us after an interval. Even more familiarly, 
upon closing and opening one’s eyes, we find that impressions prior to closing them resemble 
those which appear upon opening. On account of their resemblance, we are impelled by the 
imagination to consider constant impressions identical. However, the interval separating the 
impressions is so contrary to identity that the mind is cast into a state of confused 
contradiction regarding the matter. In order to resolve this predicament we feign or suppose 
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that the interrupted perceptions are connected by a continual existence of which we are 
insensible.    
This sketch of Hume’s argument is unlikely to look plausible until the key steps are 
properly explained. The initial or background premise concerns identity, or rather, given that 
it is temporally spaced (resembling) impressions which are taken to be identical, the 
argument concerns identity over time. If we did not have such an idea, the imagination could 
hardly impel us to consider constant impressions identical. However, Hume’s early 
reflections upon this topic are not promising, for he declares that we never perceive an object 
identical over time. This is because all impressions have an ‘internal and perishing existence’; 
they are bereft of temporal thickness. A single impression therefore can afford only the idea 
of unity, not identity. On the other hand, perceiving many objects conveys only multiplicity, 
not identity. Between unity on the one hand and number on the other, there is said to be no 
medium. 
This impasse is resolved by recourse to the imagination. Although strictly speaking, 
duration entails perceptual diversity and therefore forecloses numerically identity, the 
imagination is able to engage in a ‘fiction’ which affords the idea nonetheless: “a single 
object, placed before us, and surveyed for any time without our discovering in it any 
interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 155). 
Hume’s thought here seems to be that the idea of identity derives from a foible in our 
imaginative capacities. In particular, we have the idea of identity because we can conceive of, 
or ‘keep in view’, an object over time without discovering or noticing that it varies, despite its 
actual variance. So for series of resembling impressions, symbolised as: 
AAAAAAAAAAAAA, 
The resemblance and uninterrupted nature of the sequence is sufficient for the imagination to 
prompt the idea of identity over time. Identity is therefore defined as “the invariableness and 
uninterruptedness of any object, thro’ a supposed variation in time” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 156). 
 Having secured the idea of identity, Hume needs to show why the imagination forces 
us to ascribe identity to constant impressions, which are invariable (a strong form of 
resemblance), but interrupted. The reason for this, Hume claims, is that the disposition or act 
of surveying a sequence of constant impressions ‘feels’ like the perception of an identical 
object. The passage from one resembling idea to another is so smooth that we confound the 
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constancy of our ideas for their identity: the invariable and uninterrupted view of an object. In 
other words, a series of constant impressions: 
(1) AAAABBBBAAAAA 
Places the mind in almost exactly the same dispositional state as an uninterrupted series of 
invariable impressions: 
(2) AAAAAAAAAAAAA 
Since the imagination compels us to regard cases of (2) as cases of identity, by confounding 
(1) with (2) so too we are inclined to regard constant impressions as identical.  
However, despite this tendency to inflate constancy into identity, the interruption of 
constant impressions is contrary to the idea of identity, suggesting instead diversity. As such, 
we find ourselves caught in a dilemma or contradiction: impelled to ascribe identity to 
constant impressions and yet unable to do so. This state of uneasiness and perplexity 
“produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continued 
existence” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 159). That is, we overcome the contradiction by supposing that 
objects have a continual existence beyond their being perceived, and so secure their identity 
over time in a way which is compatible with their perceptual intermittency. 
Having uncovered the emergence of the idea of continued existence, Hume quickly 
explains why we come to believe it, how it gains the requisite FLV. Although up to this point 
speaking loosely of the ‘recognition’ of resembling impressions or ‘holding an object in 
view’, it is clear that this capacity depends upon the memory. For example, a sequence of 
constant perceptions, 
AAAABBBBBAAAA 
can only be recognised as constant (invariable, but interrupted), insofar as we can recall that 
the perceptions prior to the interruption resemble those that follow it. As already noted, ideas 
of the memory are the functional equivalents of impressions according to Hume, bearing 
comparable amounts of FLV (in contrast to ideas of the imagination). Hume concludes from 
this that since our propensity to feign the continued existence of objects arises from “lively 
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impressions of the memory”,38 these impressions must bestow vivacity upon the fiction, 
rendering the fiction a belief (Treatise: 1.4.II, 161).  
 
There are two serious objections to Hume’s explanation of our belief in external bodies. The 
first concerns how the idea of continued existence is acquired. The problem is that, upon 
closer inspection, Hume does not have an account of this acquisition at all, let alone a 
plausible one. To illustrate this, it is worth reviewing the relevant step in Hume’s argument, 
the point at which the idea of continued existence is supposed to emerge: 
“The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions 
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted manner of their 
appearance makes us consider them as so many resembling, but still distinct beings, 
which appear after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this contradiction 
produces a propension to unite these broken appearances by the fiction of a continued 
existence, which is the third part of that hypothesis I proposed to explain.” (Treatise: 
1.4.II, 159) 
There is a state of perplexity or contradiction, and this prompts the idea of continued 
existence which resolves the contradiction. In other words, the acquisition of the idea is 
explained by the instability or perplexity of the mind prior to its acquisition. We acquire the 
idea because we have need of it. Yet, this is surely one of the weakest claims to be found in 
the whole of the Treatise. As Stroud puts it witheringly: 
“Acquiring a new idea cannot be explained as simply a matter of selecting, among a 
number of antecedently intelligible alternatives, the one that best squares with all the 
available data, since in acquiring a new idea we come to find something intelligible or 
to understand something that we did not understand before.” (Stroud, 1977: 108) 
Indeed, a much more coherent reconstruction of this stage of Hume’s argument is that it is 
not directly concerned with the idea of continued existence at all, but with why we come to 
believe or judge an idea already apprehended. For one thing, Hume’s own language suggests 
this. The state of perplexity is said to prompt “a propension to unite these broken appearances 
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 Although strictly speaking the memory is a faculty of ideas not impressions, Hume talks of ‘impressions of 
the memory’ in places, apparently to reinforce the functional equivalence of ideas of the memory and 
impressions.  
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by the fiction”, “our inclination to that supposition” or the “feigning a continued being” 
(Treatise: 1.4.II). This sounds much more like the formation of a belief, albeit one which 
perhaps involves a certain degree of self-deception, than the acquisition of an idea. Moreover, 
tending towards belief formation makes sense given that only the belief in the continued 
existence of objects, as opposed to the mere idea, would be capable of resolving the state of 
perplexity described.  
  For example, imagine that I have spent years working on a paper. This paper is not 
merely an exposition of a view I happen to regard as correct or true, but one which captures 
the essence of all my philosophical thinking for years previous. However, the paper is 
rejected by every journal that I send it to outright. What am I to think of the paper? On the 
one hand, to discard it would be to discard the conviction that I am good at what I do, that my 
career is being spent in a productive fashion, and so all of my instincts of self-worth and self-
preservation impel me to regard it as a piece of great insight and importance. On the other 
hand, it has been rejected by my peers. This casts me into a state of contradiction: inclined 
and yet unable to view my paper as philosophically revelatory. In order to escape this 
perplexing state, I feign or suppose that the journal reviewers have an unreasonable prejudice 
against the position defended in the paper. This feigning reconciles the need to regard the 
paper as brilliant with the rejection it has suffered.  
In this example, it is clear that the state of perplexity or contradiction is resolved by a 
belief. When I feign that the reviewers are prejudiced, I must really affirm or assent to it if the 
perplexity is to be dispelled. Merely having the idea of prejudiced reviewers could not serve 
in this respect. Similarly in the case of the continued existence of bodies, it is the belief that 
bodies continue to exist which is capable of resolving the contradiction. In other words, at 
this stage of his argument, Hume is forging a connection between a natural state of perplexity 
and a belief in the continued existence of bodies: the latter resolves the former and the former 
explains the latter. However, this serves to underline the objection: this is not an account of 
the acquisition of the idea of continued existence at all. By Hume’s own lights, all belief 
presupposes the idea believed.39 In the paper case, I cannot form the belief that the reviewers 
are prejudiced if I lack the idea of prejudice. Equally, it is no good being told that we believe 
bodies to have continual existence because this resolves a contradiction, since this 
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 Presumably this is why Hume never uses the terms ‘belief’ and ‘judgement’, but masks the true character of 
this stage of his argument with talk of ‘feigning’ and being ‘inclined to suppose’.     
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presupposes the idea of the continual existence of bodies and this is precisely what is 
supposed to be under investigation! 
The second objection to Hume’s account is that he is unable to give an adequate 
description of the original position from which the belief in external bodies originates.  
 “Whoever wou’d explain the origin of the common opinion concerning the continu’d 
and distinct existence of body, must take the mind in its common situation.” (Treatise: 
1.4.II, 164).  
It is certainly correct that tracing the genesis of the judgement presupposes an account of the 
common situation from which it springs. Evidently, the minimal standards of adequacy for 
such an account is that it be free from the judgement in question. It is of no explanatory value 
to trace the belief in external bodies back to a common situation which presupposes, in some 
respect, the relevant judgement. In the case of causation for example, Hume had such a 
coherent description of the common position, one involving the constant conjunction of 
impressions and laws of association. In the case of external bodies however, the matter is not 
so straightforward. 
Hume labels the common situation the ‘vulgar position’, by which he means to 
contrast it with the position held by philosophers. The crucial element of the philosophical 
position is that it invokes a ‘double existence’ of perceptions and objects. On the one hand, 
we are only ever directly acquainted with our own perceptions. Yet equally, on this view, 
there also exists a realm of objects which our perceptions resemble. Hence, philosophers 
recognise a dichotomy of fleeting perceptions on the one hand and objects which are 
coexistent and resembling on the other. 
By contrast, Hume insists that the vulgar embrace no such view. They “never think of 
a double existence internal and external, representing and represented” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 158). 
Apart from the plain conviction that this is just ‘not how it is’ with the common man, Hume 
offers two reasons in support of this. Firstly, if the common situation involved a dichotomy of 
perceptions and objects, the idea of the external existence of bodies would already be present 
since this simply is a dichotomy of perceptions on the one hand, and objects which are 
distinct from those perceptions on the other. Secondly, Hume argues that were the common 
situation the philosophical one, belief in the existence of bodies would never emerge. This is 
because we would never be tempted to ascribe identity to our perceptions if we recognised 
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them as perceptions – internal, fleeting images. In other words, the philosophical position is 
subsequent to belief in the existence of bodies:  
Common situation/Vulgar position → Belief in external bodies → Philosophical position    
Instead of drawing a philosophical distinction between perceptions and objects, the vulgar 
understand that, “those very sensations, which enter by the eye or the ear, are with them the 
true objects, nor can they readily conceive that this pen or paper, which is immediately 
perceived, represents another, which is different from, but resembling it” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 
156). But what does this amount to? The most natural way to understand this is that the 
vulgar are direct realists about perception: they take themselves to be directly acquainted with 
pens, paper and teapots. But this surely entails that they already have the idea of, at least, the 
distinct existence of bodies, if not that of continued existence also, because that is what pens, 
paper and teapots are: things which exist distinctly! A clear way of presenting this difficulty 
is to apply it to a particular step in Hume’s account, one explanatorily prior to the emergence 
of the idea of continued existence i.e. prior to the state of contradiction and perplexity. 
Suppose that I am standing atop a castle turret and have before me a glorious vista across 
open countryside. I close my eyes and when I reopen them, the same vista reappears to me. 
Hume says that in this case, there is a natural relation of resemblance holding of my 
impressions in the two instances. Because a sequence of constant impressions ‘feels’ the 
same as the uninterrupted view of an invariable object, the imagination impels me to construe 
them as identical. Now, this is the pivotal question: what is it that I am inclined or impelled to 
consider identical? The obvious response is that it is the countryside, with its rolling hills and 
scattered trees which is taken to be identical or the same. Yet, this cannot be right for it would 
amount to saying that what is the same is an object or collection of objects distinct from my 
perception and this idea of distinctness is not available at this point in the account. 
Since it cannot be distinct objects which are considered identical, it is tempting to 
ascribe to the vulgar something of the philosophical view Hume denies they have. According 
to this, rather than it being hills and trees which are deemed identical, it is only our 
perceptions which are deemed identical. Indeed, Hume suggests as much when he says that: 
“The very image, which is present to the sense, is with us the real body; and ‘tis to 
these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect identity.” (Treatise: 1.4.II, 158) 
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However, this is equally implausible given Hume’s belief that if the common situation of the 
vulgar made a distinction between our perceptions and objects, the idea of the continued 
existence of bodies would never arise. Indeed, it seems more appropriate to interpret Hume’s 
loose talk of ‘ascribing perfect identity to (perceptual) images’ as a tacit recognition of the 
conundrum he faces: namely, that ‘ascribing perfect identity to objects’ is equally 
problematic.  
 
2.3. The thread from Hume’s science of man to the Critique of Pure Reason 
Hume’s failure to explain the genesis of our belief in external bodies is extremely significant, 
much more so than it first appears. Hume presents the issue of external bodies as one among 
the many which a science of man must address: other similarly fundamental judgements such 
as those concerning causation, personal identity etc., also demand attention. Viewing these as 
relatively distinct topics for investigation suggests that difficulties with one of them need not 
afflict the others. Roughly, just because Hume fails to provide an adequate account of the 
belief in external bodies, this need not permeate the broader naturalistic endeavour.  
However, this rather benign assessment is over-simplistic. The problem is that belief 
in external bodies is not isolated in the way that this analysis would suggest. What is in 
question is not a single, confined belief, ‘Distinct and continuous bodies exist’, nor even a 
broad class of beliefs of the form ‘X exists distinctly and continuously’. In fact, belief in 
external bodies is implicit in all judgements.  As I pointed out earlier, ‘external bodies’ for 
Hume is interchangeable with ‘external objects’ or even the more ontologically neutral 
‘external world’. By it, he simply means to denote whatever is understood to exist distinct of 
our perceiving it and exist continuously when unperceived, and this can be construed broadly 
to include objects, properties, relations etc. (as far as I can see, it can include whatever 
ontological categories one may endorse). Yet, it follows from this that most, if not all of our 
judgements invoke or presuppose belief in external bodies, for this is to say no more than that 
our judgements are directed at the world: that they have accuracy or veridicality conditions 
which are satisfied, or not, by the way the world is, rather than by the way our perceptions are. 
For example, when I judge ‘this rose is red’, I am not claiming that there is a connection 
holding of my ideas/perceptions. Rather, I am attributing a property of objects which exist 
distinctly and continuously to an object which exists distinctly and continuously. The same 
essentially applies to: ‘swans are white’, ‘the motion of the billiard ball caused the second 
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billiard ball to move’, and ‘I am identical with myself’. In other words, to ask why we make 
judgements about external bodies/object/existence is to ask why judgements have intentional 
content.  
That Hume did not fully appreciate this is manifest in how he attempts to explicate the 
common position from which judgements of external bodies emerge. In particular, he treats 
this as a state in which many judgements – suitably forceful ideas - are possible, just not that 
of external existence. Most notably, he declares that subjects in the common position make 
judgements about identity. Yet, this is to neglect how all judgements seem to be judgements 
of external bodies. Hume’s neglect of this point made it all but inevitable that his account of 
the common position from which belief in external bodies springs would presuppose what is 
in need of explanation. 
Since belief in external bodies is presupposed by all judgements, what appears to be 
an isolated shortcoming of Hume’s science actually comprehensively pervades it. This is 
because, recall, the explananda for a science of man are the judgements (or at least, an 
important subset thereof) people form. The whole approach is founded upon treating 
judgements as a data set peculiar to moral subjects, to be explained by tracing their genesis 
back to more primitive causal antecedents. Consequently, in failing to account for the belief 
in external bodies, Hume fails to account for the most fundamental feature of this data set – 
that they are intentional. He does not explain why judgements ubiquitously have intentional 
content.   
In the context of Hume’s theory of ideas, this worry could be posed more generally as 
a challenge for this framework. Insofar as this is the framework within which the judgements 
of moral subjects are to be explained, a scientist of man is faced with a pressing challenge: 
The Intentionality Problem: How is it that, by means of our perceptions, we enjoy mental 
states which so much as seem to be about or directed at things other than these perceptions 
themselves, specifically objects which exist distinctly and continuously? 
Given that this question is simply a theory of ideas-relative formulation of the question ‘how 
is it that judgements are objective / why do humans form belief in external bodies?’ Hume, 
inevitably, has no adequate response to offer here.40  
                                                           
40
 Consider how, as I have pointed out on numerous occasions, impressions and ideas have content essentially 
according to Hume. They are inherently in the representation business. But to say this much is already to 
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It is important to emphasise that presenting this as a problem for Hume does not 
conflict with my earlier pronouncements in Section 1.4 and 1.5 regarding the naturalistic 
status of his theory of ideas. Recall, I argued there that Hume’s theory of ideas is primarily 
intended as a psychological thesis, an inference to the best explanation, rather than an 
epistemological thesis. I argued that although the theory of ideas raises epistemological 
questions, namely whether our mental states successfully make cognitive contact with the 
world, these are questions Hume legitimately considers to fall outside the purview of a 
science of man. Now, one possible suggestion at this point, and one which I am anxious to 
guard against, is that the intentionality problem is essentially an epistemological challenge of 
the sort I earlier declared Hume need not concern himself with. Were this the case, I would 
clearly be contradicting myself, but it isn’t, so I’m not. The Intentionality problem is not that 
of determining whether our representations or states are veridical or accurate. Nor is it that of 
determining criteria by which we might justifiably take them as veridical. Rather, it is the 
challenge of determining why it is that they are directed upon or are about a world which 
exists distinctly and independently at all: a problem of intentionality. Why they so much as 
purport to be about the world in this fashion (even if they are actually non-veridical).41 
Insofar as this is simply a theory of ideas-relative formulation of Hume’s question: ‘how do 
we acquire belief in external bodies’, it certainly is a problem for a scientist of man.  As we 
might say, the intentionality problem is not that of whether our states are veridical or not – a 
problem which falls outside the purview of Hume’s approach –, but rather, the problem of 
why our states so much as purport to veridicality, a problem which absolutely does fall within 
the purview of Hume’s approach. 
In my view, this intentionality problem marks the most fundamental connection 
between Hume’s science of man and Kant’s transcendental philosophy. However, whereas 
Hume was never properly cognizant of the issue, Kant has a sophisticated grasp of it, placing 
it at the heart of the first Critique: 
“How does it come about that we posit an object for these representations, or attach to 
them, beyond their subjective reality as modifications, some kind of an objective 
reality?” (A197/B242) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
attribute to subjects the idea of external bodies, and at least some beliefs in external bodies. There is a certain 
sense then in which Hume’s pursuit of the question, ‘why do moral subjects form beliefs in external bodies’ is 
confused by his own standards.  
41
 I discuss this distinction in more detail in relation to Kant in Section 4.2. 
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In this sense, Kant picks up a challenge which is of pressing concern for a science of man - 
albeit one which Hume overlooks - and attempts to answer it from within his own distinction 
philosophical standpoint.42 The account Kant develops will be the primary concern of Part II, 
but I want to conclude my discussion of Hume by foreshadowing why this account is so 
important, and why it is an appropriate topic to turn to having explored Hume’s science of 
man. The significance of Kant’s account lies not merely in that he is grappling with a 
problem which should be on Hume’s horizon also, although this certainly invests it with 
enough significance to be getting on with. In the context of this thesis, the reason why Kant’s 
response to this challenge is so consequential is that fundamental to the account he develops 
is the role he assigns to judgement. Indeed, Kant’s conception of judgement only makes sense 
in light of his interest the problem of intentionality; they are inextricably entwined for him. 
This is of pivotal importance: it ensures that a philosophical thread which moves from Hume-
on-judgement (or more generally, judgement within a science of man - see below) to Kant-
on-judgement is much more than a survey of disparate and unconnected approaches to 
judgement: much more than an inspection of a fraction of Sluga’s “hyper complex” domain. 
The problem of intentionality binds together these approaches relative to a common 
philosophical question, providing the thread or philosophical narrative which runs throughout. 
While the theme of this thesis is judgement, the integrity of this theme derives from its being 
interwoven with the problem of intentionality.  
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 Longuenesse (1998: 186-7) considers, and then rejects, interpreting Kant’s refutation of Hume in this way. 
The reason for this is that “of course, Hume does have a story to tell about how we come to believe that our 
impressions and ideas represent properties of objects “whatever the state of the subject””. However, as I have 
argued, not only does Hume lack an adequate story, he has only a weak grasp of the problem.  
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Chapter 3. Cognitive Science 
 
My concern in this chapter is to show how Hume’s naturalism forms the methodological 
framework for contemporary cognitive science and how, as such, cognitive scientists can be 
seen reinvigorating the science of man, two hundred and fifty years after the publication of 
the Treatise. I shall begin by observing some general points of comparison, before turning to 
two case studies of how cognitive scientists have approached grammaticality judgements and 
moral judgements.43  
 
3.1. Picking up humean strands 
Hume’s attempt to chart a “[human] mental geography, or delineation of the distinct powers 
of the mind” (Enquiry: 1.13, 93) has been widely identified as a forerunner of contemporary 
cognitive science (e.g. Chomsky, 2000: 164; Hinzen, 2006: 1). Indeed, Fodor (2003: 134) 
claims that the Treatise is the “foundational document” of cognitive science. Unfortunately 
however, this connection is too often amalgamated into, or subsumed under, a more general 
historical reading, according to which the whole of early modern philosophy is portrayed as a 
fledgling empirical science of the mind. Hatfield notes how it is increasingly common to see 
the early moderns “as having been pioneers in the development of a naturalistic approach to 
the mind, and perhaps to have been early labourers in the field of cognitive science” (Hatfield, 
1990: 10).44 On this view, early modern philosophers were primarily interested in what would 
today be thought of as largely psychological problems: how does the mind work? What are 
its component parts? For example, Chomsky has repeatedly insisted that the common practice 
of labelling the deep shifts in intellectual thought which laid the foundations for cognitive 
science in the 1950s the ‘cognitive revolution’ is misleading. Instead, he suggests, ‘the 
second cognitive revolution’ would be more appropriate since cognitive scientists have been 
“rediscovering” themes which first arose towards the end of the seventeenth century 
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 Since my case study of moral judgements is more original and less familiar than that of grammaticality 
judgements, I shall dwell on it longer.  
44
 I do not mean to suggest that this is the overriding view of the early modern period amongst, say, historians of 
philosophy or, indeed, philosophers at large. However, where the connection between Hume and cognitive 
science has been identified, often this has been within the confines of this broader historical stance.  
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(Chomsky, 2007: 3). As such, to the extent that philosophy nowadays eschews psychological 
questions, it is seen to be betraying its early modern roots (e.g. Knobe, 2007).  
Essential to this exegetical strategy has been to interpret the early modern 
preoccupation with the existence of innate ideas, a topic which enlivened and animated the 
likes of Locke and Leibniz, as a precursor to current debates in the field of developmental 
psychology. These debates centre upon the question, ‘to what extent, and in what sense, are 
our mental powers genetically constrained?’ with a scale of answers possible. At one end of 
the scale, a strong empiricist contends that our genetic endowment greatly under specifies the 
type of mental faculties which humans acquire, providing little more than a general learning 
device, enabling abstraction and generalisation. At the other end of the scale, a strong nativist 
favours a substantial genetic endowment which severely restricts the space of possible (that is, 
biologically possible) psychological development. Such developmental questions are matters 
for empirical science if anything is and by equating these questions with the early modern 
concern with innate ideas, the broader historical outlook is largely secured. For example, 
Steven Pinker (2002: 18-19) interprets Locke’s famous proposal that the mind is a tabula 
rasa as an early example of psychological behaviourism. Specifically, Locke is said to be 
denying that is such a thing as human nature: that there are virtually no initial constraints 
upon the pathway of mental development. Psychological behaviourists in the twentieth 
century simply updated this view by “replacing” Lockean ideas with stimulus and response, 
and association with conditioning. 
However, portraying Locke as an early psychological behaviourist is plainly 
inconsistent with much of what he says in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. For 
example he says that “The candle, that is set up for our purposes, shines bright enough for all 
our purposes”, adding that objects must be entertained in that way that is suited to our 
faculties (Locke, 1690: 13). Locke accepted that there was such a thing as human nature, 
constantly stressing that we are not angels and can only make best use of the limited faculties 
we have available to us. As Blackburn (Ms.) states in his review of Pinker, “Locke only 
wanted to deny innate ideas and knowledge, not innate powers or tendencies, nor innate 
limitations, nor innate cognitive and emotional capacities”. For Locke, the tabula rasa 
metaphor was not a rejection of a psychological thesis regarding mental development, but a 
rejection of an epistemological thesis. Specifically, Locke was claiming that what can be 
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known prior to experience is highly limited.45 He thought that aside from a class of intuitive 
and demonstrative propositions, there are no propositions we are justified in asserting 
irrespective of sense data. Whatever psychological nativism one may choose to endorse, there 
is no nontrivial move from this to any claim about what we are warranted in asserting a 
priori;46 it is the latter issue which Locke is interested in: “The initial and abiding focus of 
Locke’s investigation is the ground of belief... rather than the naturalistic search for causal 
mechanisms... or psychogenesis” (Hatfield, 1990: 29-30).47 Indeed, it is precisely this 
epistemological question which Hatfield (1990; 1997) persuasively argues was the 
centrepiece of early modern philosophy, one which concerned the real use of the intellect. 
Many philosophers believed that, alongside a logical use whereby ideas were compared and 
contrasted, the intellect also had a ‘real use’ in which it operated as an epistemic power 
(Hatfield, 1990: 3). According to this view, the intellect, properly employed, was capable of 
delivering substantial truths about the world a priori, without the aid of the senses. It was this 
real use of the intellect which Locke sought to curtail with his tabula rasa metaphor. By 
contrast, for Descartes the undiluted operation of the intellect, ‘the clear and distinct light of 
reason’, was capable of yielding considerable knowledge of the world e.g. the essences of 
substances. Cudworth believed that the real use of the intellect had a very wide range. Most 
famously, he argued (1731: IV.2, 83) that our moral knowledge, that of “virtue, vice, honesty, 
dishonest, justice, injustice”, was derived not from the senses, but secured by the activity of 
the intellect. Crucially, the key claim for Cudworth was not merely that our moral ideas are 
innate, but that they provide us with secure knowledge of an independent moral reality i.e. 
knowledge of matter of fact.48 As Norton (1982: 31) comments, “There can be no question, 
either, of this moral reality being [for Cudworth] mutable, private, or conventional. 
Knowledge is, after all, of that which is unchangeable and public, and of the nature of 
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 For Locke, what can be known prior to experience is either a matter of intuition or demonstration. Intuitive 
knowledge involves comparing our ideas and recognising relations they bear to each other e.g. white does not 
resemble black. Yet, such knowledge does not extend our knowledge of the world, only of our ideas (it is, 
roughly, analytic in Kant’s terminology). Demonstrative knowledge is a matter of moving from one idea to 
another by interposing a chain of related intermediaries. According to Locke, this includes mathematics, the 
existence of God and key moral axioms (cf. Allison, 2008: 65-72), - knowledge sufficiently extensive to call 
into question the appropriateness of calling Locke an ‘empiricist’ at all. 
46
 This is for the obvious reason that the ‘innate’ basis of a belief does not preclude error. For example Richard 
Joyce (2007) argues (a) that our moral concepts are innate (or evolved) and, (b) that we are not justified in 
endorsing any moral proposition. There is certainly nothing incoherent about such a view. 
47
 By contrast, “psychogenesis” is precisely what Hume is interested in.  
48
 For this reason, hypotheses regarding the existence of a genetically encoded language acquisition device 
would have been of little interest to Cudworth (pace Chomsky, 1966: 100). 
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things.”49 While the early moderns were keenly occupied with the matter of innate ideas then, 
this was understood within this broader epistemological frame, foreclosing any simplistic 
‘psychologistic’ readings of the period. 
It follow from this that it is imperative to hold apart the claim that Hume’s science of 
man is a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science from the claim that the early modern 
period as a whole should be read as a kind of nascent psychology. For while the latter claim 
is mistaken, in Hume’s science of man, something, recall, he considered to be “almost 
entirely new” (Treatise: intro., xvi), we really do, I think, find the seeds of cognitive science. 
This marks Hume’s project out as unique, and renders more valuable an assessment of its 
relation to cognitive science. Although this is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of 
the history and philosophy of cognitive science, I think that some brief observations 
regarding its foundations can serve to illuminate this relation. Consider the following: 
“It is the business of normal empirical science – of the burgeoning field of “cognitive 
science,”... to generate best hypothesis about what states and processes would best 
explain the creatures’ observable behaviour.” (Biro, 1993: 52) 
In this quote, Biro intentionally describes cognitive science in terms which can be accurately 
applied verbatim to Hume’s naturalistic approach in order to underline the parallels (these 
parallels are the subject of the article in question). Yet, in fact, the language should be 
stronger. Specifically, while Hume talked of targeting ‘the observable behaviour’ of moral 
subjects, but largely concerned himself with certain universal judgements produced regarding 
matters of fact, so too linguists and moral psychologists have had a special interest in 
explaining the judgements people make. For example, Baker (2008: 235) stresses that 
essential to the foundation and subsequent flourishing of linguistics in the 1950s was the 
identification of a relatively narrow and well-defined linguistic explananda: subjects’ 
grammaticality judgements. The challenge was (and still is) to account for how native 
speakers judge certain strings to be linguistically acceptable or sentences of the language. 
Crucially, isolating acceptability judgements in this way entails the eschewal of other 
possible, and perfectly coherent, linguistic explananda, most notably, linguistic performance 
or language use: why speakers say what they say in certain circumstances, rather than 
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 On Norton’s reading, the Scottish Naturalists, Kames, Reid and Beattie, were also appealing to this real use of 
the intellect, i.e. an priori warrant for non-demonstrative truths,  when they spoke of ‘natural belief’ (cf. 1982: 
Chapters. 4 & 5). This reading strikes me as plausible and shows that their criticisms of Hume were largely 
misplaced. 
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something else (or indeed, nothing else) (cf. Newmeyer, 1986: 3). By contrast, accounting for 
linguistic performance had been the major desideratum for earlier behaviourist sciences of 
language. For example, Skinner (1957) had aimed to explain (and so predict) the linguistic 
behaviour or performance of speakers, that is, their utterances, on the basis of environmental 
stimuli and their history of conditioning. Chomsky (1959: 55) influentially argued not that 
such a desideratum is incoherent or ‘not really linguistic’, but simply that it is too difficult to 
be the subject of scientific investigation, a state of affairs which has yet to change (Chomsky, 
2000: 17; Mukherji, 2010). 
Just as in linguistics acceptability judgements are the foundational explananda for the 
discipline, in moral psychology subjects’ moral judgements have played this role. That is, 
peoples’ moral judgements constitute, for the moral psychologist, the primary data set: “a set 
of considered judgements” which are stated “as explanandum sentences” (Mikhail, 2009: 27-
28). It is this data for which a principled account is sought. By contrast, moral psychologists 
have largely forborne from investigating other moral phenomena, such as moral behaviour. 
Just as linguists consider linguistic performance to be too complex a matter for the current 
state of inquiry, so too in the corresponding case of moral behaviour (Dwyer, et al., 2010: 
489). As Abend (2012: 1-3) puts it, in moral psychology, ‘judgement-centric approaches’ 
dominate.  
Having isolated a class of such judgements, understood as an identifiable kind of 
observable behaviour, the task for the cognitive scientist is to trace their psychological 
genesis or “causal etiology” (Dwyer, 2009: 279). That is, judgements are treated according to 
the ‘science of man template’. Judgements are the explananda of inquiry. In my view, this 
point of convergence is sufficiently critical to justify the claim that linguists and moral 
psychologists are pursuing a science of man. 
Moreover, the parallels between Hume’s naturalistic approach and contemporary 
cognitive science go further. For Hume, tracing the etiology of judgements meant tracing 
their causal ancestry back to more primitive mental elements: impressions, ideas and natural 
relations holding thereof. This theory of ideas was the theoretical framework within which 
the explanatory task was addressed. In turn, it is possible to ask what the corresponding 
theoretical framework within which cognitive scientists address the question of causal 
etiology is. According to Bermudez (2010: 6), “the guiding idea of cognitive science” is that 
mental activity is information processing. It follows from this that insofar as the judgements 
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people draw, grammatical, moral or otherwise, are to be amenable to a cogno-scientific 
investigation, that is, insofar as they are suitable explananda, they must be produced by 
mechanisms or systems which process information. Yet, ‘information processing’ is vague if 
anything is, and a more concrete formulation of the notion of information processing is that 
the relevant mechanisms or systems are computational.50 This computational paradigm has 
been central to developments in both linguistics and moral psychology:    
 “The general idea is that the language faculty involves a precisely articulated 
computational system.” (Chomsky, 1986: 204) 
“EMP [(empirical moral psychology] targets the computational mechanisms and 
cognitive architecture that is responsible for the explicit intuitions [judgements] about 
justice, rights and welfare that arise as people attempt to resolve moral quandaries.” 
(Huebner, 2011: 52) 
Evidently, the full breadth of this topic extends well beyond what can be broached here. 
Nevertheless, saying a bit more will indicate why this computational paradigm is relevant to a 
comparison of Hume’s naturalism and cognitive science. Marr (1982) influentially argued 
that any computational system can be described at three levels of analysis: 
1. Functional level: Describes the function or processing task performed by specifying the 
input to the system and the output of the system.51 
2. Algorithmic level:  Describes how the system performs the function described in (1) by 
stating the algorithms according to which the input is mapped to the output. 
3. Implementation level: Describes how the execution of the algorithms described in (2) is 
realised by or implemented in a supervenience base e.g. neural circuitry (cf. Bermudez, 2010: 
47-54 &127-134). 
According to Marr, accounts ought to begin at the top level of description, i.e. (1), since the 
higher order descriptions constrain the descriptions given at the level(s) below. Perhaps most 
                                                           
50
 Strictly speaking, information processing is a broader notion than that of computation. Although Fodor once 
claimed that the computational paradigm is the ‘only game in town’, connectionism is generally seen nowadays 
as a viable alternative (though, for an influential denial of this point, see Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). Either way, 
since both linguistics and moral psychology have been founded upon the computational paradigm, I shall set 
aside connectionism here.  
51
 Arguably Hume grasped the importance of this functional level of description. Compare it with Stroud’s 
(2006: 350) assertion that Hume’s enterprise is “illuminating in direct proportion to the size of the gap it posits 
between the impoverished non-propositional input human beings receive and the profuse and highly articulated 
output of beliefs and other attitudes they end up with” [my italics]. 
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importantly, it is possible to describe a cognitive system at the Functional and Algorithmic 
levels, without prejudicing, or independently of, the question of how the input, output and 
algorithms of the system are implemented or realised i.e. descriptions at level (3): 
“It is possible to study formal algorithmic processes without regard to how such 
processes are physically instantiated in an actual device.” (Pylyshyn 1980: 115)52 
As such, it is possible to study computational systems in abstraction from their physical 
implementation: namely, at the Functional and Algorithmic levels of description. The notion 
of an algorithm is that of a purely mechanical procedure: specifically, a finite set of rules that 
are unambiguous and can be applied to objects and yield objects as an output. That is, the 
Algorithmic level describes functions which map the inputs of a system, as per described at 
the Functional level, to the outputs of the system, as per described at the Functional level. 
This mapping is a kind of process, and insofar as the relevant inputs and outputs are 
appropriately understood as information, this computational paradigm is an information 
processing paradigm. In this way, the inputs and outputs of the system, the bearers of 
information, are the primitives of the system, the units over which the algorithms are defined. 
In cognitive science, these units are taken to be mental symbols or representations. Insofar as 
they bear information, they have certain semantic properties, and insofar as they are 
algorithmic primitives they have also certain formal or syntactic properties. 
 To a certain degree, the details of this picture do not matter too much. What does 
matter is that insofar as cognitive scientists have sought to account for their explananda by 
recourse to a computational paradigm, they necessarily invoke a domain of mental 
representations. These mental representations are postulated as part of an inference to the best 
explanation, and feature in an account of the causal genesis of certain judgements. The 
parallels to Hume’s own theory of ideas should be obvious. For instance, compare Hinzen’s 
(2006: 42) assertion that  
“Chomsky’s study of the mind... is crucially not concerned with mental 
representation-as a relation between mind and world...-as with mental representations, 
considered as specific natural objects that enter into language use and are invoked to 
explain it.” 
                                                           
52
 This foundational claim is one which philosophers of mind have not always been sufficiently sensitive to, 
occasionally resulting in misplaced criticism of certain cognitive scientific proposals e.g. Johnson, (2012). See 
Kirkby (2013) for a critique of Johnson on this point. 
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, with: 
“…he [Hume] treats all cognitive operations... as consisting entirely of operations 
performed with and on mental representations” (Garrett, 1997: 39) 
Admittedly, this parallel should not be overstated. Insofar as Hume had no concept of 
computation or of an algorithm, he understands mental representations very differently. For 
Hume, mental atoms or representations are understood in imagistic terms. Perceptions are 
simply mental images of some degree of clarity and vividness. It never occurs to Hume that 
over and above their imagistic properties, perceptions may also have formally specifiable, 
syntactic properties. Of course, insofar as the idea of syntactic properties only really arises 
with that of computation, this is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, since construing mental 
representations as syntactic objects has been critical to cogno-scientific accounts, this still 
marks a significant disanalogy between the two conceptions of mental representations. 
Furthermore, while both Hume and cognitive scientists appeal to mental atoms as part 
of an inference to the best explanation, there is a radical divergence in the range of relations 
these atoms are subject to. Hume avails himself of remarkably few resources in accounting 
for the judgements of moral subjects. Three natural relations, resemblance, contiguity and 
cause and effect hold of ideas and serve to guide the primitive act of the imagination: 
association. Hume’s explanations for judgements of any kind appeal to little more than the 
ways in which association, guided by these qualities, conflates our ideas and is generally 
overactive like ‘a ship set in motion’. As such, the relations mental representations are subject 
to are highly circumscribed and completely domain general. By contrast, the modularity of 
the mind has long been an influential doctrine in cognitive science: where the mind is 
comprised of a number of domain specific systems (Fodor, 1983). An effect of modularity is 
that the relations which mental representations are potentially subject to are far more 
numerous than those considered sufficient by Hume.  
Despite these significant qualifications, the points of comparison between Hume’s 
naturalistic approach and cognitive science – the common conception of judgement and the 
postulation of a realm of mental representations as an inference to the best explanation – 
warrant the assertion that  cognitive scientists are engaged in a science of man. I now turn to 
case studies of contemporary linguistics and moral cognition. 
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3.2. Grammaticality judgements 
The point of departure for linguistic inquiry is the judgements speakers of natural languages 
make about physical strings. For example:  
1. John likes him. 
2. John thinks that Bill likes him. 
3. Every man loves some woman. 
4. Loves some woman every man. 
Speakers of English have clear judgements about these strings. In (1) ‘him’ cannot 
referentially depend upon ‘John’. In (2), ‘him’ can referentially depend upon ‘John’, but need 
not. (3) is ambiguous; it can mean either that there is a particular woman that every man loves, 
or that every man loves a woman, but not necessarily the same one. (4) is unacceptable. In 
other words, these are judgements about how sounds (or gestures or marks) can and cannot be 
paired with meaning. Certain connections of sound and meaning are acceptable, others are 
not.53 Such corpuses of acceptability or grammaticality judgements are the explananda for 
linguists, that which grounds and motivates the inquiry. Equivalently, acceptability 
judgements are understood as a kind of observable behaviour for which principled 
explanation is sought. This principled explanation is a matter of tracing the causal genesis of 
the judgements in question.  
What kind of competence must be attributed to speakers in order to account for, or 
explain the grammaticality judgements they produce?54 It should be clear that invoking folk 
psychology is hopeless in this regard. Notoriously, people have sparingly few beliefs about 
grammar, seldom extending beyond classifying constituents in terms of subject, object and 
verb. No inspection of subjects’ propositional attitudes can account for their grammaticality 
judgements. Equally untenable is an account which invokes a stored mental repository of 
string-meaning pairings based upon the subjects’ past experience. Such a competence could 
not explain the fact that subjects’ grammaticality judgements are unbounded and very often 
novel. Because language allows for the iteration of attitudinal verbs and relative clauses, 
                                                           
53
 This is something of an oversimplification since natural languages are not constituted by well-formed formula 
in the way that formal languages are. Rather, the unacceptability of a sentence can be more or less severe. 
Nevertheless, I ignore this complication here. 
54
 Chomsky has sometimes spoken of what speakers of a natural language must know. However, knowledge 
implies, if not entails, justificatory grounds, and insofar as Chomsky is not interested in making an epistemic 
claim, only an explanatory one (see, Chomsky, 1980: 69-70), the epistemically neutral term ‘competence’ is 
better in this respect (Collins, 2004; 2008: 125-8; Hinzen, 2006: 19). 
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speakers’ grammaticality judgements extend to an unbounded number of strings, most of 
which they have had no past experience of: 
5. The man which the dog bit which the cat scratched... 
6. John thinks that Mary said that Bill hoped... 
Prior to the inception of Generative Grammar, structural linguists tried to explain this novelty 
phenomenon by gesturing towards a capacity for analogy. For instance, it was said that a 
speaker “utters them [new sentences] on the analogy of similar forms which he has heard” 
(Bloomfield 1933: 275). However, there is simply no precise formulation of how an 
analogical ability could explain speakers’ grammaticality judgements. Jackendoff (2002: 87) 
draws attention to the example:  
7. Every acorn grew into an oak. 
8. Every oak grew out of an acorn. 
9. An oak grew out of every acorn. 
10. *An acorn grew into every oak. 
From (7-9) there is a relation of symmetry between each acorn and each oak. However, in the 
case of (10) this relation is not available, despite its apparent analogical form. Similarly, 
Pietroski (2005: 3-5) underlines the non-analogical character of subjects’ grammaticality 
judgements by citing what he calls ‘negative facts’. Negative facts concern the unavailability 
of certain interpretations of strings. For example: 
11. a. John is easy to please. 
b. It is easy for us to please John. 
c. It is easy for John to please us. 
12. a. John is eager to please. 
b. John is eager for us to please him. 
c. John is eager that he pleases us. 
(11. a) can be paraphrased with (11.b), but not with (11.c), whilst (12.a) can be paraphrased 
with (12.c), but not with (12.b). Pietroski points out that these unavailable interpretations, 
(11.c) and (12.b) are not incoherent or contradictory. Most interestingly from the current 
perspective is that were grammaticality judgements analogical, we would expect these 
interpretations to be available. For example, given that when ‘John’ combines with ‘is easy to 
please’, John is the recipient of the pleasing (i.e. 11.a. to 11.b), analogy would imply that 
when ‘John’ combines with ‘is eager to please’ John is the recipient of the pleasing also (i.e. 
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12.a to 12.b). Yet 12.b is not a possible reading of 12.a. Alternatively, given that when ‘John’ 
combines with ‘is eager to please’ John is the pleaser (i.e. 12.a to 12.c), analogy would imply 
that when ‘John’ combines with ‘is easy to please’, John is the pleaseer also (i.e. 11.a to 11.c). 
Yet 11.c is not a possible reading of 11.a. As Chomsky (1988: 20) points out, such examples 
preclude explaining subjects’ grammaticality judgements by recourse to a domain general 
capacity for reasoning analogically. 
Since the late 1950s, linguists have argued that subjects’ grammaticality judgements 
are attributable to a computational competence: a generative grammar. This grammar is 
comprised of a finite number of lexical items along with rules and principles for recursively 
combining these items into part-whole structures. This grammar mechanically generates the 
grammaticality judgements of speakers, and so can be thought of as the causal antecedent of 
these judgements. For this reason, a generative grammar is commonly called ‘I-language’, 
since it defines the sentences of a speaker’s language intensionally, at the individual level, 
and in internalist terms (i.e. without recourse to social conventions). 
 
3.3. Moral judgements 
The primary explananda for moral psychologists are the moral judgements subjects make. In 
fact however, investigation is not only restricted in this way, but has been primarily limited 
more specifically to a certain type of moral judgement: deontic moral judgements. These 
judgements concern whether a particular act or event is permissible/obligatory/forbidden. 
This is a non-trivial limitation given that as well as deontic judgements, moral judgement also 
include evaluative judgements e.g. ‘Brian is good/courageous/kind’ etc.55 Deontic moral 
judgements (from here on in, moral judgements) have been investigated as responses to 
situations of ‘quandry ethics’. Subjects are presented with complex vignettes describing a 
particular situation and a possible course of action. Subjects are then asked whether the 
proposed course of action is a permissible one. Consequently, the judgements elicited are of 
the form: 
‘It is permissible for person A to do X in situation S’ 
                                                           
55
 There are a number of reasons why the former have been favoured over the latter and I will only gesture at 
them here. Firstly, evaluative predicates are inherently gradable, prompting an issue of quantification which is 
hard, if not impossible to determine simply the basis of subjects’ responses. Secondly, deontic operators exhibit 
a common logic (Mikhail, 2007: 144). There is no such logic for evaluative terms, apparently foreclosing the 
possibility of a precise or formally specifiable relation between different evaluative predicates.  
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The vignettes most utilised have included the well known trolley problems (Mikhail, 
2000, 2011; Hauser, 2006), originating in the work of Philippa Foot (1978). Alongside these, 
researchers have also devised their own scenarios of lifeboat dilemmas (Shenhav & Greene, 
2010), infanticide dilemmas (Greene, et al., 2004) etc.56 For example: 
Switch case: A runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people, but the driver can 
push a button that will turn the trolley onto a sidetrack where it will kill only one person. Is it 
permissible to push the button? 
Footbridge case: A runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people, but a bystander 
who is standing on a footbridge can shove a man in front of the trolley, saving the five people 
but killing the man. Is it permissible to shove the man? 
The most important, general result of these studies has been to show that, as a matter of fact, 
peoples’ moral judgements exhibit a certain regularity and predictability. For example, 
subjects overwhelmingly agree that it is permissible to push the button in the switch case and 
impermissible to push the man in the footbridge case, despite the equivalent consequences 
(five men saved, one killed). These kinds of regularities consistently appear for a wide range 
of such scenarios. Furthermore, this holds across demographic divisions such as sex, gender, 
religion and education (Mikhail, 2011; Hauser, 2006). Generalising from the data, we might 
say, rather sweepingly, that with respect to peoples’ moral judgements, as a matter of fact, it 
is not the case that ‘anything goes’.  
This regularity thesis is especially significant when considered in conjunction with the 
novelty of subjects’ moral judgements. As Mikhail (2000: 56-7) puts it, “with a few 
exceptions, no two situations which occasion moral judgements are exactly alike. Each is a 
potentially brand new combination of agents, acts, events and circumstances, occurring for 
the first time in the history of the universe”. The trolley problems are a case in point. Few 
people will have ever been confronted by such peculiar situations, yet they have no difficulty 
in producing moral judgements about them. Quite simply, moral judgements are not restricted 
to a set of prescribed situations or ones which people have previously encountered. The vast 
majority of moral judgements subjects produce pertain to situations hitherto unfamiliar to 
them, involving novel combinations of actors and properties. Indeed, such considerations lead 
                                                           
56
 There are complex and nuanced issues surrounding the choice of dilemmas subjects are presented with. For 
example, how artificial should the scenarios be? How much information about the participants in the scenario 
should be supplied? (Participants are almost always described in the third person, hence foreclosing any 
personal connection to the subject).   
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Dwyer (2009: 10) to talk of the human capacity for an “infinity of scene/[deontic]valuations 
associations”. This novelty is important because it renders the regularity of subjects’ moral 
judgements all the more puzzling. In particular, it invalidates any explanatory account which 
simply attributes to subjects a stored repository of scene type/deontic valuation pairings. Such 
a competence could not account for the fact that moral judgements can be, and very often are, 
novel from the perspective of the subject.  
The question for the moral psychologist then is why do people have the moral 
judgements that they have? More precisely, how can they be regular and predictable in the 
ways that they are, rather than regular in quite different ways, or indeed, not at all, and yet at 
the same time often be novel from the perspective of the subject? Answering this will be a 
matter of establishing “the causal etiology of such judgements” (Dwyer, 2009: 279) or 
reverse engineering their psychological origins. Despite the paradigmatically normative 
character of the judgements in question, tracing their genesis is, nevertheless, a purely 
descriptive undertaking and does not entail any normative conclusions.57 
Prima facie, perhaps the most obvious source of these regularities is common patterns 
of reasoning and deliberation. Indeed, the rationalist thesis that peoples’ moral judgements 
are determined by the types of moral reasoning they engage in was fundamental to the highly 
influential model of moral development advanced by Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) (for 
discussion, Krebs & Denton, 2005: 629). However, one of the most significant developments 
in moral psychology over the past twenty years has been a recognition that moral judgement 
does not depend upon reasoning and deliberation in the way which Kohlberg envisioned. Of 
particular importance has been the phenomenon of ‘moral dumbfounding’, where subjects are 
unable to articulate reasons for their own moral judgements. Perhaps the most famous 
example of moral dumbfounding concerns sibling incest (Haidt, Koller and Dias, 1993), 
though the phenomenon has been exhibited across a wide range of cases (e.g. Cushman, et al., 
2006). Moreover, where subjects do offer reasons, they are often not relevant, or clearly ill-
suited to justifying the judgement made. Rather than being the products of deliberation, 
subjects’ judgements very often appear almost reflexive, appearing in consciousness as a 
‘flash of insight’ (Haidt, 2001: 818). Indeed, Haidt claims that the field has converged upon 
                                                           
57
 Although there is no entailment, certainly some researchers have sought to forge a connection between 
descriptive facts about the genesis of a judgement and its normative warrant. “It is hard to see how one could 
reach a conclusion about whether moral intuitions [moral judgements] are justified without having any idea of 
how they work.” (Sinnott-Armstrong et al, 2010). Generally however, researchers have been quick to stress that 
an answer to the descriptive question, need not entail anything with respect to the normative one e.g. Hauser 
(2006: 96); Dwyer (2007: 252-253).   
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the ‘intuitive primacy principle’ which relegates verbal reasoning, in most cases, to the role 
of a post hoc rationalisation of a pre-existing intuition. According to this view, moral 
deliberation plays the role of a lawyer trying to defend a position already determined (Haidt, 
2001: 814).58  
The conjunction of (a) the regularity and predictability of subjects’ moral judgements, 
(b) their novelty and, (c) the lack of a clear explanatory connection between them and 
subjects’ moral reasoning, raises the prospects of a distinctive object of inquiry in the moral 
domain: that is, those psychological mechanisms and processes, those ‘secret springs and 
principles’, which are responsible for subjects’ moral judgements. This object of inquiry can 
be described in terms of Marr’s three levels. Consider first the functional level, where the 
challenge is to describe the function of the target mechanism in terms of its input and output. 
The output in the current case is clear: the moral judgements subjects produce. The far more 
challenging task is to explicate the input. For the language faculty this is a lexical array, 
roughly, a set of words, but what about in the moral case? An important initial observation is 
that whatever the input is, it is necessary that it encode for those distinctions and properties 
which the output provably co-varies with, and so those which ex hypothesi play a causal role 
in the derivation of moral judgements. That there are such distinctions is presupposed by the 
methodological approach universally embraced by moral psychologists: presenting subjects 
with descriptions of acts/events and then testing how their judgements systematically vary 
when features of the acts/events are modified. Indeed, insofar as these properties are 
generally supposed to be non-moral in character, moral psychologists are simply 
presupposing a descriptive version of moral supervenience: 
“An action-guiding appraisal of actions, persons, and institutions that did not depend 
on the otherwise specifiable features of these items would not be moral judgement as 
we know it.” (van Roojen, 2006: 172)59 
This seems reasonable enough. Even without a precise enumeration of what the “otherwise 
specifiable features” are, there is good evidence that they must include properties such as 
agent, patient, end, means, battery, omission etc., and consequently, the input must be such 
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 This is almost certainly an oversimplification (Pizarro and Bloom, 2003). Establishing the extent to which 
reason does shape moral judgements is a delicate, and largely open question. Nevertheless, for present purposes, 
the generalisation that moral judgements are typically not driven by deliberation suffices. 
59
 Although moral supervenience is generally understood in the philosophical literature as a normative principle 
about how people should behave/judge, there no reason why it cannot also be understood as a descriptive 
principles about how people do behave/judge. 
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that it can encode or mark for them. However, while being reasonable enough, this premise 
actually has serious ramifications for what the input to functional system could be:  
“…an intervening step between stimulus and response must be postulated: a pattern of 
organisation of some sort that is imposed on the stimulus by the mind itself” (Mikhail, 
2000: 130) 
Subjects generally judge it permissible to flip the switch in the switch case, but not push the 
man in the footbridge case, despite the equivalent consequences, and a plausible explanation 
of this invokes an ‘intentionality difference’: the killing of the man in the footbridge case is 
intended, whereas the killing in the switch case is merely foreseen. Yet, this ‘intentionality 
difference’ is not explicit in the vignettes subjects are presented with and short of 
linguistically specifying this intentionality, it is hard to see how this difference could be 
explicit. This point applies generally to other properties and distinctions which subjects’ 
considered moral judgements are sensitive to: including ‘means’, ‘ends’, ‘act’, ‘omission’ and, 
according to Mallon and Nichols (2010: 307), ‘right’ and ‘injury’. Such properties are not 
fixed or determined by the stimulus given to subjects, whether that be the artificial vignettes 
of a research lab or visually perceived in the ‘real world’, but rather, need to be in some sense 
inferred from such stimulus. Indeed, it is unclear whether it makes any more sense to attribute 
these distinctions to the nature of the stimulus than it does to attribute grammatical categories 
to acoustic segments. Just as an acoustic stream needs to be parsed by a subject according to 
grammatical categories e.g. noun phrase and verb phrase, so too these distinctions relevant to 
the moral valuation should be understood as forms of parsing. In fact, insofar as it is possible 
to morally evaluate imagined or counterfactual situations there need not be any stimulus at all 
(Sterelney, 2010: 287). For example, consider Gray et al.’s (2012: 103) claim that, “there 
need not “objectively” be an intentional agent and a suffering patient in every moral situation, 
but only the perception of this dyad”.  
In other words, we need to distinguish the stimulus which may trigger a moral 
judgement, from the input which is psychologically mapped moral judgement. It should be 
clear that this is no more than a morality-specific formulation of the under-determination 
thesis noted in Section 1.5. There is a gap between distal stimulus and proximal stimulus and 
consequently, “psychological regularities will always have to be stated relative to particular 
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readings of stimulus” (Pylyshyn, 1980: 11).60 Echoing Pylyshyn then, we can say that in the 
moral domain, the relevant distal stimulus must be parsed as an internal representation. Call 
this parsing the construction of an act analysis: 
“…the brain must be generating actions representations of its own that go beyond the 
information given. That is, much like a given patch of retinal stimulation or the 
acoustic stream in speech perception, the stimulus here evidently consists merely of 
clues for the formation of an unconscious percept that the perceiver firsts constructs 
using her own internal resources.” (Mikhail, 2011: 114) 
The position here is that, adopting a representational theory of mind, subjects utilise various 
stimuli drawn from different sensory modalities to construct unconscious, act analyses. These 
act analyses are complex mental representations and constitute the ‘input’ to the system 
described at the functional level. Although this leaves many substantive theoretical questions 
about these constructions open, it is widely agreed that some form of act analysis must be 
postulated by any empirically adequate account of moral cognition (Cushman, Young and 
Greene, 2010: 6-9; Prinz, 2008: 161-2).61 
The second of Marr’s levels of description is the algorithmic level: according to what 
rules is the input mapped to output? As Joseph and Haidt (2008: 379-380) explain, the 
challenge at this level of analysis is to describe “input-output programming connecting the 
pattern in the social world... to an evaluation”, or alternatively, “formulating a set of 
algorithms from which they [the moral judgements subjects produce] can be derived” 
(Mikhail, 2009: 28).62  
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 Although in the previous section I chose not to discuss how this under determination thesis applies to 
grammaticality judgements, there clearly is a linguistic analogue: the physical marks a speaker is confronted 
with are often ambiguous and can be assigned multiple interpretations e.g. ‘Flying planes can be dangerous’ can 
be parsed as either [VP[V Flying][NP planes] can be dangerous] or [[NP[Adj Flying][N planes]] can be dangerous]. In 
such a case, there is a distinction between the distal stimulus (the marks on paper or acoustics) and the proximal 
stimulus, where the former fails to fix or determine the latter.   
61
 Mikhail (2011: Chpt. 5) has proposed what is, to date, the most developed account of these representations. 
Although I have left the matter fairly open here, I think that understanding the nature of act analysis is integral 
to understanding moral cognition as a whole. For example, there is good reason to think that an act analysis 
must be a part-whole organisation of atomistic constituents. Another issue is whether act analysis should be 
understood as unique to the moral domain (see Sterelney, 2010; Dupoux and Jacob, 2007). It is quite plausible 
that the act analysis necessary for moral judgement is isomorphic with that found in event cognition generally 
(Strickland, et al., 2012), raising interesting questions. 
62
 A shortcoming of this way of posing the challenge is that the type of empirical adequacy being targeted is 
merely extensional rather than intensional (Nichols, 2005). Nevertheless, extensional adequacy is challenging 
enough to be getting on with. In order to penetrate deeper to intensional adequacy, if it is methodologically 
possible at all, acquisition considerations will presumably be key – as they have been within Generative 
Grammar.    
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Figure 3. 
 
These rules are properly understood as functions which, operating on act analyses, yield 
deontic valuations as their range; these functions can be paraphrased as follows: if an act 
analysis has feature X1, X2... Xn, map it to the deontic value, α. Of course, this is a great 
oversimplification insofar as individual features must be treated as having pro tanto rather 
than sufficient force, but the general point stands. The hope is that these rules will prove 
amenable to explicit formulation, in the same way that the grammatical rules of language 
users have proven to be (Harman, 2008: 7-8). 
Whether an empirically adequate set of rules would be unique to the moral domain is 
a keenly contested issue in the literature. Some commentators argue that there is good 
evidence for principles and rules unique to the moral domain and that these may constitute a 
moral faculty or moral grammar.63 This is by no means universally accepted though, and it 
has been argued that domain general rules may suffice. For example, calculations of utility 
magnitude and the probability of success have been shown to play a role in determining the 
moral appraisals subjects make in at least some situations (Shenhav and Greene, 2010). The 
following principles have been postulated in order to account for subjects’ moral judgements 
(though whether they are unique to the moral domain I set aside here): 
The Action Principle: Harm caused by action is morally worse than equivalent harm caused 
by omission. 
The Intention Principle: Harm intended as a means to a goal is worse than equivalent harm 
foreseen as the side effect of a goal 
The Contact Principle: Using physical contact to cause harm to a victim is worse than 
causing equivalent harm to a victim without using physical contact (Cushman, Young, 
Hauser, 2006). 
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 See Kirkby (2013); Kirkby, Hinzen & Mikhail (2013); Cushman, Young and Hauser (2006); Dwyer (2007, 
2009); Harman, (2008); Hauser (2006); Hauser, Young and Cushman (2008); Mikhail (2000, 2007, 2011) . 
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The Principle of Double Effect: An otherwise prohibited act which has good and bad effects 
may be permissible if the act itself is not directly intended, the good but not the bad effects 
are directly intended, the good effects outweigh the bad, and no morally preferable alternative 
is available. 
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Part II 
 
 
KANT: THE INTENTIONALITY OF 
JUDGEMENT 
 
That Kant’s transcendental philosophy contains or amounts to a reaction to Hume is hardly an 
original observation. Kant himself affirmed as much with his famous remark that it was 
Hume who awoke him from his “dogmatic slumbers” (Prol: intro., 6). In Strawson’s The 
Bounds of Sense, the nature of this reaction is carefully detailed. Strawson argues that, in 
contestation of Hume’s scepticism, Kant shows that the existence of the external world is a 
necessary condition for self-consciousness. Since sceptics generally accept some notion of 
self-consciousness, they must also accept the existence of the external world. However, 
irrespective of whether this is a good interpretation of Kant, it would hardly be a relevant one 
in the context of this thesis, given that the previous chapter was devoted to emphasising the 
primacy of Hume’s naturalistic or constructivist outlook.64 
Instead, the ‘Kantian reaction’ I am interested in here concerns intentionality. Kant 
thinks that there is a problem regarding the possibility of intentionality: a problem which 
strikes at the heart of what it is to be a being which cognizes or enjoys experience: a problem 
which Hume, in his best naturalist clothing, had failed to adequately address. In Chapter four, 
I describe the nature of this intentionality problem, endeavouring to situate it within Kant’s 
overarching transcendental philosophy. Chapter five concerns Kant’s philosophical response 
to this problem: his account of how intentionality is possible. There are two essential and 
interdependent components of this account: that of rules and that of judgement. As such, 
Kant’s theory of judgement is an integral part of his solution to the intentionality problem. 
Chapter six describes how the central role allocated to judgement leads Kant to ascribe 
special significance to the particular forms which judgements exhibit. However, I argue that 
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 I do not mean to imply that the suggestion that Kant responds to Hume-as-naturalist, rather than merely 
Hume-as-sceptic, has gone unnoticed in the secondary literature. On the other hand, this critique has not been 
nearly as prominent as the Strawsonian line and is seldom developed in any great detail. 
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Kant does not go far enough, and actually understates their significance. In particular, I 
contend that the distinction Kant draws between the ‘merely’ formal forms of judgement and 
the categories is not sustainable. Rather, the forms of judgement are of inherent 
transcendental significance. Finally, Chapter Seven addresses the issue of how the forms of 
judgement are to be identified. I argue that these forms ought to be derived from our best 
theories of grammar. That is, grammar provides the table of judgement forms. This amounts 
to a naturalisation of this component of Kant’s philosophy. 
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Chapter 4. The Nature of Experience 
 
4.1. From synthetic a priori judgements to the possibility of experience 
The Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) begins on a rather mournful note. Metaphysics or 
speculative philosophy, Kant laments, is in a parlous state, plagued by dogmatism on the one 
hand and on the other, scepticism. The problem, according to Kant, revolved around the 
uncertain epistemic status of a class of judgements he called ‘synthetic a priori’. For example:  
1. The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. 
2. All succession is alteration.65  
3. Every event has a cause. 
In calling these judgements ‘synthetic a priori’ Kant means, in brief, that (a) they are not 
truths of logic and that, (b) they cannot be known by recourse to experience. As such, they 
amount to a ‘third type’ of judgement, defined in contradistinction to those judgements which, 
on the one hand are truths of logic, and on the other, those judgements which are known by 
recourse to experience. Consider the former first:  
4. Bachelors are unmarried men 
(4) is an example of an analytic judgement for Kant: it is a logical truth. This might appear 
surprising – it doesn’t seem to be the kind of truth which logic yields. However, crucial to 
this claim is Kant’s view that concepts can be decomposed into constituent marks.66 For 
example, according to Kant, the concepts ‘unmarried’ and ‘man’ are contained under that of 
‘bachelor’ as marks. A perspicuous analysis of (4) then, would be (5): 
5. For any x to which bachelor (unmarried ˄ man) applies, unmarried man applies. 
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 That is, alteration of a persisting substance. 
66
 With the publication of Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951), in which the idea of ‘concept 
containment’ was subjected to scathing criticism, the credibility of a category of analytic judgements fell into 
disrepute. Despite this, it is not clear to me that there is anything tendentious about the notion of analyticity (for 
a nice discussion, see Bell, 2001: 9). For one thing, the theory of concepts it is founded upon has a comparable 
modern analogue in lexical semantics (cf. Jackendoff, 2002: Chpt. 11). Either way, in the context of this thesis, 
nothing hangs on the philosophical credentials of the analyticity which I am here using primarily a point of entry 
to other topics in Kant’s work. In principle, these topics could be formulated without presupposing anything 
about analyticity.  
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This analysis reveals that (4) has analytic content: the predicate is ‘contained’ in the subject 
concept and so the content can be formulated in tautologous terms i.e. ‘For any x to which P1 
˄ P2... applies, P1 applies’.67 As such, the truth of an analytic judgement is grounded the law 
of non-contradiction. Despite their logical triviality, analytic judgements are not utterly 
uninformative or useless. They can clarify and inform us of the nature of our concepts, many 
of which may be quite opaque to us. Nevertheless, because the truth of analytic judgements is 
secured irrespective of how the world is, i.e. merely by the laws of logic, they do not extend 
our knowledge of the world. For example, the truth of (4) is consistent with the state of the 
world turning out to be any of an infinite number of possible ways: realising any set of facts, 
and consequently its truth cannot inform us of how the world is. For this reason, Kant says 
that analytic judgements are non-ampliative. By contrast, consider: 
6. Some tables are round 
7. Humans inhabit cities 
These judgements are, evidently, not analytic. No plausible analysis of the concepts ‘table’ 
and ‘round’ will show that the predicate is contained in the subject: they cannot be formalised 
in tautologous terms and so are not truths of logic. Kant calls judgements which are not truths 
of logic ‘synthetic’. Insofar as they make a claim which goes beyond the law of non-
contradiction, they are ampliative. As we might say, they make a substantive claim about 
how the world is. Whereas, analytic judgements are justified by the laws of logic, most 
synthetic judgements are justified by recourse to empirical experience. For example, ‘some 
tables are round’ is known to be true because we have had empirical experience of round 
tables. Judgements which are justified on the basis of experience are labelled ‘a posteriori’. 
So both (6) and (7) are synthetic a posteriori judgements. 
There is an important point which needs to be made about a posteriori judgements, or 
judgements which are justified by recourse to empirical experience. According to Kant, a 
posteriori judgements are only capable of expressing contingent, as opposed to necessary, 
truths. This is because, “experience does indeed teach us that something is thus or thus, but 
not that it cannot be otherwise” (B4). For example, insofar as (6) and (7) are both justified by 
our empirical experience of the world, it is clear that they can only be expressing contingent 
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 An objection to this formulation of analyticity is that it is restricted to categorical propositions (Quine, 1951: 
21). However, it can be extended to other proposition types without difficulty. For example, a conditional would 
be analytic if, firstly, the antecedent and consequent have the same subject and, secondly, if the predicate in the 
consequent is a mark of the predicate in the antecedent. 
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truths about how the world happens to be, not about how the world must be. A posteriori 
judgements therefore, are always contingently true, if true at all. In this respect, Kant agrees 
with Hume: the deliverances of the senses are never necessities. 
 The category of synthetic a priori judgements lies outside of either of these two 
classes of judgements. In contrast to analytic judgements, Kant considers that (1), (2) and (3) 
all make substantive, ampliative claims about how the world is: claims which cannot be 
reduced to, or justified by, the laws of logic. Equally however, (1), (2), and (3) are also said 
to be knowable a priori, setting them apart from synthetic posteriori judgements. Specifically, 
Kant thinks that they amount to claims of necessity, rather than mere contingency. In 
outlining this class of synthetic a priori judgements, Kant saw himself as delineating the 
subject matter of speculative philosophy, or metaphysics. Metaphysical inquiry is a priori by 
nature, and it is concerned with synthetic judgements insofar as it seeks to advance our 
knowledge of objects or the world, rather than simply clarify the nature of our ideas. 
According to Kant, synthetic a priori judgements are the appropriate subject matter for 
metaphysics.  
“…on such synthetic, i.e. expansive, principles depends the whole final aim of our 
speculative a priori cognition” (A10/B14) 
“…metaphysics consists... of nothing but synthetic a priori propositions” (B18)  
The difficulty with the synthetic a priori however, and therefore the difficulty with 
metaphysics, concerns how such judgements can be justified. In this respect, synthetic a 
priori judgements are problematic in a way in which analytic or a posteriori judgements are 
not. Analytic judgements are justified by the rules of logic. A posteriori judgements are 
justified by experience. But since Kant defines synthetic a priori judgements as being neither 
truths of logic, nor justifiable by recourse to experience, what does justify them?   
This problem can be described as that of how it can be legitimate to apply concepts to 
objects of experience in ways not justified by either logic or empirical experience (Winkler, 
2010: 58). For example, in the judgement ‘every event has a cause’, the concept of having a 
cause is being applied to every x which satisfies the concept of event. The question is, what 
justifies this application of the concept? Ex hypothesi, it is not justified by experience or by 
logic, but then what does justify this application?  Crucially, Kant’s problem here is an 
epistemic one, rather than a psychological one. His aim not to, for example, challenge 
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Hume’s psychological account of how we form beliefs; nor is it to say that we must have 
innate ideas of one form or another. Rather, the question is one of entitlement (quid juris) 
(A84/B116).   
In his earlier work, e.g. the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant thought that this problem 
could be resolved by appeal to the real use of the intellect: the nature of mind-independent 
objects could be apprehended by the intellect without the aid of the senses. By the time of the 
CPR however, he had abandoned this position (Wolff, 1963: 15-17). As Kant explains in his 
letter to Herz, in espousing a real use of the intellect, he had “passed silently over” a crucial 
problem, that of, “how a representation that refers to an object without in any way being 
affected by it can be possible” (Corr: Letter to Herz, Feb. 1772, 133). The short answer to this, 
Kant decides, is that it is not possible; there is no real use of the intellect and any claim to the 
contrary is mere dogmatism. Instead, “all knowledge begins with experience” (A1).68 In this 
respect at least, Kant was far closer to his empiricist predecessors than his rationalist 
predecessors. This stance entailed that, of the ‘supersensible’ objects which had occupied 
rationalist metaphysicians e.g. God, the soul, objects which, by definition, transcend the 
bounds of possible experience, no knowledge was possible (Pippin, 1982: 10).69  
However, this meant that Kant was mired in a severe predicament. The whole field of 
metaphysics depends upon showing that synthetic a priori judgements are possible (that they 
can be legitimate), yet his philosophical commitments barred him from appealing to either the 
real use of the intellect or empirical experience of mind independent objects: a disjunction 
which apparently exhausts the possibilities. At this point in the dialectic, Kant makes a simple, 
yet philosophically revolutionary suggestion:  
“…it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects. On this 
presupposition, however, all our attempts to establish something about them a priori, 
by means of concepts through which our cognition would be expanded, have come to 
nothing. Let us, therefore, try to find out by experiment whether we shall not make 
better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must 
conform to our cognition.” (Bxvi)  
This is, of course, Kant’s famous Copernican turn. By talking of objects conforming to our 
cognition, Kant is invoking the idea that cognition presupposes certain conditions: a priori 
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 ‘Experience’ should be interpreted here as essentially containing a sensory or receptive component.  
69
 Although of course, this does not preclude these concepts playing a regulative role in our reasoning. 
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conditions, since it is only by conforming to these that objects can be cognised in the first 
place. Kant declares that he will call ‘transcendental’ that which “deals not so much with 
objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of 
cognizing is to be possible a priori” (A11-12/B25). That is, the transcendental is concerned 
with the a priori conditions for the possibility of cognition.  
It is crucial to emphasise that Kant portrays the Copernican turns as a philosophical 
undertaking, rather than a substantive view or position in its own right. It is referred to it as 
an “experiment” (Bxvi), and the reason for this is obvious. Quite simply, at this stage, the 
existence of a priori conditions of cognition is completely unproven. Nothing has been said 
which indicates, let alone justifies the postulation of such conditions. Whether there are such 
conditions is precisely what is in question, and as such, we might follow Hanna (2001) in 
referring to the Copernican turn as the adoption of a transcendental method: one which seeks 
to uncover a priori conditions of cognition.  
There are, I think, two related issues regarding this transcendental method which need 
to be addressed from the outset. Firstly, what motivates this undertaking? Call this the 
motivation issue. As Longuenesse (1998: 7 & 71) emphasises, in proposing the Copernican 
turn, Kant moves from the question: 
• How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? 
to 
• Under what conditions is cognition possible a priori? 
Although the existence of such a priori conditions is not, at this point, proven, clearly Kant 
thinks that establishing this will bear upon the problem of the synthetic a priori. Were there 
no such connection between these two questions, it would be completely obscure as to why 
we have moved so abruptly from one to the other. Kant quickly reassures us on this point 
when, almost immediately after announcing the Copernican turn, he declares that if there are 
a priori conditions of cognition, he can “quite readily conceive” how we might have synthetic 
a priori knowledge (Bxvii).  The claim is that establishing the existence of a priori conditions 
of cognition will somehow ‘solve’ the problem of the synthetic a priori, and it is this 
connection which motivates the transcendental method.  This much is clear. However, what is 
not yet clear is exactly what this connection is for Kant. Certainly, Kant thinks that there is 
such a connection, but equally certain is that we are not yet in a position to state precisely 
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what this connection amounts to. We are still missing a piece of the puzzle. In order to see 
what this piece is, we must turn to the second issue regarding the Copernican turn which 
needs to be addressed. 
Suppose we want to pursue the transcendental method, adopt the Copernican turn and 
seek out conditions for the possibility of cognition. Where do we start? Well, the point of 
departure for any such inquiry will be, surely, that for which a priori conditions are being 
sought: namely, cognition or experience.70 It is senseless to inquire after conditions of 
experience, in the absence of a clear conception of what experience is. In other words, the 
point of departure for the application of the transcendental method is a robust answer to the 
question: 
• What is experience? 
 This is the ‘second issue’ regarding the Copernican turn: as a methodological approach, it 
presupposes a well defined view of what experience is. This is the premise from which 
inquiry must proceed, for in its absence, talking of the a priori conditions of experience 
verges upon vacuity. In the next section, I outline what this premise is for Kant: what he 
means by ‘experience’.  
Returning to the motivation issue, this illuminates why we are not yet in a position to 
explain the connection between the synthetic a priori and the conditions of experience: the 
piece of the puzzle which is missing precisely is this conception of experience – something 
we are currently lacking. Consider the following:  
(i) What is experience? 
(ii) Under what conditions is experience possible a priori? 
(iii) How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? 
Kant’s view is that there is a crucial connection between (ii) and (iii): an answer to (ii) will 
bear upon answers to (iii). However, as I have shown, (ii) is not even meaningful until we 
have an answer to (i). As such, any purported connection between (ii) and (iii) is dependent 
upon first addressing (i). In light of this, I shall give a full account of this connection between 
the synthetic a priori and the a priori conditions of cognition only in the final part of the next 
section, once the nature of experience has been suitably clarified.   
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 It is common in Kantian scholarship to use the terms ‘cognition’ and ‘experience’ interchangeably, and I shall 
be following this practice here. 
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4.2. Relation to an object 
The notion of experience is the fundamental premise of the transcendental method. It is the 
centrepiece around which all transcendental inquiry is organised. What then, does Kant mean 
by experience?    
“I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long 
metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to pay attention to and that, in fact, 
constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. I asked 
myself: What is the ground of the reference of that in us which we call “representation” 
to the object?”  (Corr: Letter to Herz, Feb. 1772, 132-133) 
“The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time 
conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.” (A111) 
Kant persistently invokes ‘relation to an object’ as the mark of experience.71 The concept of 
an object, in Kant’s hands, is not an ontological category; it is not supposed to mark a 
difference between, for example, desks and stars on the one hand and the greenness of a leaf 
or Will’s love for Kate on the other. Rather, ‘object’ encompasses all beings including, for 
example, events (Bird, 1962: 89), not merely some subset thereof. As such, the relation of 
representations to an object is equivalent to ‘objectivity’ or ‘objective experience’ or 
‘objective validity’ all of which Kant uses interchangeably in the CPR, and I shall follow him 
in this respect.72 
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 It might be objected at this point that it is the unity of apperception which is the fundamental premise of the 
transcendental method. This is certainly the traditional view (Bennett, 1966; Strawson, 1966: 26; Wolff, 1963: 
105) and indeed, Kant himself calls it the “supreme principle in all of human cognition” (B135). It is crucial to 
stress therefore, that my taking the relation of representations to an object as the premise is not in contradiction 
of this view. For Kant, they are equivalent: 
“The essential point is that thinking its own identity is not another act that the mind performs in 
addition to the representation to itself of objective connection.” (Allison, 1996: 61) 
Given that there is no contradiction here, I think restricting myself to the ‘object side’ of (what is for Kant) a 
single object/apperception coin, is well motivated. Firstly, I am not attempting a complete exegesis of CPR here 
– apperception is one of many central strands which will not receive direct attention. Secondly, while they are 
equivalent for Kant, there is nothing non-trivial about this claim in philosophical terms, and since, in the context 
of this thesis what matters is the issue of the representation of the object, I do not want to render it more 
tendentious by asserting it equivalence to apperception needlessly.  
72
 Admittedly, Kant’s use of the term ‘object’ is not always consistent. For example, “Everything, every 
representation even insofar as we are conscious of it, may be entitled object. But it is a question for deeper 
enquiry what the word ‘object’ ought to signify in respect of appearances when these are viewed not insofar as 
they are (as representations) objects, but only insofar as they stand for an object.” (A189-90/B123-5) 
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Furthermore, objective experience is not true or veridical experience, or at least, it 
need not be. Crucially, while it is natural to interpret Kant’s ‘object talk’ it as marking the 
difference between experience merely deemed to be true by a subject, and cognition which is 
actually true of the object, this would be a mistake. As Ameriks (1982: 12) points out, 
experience need not be true; experience can be both objective and delusive. For instance, 
perceiving a stick as bent when in water would be an example of objective cognition for Kant, 
despite the illusionary nature of the experience. As Kant says:  
“…a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related” 
(A58/B82-3; see also, Meta: 233-234) [my emphasis] 
“The difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the 
representations which are referred to objects (for they are the same in both cases).” 
(Prol: §13, 37) 
In other words, a representation being related to an object is no indication of its veridicality 
(Allison, 2004: 88; Longuenesse, 1998: 82), and therefore, while Kantian experience has 
occasionally been defined epistemically as empirical knowledge (e.g. Wolff, 1963: 98) this is, 
at best, misleading. Knowledge presupposes truth: objective experience does not.73 Insofar as 
the transcendental method concerns experience then, it does not concern, or is insensitive to 
the difference between appearance and reality, illusion and verdicality (Bird, 1962: 159). 
Whether an object exists or a certain state of affairs realised is an empirical, not a 
transcendental matter (A376-7; Allison, 2008: 109). Given this though, what does Kant mean 
by ‘relation to an object’? 
“Kant’s concern is not knowledge so much as the directedness of thought at objects, 
the intentionality or objective purport, that is a prerequisite for anything to be even a 
candidate to be a case of knowledge.” (McDowell, 2009: 210) 
“Kant takes as his initial focus intentionality rather than knowledge.” (Brandom, 2002: 
23) 
In Brandom’s terms (2009: 29), in speaking of ‘relation to an object’ Kant is targeting 
representational purport, and bracketing the further epistemic matter of representational 
success or accuracy (see also, Kukla 2011: 9-10). By ‘relation to an object’ Kant means to 
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 Hence, I think that Americks (1978) is seriously mistaken to argue that empirical knowledge is the premise 
from which the transcendental deduction ‘regressively proceeds’. 
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denote the respect in which representations or mental states are representational: the sense in 
which they are about or directed at the world in some particular fashion: the respect in which 
they point beyond themselves. As Brandom (2009: 29) puts it, Kant is targeting what it is to: 
“take or treat them [representations] as, for them to show up to us as, representings, in 
the sense of something that answers for its correctness to what thereby counts as being 
represented… This issue is the core around which cluster other elements of Kant’s 
concern with what he calls “objectivity”.” 
It should be clear that hallucinations and non-veridical states exhibit objectivity of this kind. 
They purport to represent the world as being a certain way; for if they did not, they could not 
be non-veridical. It follows from this that ‘relation to an object’ is not really relational, if by 
that we mean that whether it is realised or not depends upon how the world turns out to be. 
Rather, objectivity is best thought of as being inherent to certain mental states (Bennett, 1966: 
127), or as Allison (2008:108) puts it is “immanent to consciousness”. In contemporary 
philosophical parlance, this representational purport is known as intentionality.74 That in 
virtue of which a state or representation is directed at a particular object is known as its 
intentional or semantic content. Crucially, the content of an intentional state is not the object 
towards which it is directed, but rather, that property which determines that it is so directed. 
On this view then, Kant’s concept of experience is semantic, rather than metaphysical or 
epistemological (Landy, 2009: 1; Hanna, 2001: 16).  
 There are two distinctive qualities of intentionality for Kant. The first is existence 
independence (Pereboom, 1988). This has already been gestured at by the separation of 
representational purport from representational success. To be in an intentional state is to 
represent things as being ‘such and such’ irrespective of their being so represented. 
Experience is ‘objective’ in the sense of being directed at or about a realm which can be 
distinguished from, and exists independently of, the fact of it being represented, the fact of 
experience itself.75 The relevant notion of an object therefore is 
“an object corresponding to and therefore distinct from cognition” (A104) [my 
emphasis] 
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 Guyer (1987: 79-80) argues that Kant equivocates between a concept of experience which would be accepted 
as a premise by empiricists, but not sceptics, and one which would be accepted by sceptics. However, insofar as 
this premise relies only upon the notion of representational purport, and brackets the question of representational 
success, I think that this would be acceptable to both philosophical camps. 
75
 This is slightly misleading insofar as my own mental states can become the objects of other intentional states, 
but I set this point aside here. 
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Importantly, this existence independence requirement is equivalent to the possibility of error 
(A293). If intentionality presupposes that one be able to existentially distinguish the objects 
at which one’s intentional states are directed from these states themselves, it also presupposes 
that one recognises that the objects at which intentional states are directed may not be as they 
are represented to be. That is, because the objects of intentional states are recognised as not 
being, in any relevant sense, constituted by their being so represented, but as being as they 
are irrespective of this, the objects are recognised as possibly being other than how they are 
represented (Davidson, 2004). As Hanna (2001: 17) points out then, the notion of ‘object’ 
relevant to intentional states for Kant is comparable to Brentano’s ‘intentional object’: that 
upon which intentional states are directed, even if it does not exist. 
The second central property of intentionality for Kant is that it is concept dependent 
or intensional. Intensionality is exhibited where the objects of intentional states are grasped 
by subjects under characterisations or concepts which are more finely-grained than the 
objects themselves. For example, there is a difference between representing that the cat went 
up an oak tree, and representing that the cat went up the oldest tree in sight, even if the oldest 
tree in sight is an oak tree (Davidson, 1982: 320). Representing the cat as going up the oldest 
tree in sight is not the same as representing the cat as going up an oak tree, even where the 
oldest tree is sight is an oak tree for the simple reason that the subject may not be aware of 
this fact. This shows that these are intensional states. Equivalently, a state is intensional if, in 
the attribution of the state to a subject, co-extensional terms are not substitutional salva 
veritate. For example, ‘S represents that the cat went up the oldest tree is sight’ may be true, 
yet ‘S represents that the cat went up an oak tree’ may be false, despite the only change being 
the substitution of co-referential terms. What intensionality indicates is that the relevant state 
is concept dependent. That is, objects are not picked out ‘directly’, but via the mediation of 
concepts, which ipso facto are more fine-grained than the objects they denote since any 
object satisfies numbers of conceptual descriptions. If a state is intensional, the intentional 
content of the state – that in virtue of which a relation to a particular object is established - is 
conceptual or descriptive.  
Intensionality or concept dependence is a phenomenon which has been widely 
recognised to be integral to intentionality (Chisholm, 1957). Similarly, the notion of 
intentionality Kant is interested in is thoroughly intensional (Pereboom, 1988; Howell, 1992: 
Chpt. 5). All experience is said to require the use of concept (A106), introducing a descriptive 
element to all intentional states. Furthermore, Kant’s logic is destitute of singular terms 
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(A70/B95; see, Anderson, 2008: 103), which are the best candidates of representations which 
relate to objects, ‘directly’. For Kant, all relations to an object are mediated by conceptual 
description.  
This conception of intentionality defines experience for Kant. As such, it serves as the 
premise from which Kant’s transcendental method departs. Specifically, the premise is that 
that there are mental states which are experiential in this way. This is something Kant takes 
for granted; he does not seek to justify it directly. It is, therefore, both the premise and the 
presupposition of the investigation. That certain mental states are intentional or bear a 
relation to an object is foundational for Kant. I do not think there is anything objectionable 
about such a foundation. As Stevenson (1979: 348) says:  
“…the critical [transcendental] philosophy must… appeal at bottom to certain natural 
facts about human beings; facts, however, which are so obvious and all-pervasive that 
they need no confirmation by empirical research”  
I broadly concur with Stevenson, but two qualifications are in order. Firstly, labelling the 
relevant facts ‘natural’, as Stevenson does, is either vacuous or tendentious and as such, 
should be dropped. Secondly, the idea that these facts are ‘obvious’ or all-pervasive’, while 
plausible, should not be overstated. After all, philosophy is aimed at calling what is obvious 
into question. One could be an eliminativist about intentionality, so it cannot be that obvious; 
it is not incontrovertible. Nevertheless, in taking intentional experience as a premise, Kant 
can be understood as proceeding in a comparable manner to contemporary philosophers of 
mind. Roughly, just as such philosophers make claims about the nature of the mind e.g. that 
at least some mental states exhibit phenomenal consciousness, and just as some of these 
claims are ‘foundational’ in the sense that they constitute bedrock upon which debate and 
discussion is founded, so too Kant is departing from a premise about how beings like us are 
minded: specifically, they enjoy intentional mental states. This is a fact which Kant considers 
to lie at the heart of the human condition itself, as being fundamentally bound up with the 
kind of beings that we are (A546-7/B574-5).76 Although this is not incontrovertible, the claim 
that at least some mental states are marked by intentionality is, to this day, one of the most 
                                                           
76
 This is clearly incompatible with Strawson’s (1966) ‘analytic’ reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction, 
whereby the premise from which investigation proceeds is that of the mere idea or concept of an experience we 
can make intelligible to ourselves. By contrast, my view is that Kant is interested in “conditions of our having 
the type of experience that we do” (Stapleford, 2008: 6). Though I will not undertake a critique of Strawson’s 
reading here (in my view, this has been sufficiently covered elsewhere, e.g. Kitcher, 1990; Hanna, 2001), it is 
worth noting that Strawsons’s reading is incompatible with Kant’s clear belief that the discovery of a priori 
conditions of experience resolves the problem of the synthetic a priori.  
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secure (if not the most secure) of philosophical theses regarding the nature of the mind. 
Hence, the ground Kant is standing on is, arguably, as firm as anything available. 
With the premise of the transcendental method in hand, it is possible to clarify the 
nature of the investigation to be undertaken. Specifically, to inquire after the a priori 
conditions of experience, is to inquire after the a priori conditions of intentional cognition. 
Brandom (2002: 22-23) describes the matter well: 
“Cartesian skeptic asks what reason we have to suppose that the world is as we 
represent it to be in thought. An inquiry into the conditions of successful 
representation is accordingly an appropriate road to a response. Kant takes as his 
initial focus intentionality rather than knowledge. He asks about the conditions of 
even purported representation. What makes it that our ideas so much as seem to point 
beyond themselves, to something that they are about?” 
This could be variously described as Kant’s ‘question’, ‘problem’ or ‘challenge’. In any case, 
it defines his transcendental undertaking. There are three points about this question which 
deserve attention. Firstly, in the context of this thesis this problem is especially significant 
since, irrespective of its centrality to understanding Kant, it also serves as a firm point of 
contact between Kant’s transcendental investigation and Hume’s science of man. Specifically, 
inquiring after the possibility of objective cognition is precisely the question Hume himself 
grapples with in the form of: ‘how do we come to believe in the existence of external bodies?’ 
In other words, insofar as ‘experience’ is distinguished by intentionality, and insofar as 
Kant’s transcendental method seeks conditions for the possibility of experience, we have 
arrived at the intentionality problem outlined in Section 2.3. Allison (2008: 208) is quite 
wrong therefore, to suggest that a possible Humean response to Kant’s ‘objectivity talk’ 
could be, “simply [to] deny that there is any objective validity as Kant understands it”. On the 
contrary, Kant’s question is a question for Hume also, albeit framed within a much richer 
philosophical context. This establishes a strong point of contact between Hume’s science of 
man and Kant’s transcendental philosophy, even a certain degree of intellectual continuity. 
Kant is essentially picking up a question which, I have argued, Hume tries and fails to 
adequately address.  
The second point regarding Kant’s question is that it is not a semantic question. True, 
as I have noted, the premise upon which the investigation is founded, or from which the 
deduction proceeds, is a semantic one. Yet some commentators have gone further, apparently 
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suggesting that not only is the premise of the deduction a semantic one, but that the nature of 
the investigation itself is semantic.   
“If I am correct, then the overarching purpose of the first Critique is to explain how a 
mental representation can refer to its object. This is the Semantic Problem.” (Hanna, 
2001: 67; see also, Landy, 2009)  
In my view, this is pretty clearly a mistake, or at the very least, misleading. Kant’s question, 
‘what are the a priori conditions of experience’, amounts to the question of how semantic 
content tout court is possible; it targets the very possibility of semantics. This question has no 
analogue in contemporary philosophical semantics, which principally centres upon two broad 
issues. The first issue concerns how representational items, e.g. expressions, are about what 
they are about, or equivalently, what the semantic content of particular expressions or classes 
of expressions is. For example, are proper names referential or descriptive? The second issue 
concerns semantic composition. Roughly, given certain semantic contents, how do they 
combine so as to yield composite semantic contents? For example, how does the semantic 
content ‘dogs’ compose with the semantic content ‘swim’ to yield the complex semantic 
content ‘dogs swim’? Kant’s question however, is distinct from either of these issues. While 
philosophical semantics, we might say, works ‘within’ the basic paradigm of semantic 
content, Kant is working outside of it in inquiring after its very possibility, so it is highly 
misleading label Kant’s question or undertaking ‘semantic’.77 While the premise of Kant’s 
transcendental investigation is semantic in character, the nature of the investigation itself, the 
question or problem which he is interested in, falls completely outside the purview of 
philosophical semantics. Indeed, arguably it is a problem which has no analogue in 
contemporary philosophical discourse at all (Stroud, 1977: 238).78 
The final point to be made about Kant’s question concerns synthetic a priori 
judgements. Recall that at the end of the previous section, I explained that although Kant 
considers there to be a connection between the questions: 
(i) Under what conditions is experience possible a priori? 
(ii) How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? 
                                                           
77
 Arguably, insofar as Kant’s question concerns the very possibility of semantics, it would be more appropriate 
to label it ‘meta-semantic’.  
78
 A clear exception to this is Hinzen (2009; 2012) and Hinzen and Sheehan (2013). The similarities between 
Kant’s transcendental undertaking and Hinzen’s project are developed fully in Chapter seven. 
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, elucidation of this connection is only possible once the relevant notion of experience is clear. 
Since this has now been clarified, the connection is, in turn, transparent. A priori conditions 
for the possibility of experience are the conditions of intentionality: conditions which must be 
met if any intentional relation to an object is to be possible. In this sense, all objects must 
conform to these conditions if they are to be cognised at all. Yet this seems to supply 
precisely what is required with respect to synthetic a priori judgements. Judging that these 
various conditions apply to objects is a synthetic a priori matter. It is a priori because these 
conditions apply necessarily, as opposed to merely contingently, to all objects. That is, it is 
not merely that objects just so happen to conform to these conditions, they must conform to 
these conditions if they are to be cognised at all. Furthermore, this is also a synthetic matter 
since these conditions do not reduce to the law of non-contradiction. Consequently, to 
undertake a transcendental “deduction” (A85/B117) of a priori conditions for the possibility 
of experience is also to undertake a deduction of the possibility of, or rather, the legitimacy of, 
a certain class of synthetic a priori judgements, thereby securing the possibility of 
metaphysics.79 
 
4.3. The discursivity thesis 
One of Kant’s most fundamental claims about experience is that it is discursive: it requires 
both the sensible faculty and the faculty of the understanding. “Only from their union 
[sensibility and understanding] can cognition arise.” (B76) Kant characterises the faculty of 
the sensibility in terms of receptivity or passivity. Dickersen (2004: 6-7) offers the following 
metaphor for how this faculty should be understood. Imagine a globe of soft plastic. This 
globe can be acted upon by external forces which produce changes in the shape of the globe. 
We might then say that the globe has a capacity to be affected by its environment, with the 
shape changes constituting the matter of this capacity.80 This is essentially how Kant 
understands sensibility. It is a faculty of receptivity insofar as it amounts to a capacity to be 
shaped or moulded by external objects. Kant repeatedly talks of sensibility yielding 
                                                           
79
 The price that has to be paid for securing this firm foundation for speculative philosophy, is that all of our 
knowledge (not simply that delivered by metaphysical inquiry) is knowledge of appearances: knowledge of 
objects as they conform to our mode of cognition. The mind-transcendent status of the objects of knowledge is 
sacrificed at the alter of metaphysical inquiry. 
80
 Dickersen continues the metaphor with the idea that there is a viewer inside the globe which can only observe 
the internal changes in the surface of the globe. However, this strikes me as a needlessly tendentious extension: 
one which invokes the charge of homuncularism, as Dickersen himself notes. The crucial element of sensibility 
is that it is a faculty of determination; this is perfectly coherent without any additional ‘viewer’ inside the globe.  
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modifications (Modificationen) or determinations (Bestimmungen) of the subject (e.g. Corr: 
Letter to Beck, Jan. 1792, 400): always invoking the idea that these are no more than imprints 
left upon us, the purely passive recipients. These determinations are what Kant calls 
sensations: roughly, atomistic sense data of a particular phenomenal character such as taste, 
colour (A28), heat, sound (B44) and weight (A169/B211). A multitude or array of sensations 
Kant calls a manifold. In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant argues that space and time are a 
priori forms of our sensible faculty. A stream of uncoordinated sensory data, or a manifold, is 
always grasped under the general forms of space and time. A manifold of sensations grasped 
under these forms is known as an intuition.  
That Kant divides the cognitive labour between this sensible faculty and a separate 
faculty of understanding is, of course, perfectly consistent with the accounts of mental 
faculties offered by his predecessors. For example, we might think of it as mapping onto 
Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas. Or more generally, we might think of it as 
nothing more than a statement of the distinction between perception and thought. Such a 
benign assessment would, however, be deeply mistaken. In fact, the discursivity thesis 
actually imbues Kant’s distinction of these two faculties with a deep significance. 
Discursivity entails that the sensibility and the understanding have qualitatively distinct and 
irreducible cognitive functions (A52/B74). If all cognition requires the contribution of the 
understanding over and above that of sensibility, the former faculty must contribute to or 
determine cognition in a way that sensibility alone is incapable of.  
The contrast with Hume should be evident. For Hume, all cognition is constituted 
either by an array of sensible impressions, or by ideas which are simply dimmer copies of 
impressions. A sensory state is the epitome of a cognitive state for Hume, and the paradigm 
according to which all cognition is understood. In this sense, “Hume assimilated thinking to 
sensing.” (Bennett, 1966: 54-5) Even setting Hume’s sensory outlook however, the idea that 
the distinction between the intellectual and sensibly faculties is merely one of degree, in 
particular, degree of epistemic clarity, was widely held by Kant’s predecessors. For Leibniz, 
for instance, inversely to Hume’s view, the function of the understanding was to exercise 
“merely a clarificatory function (bringing conceptual clarity and distinctness to what the 
senses present obscurely)” (Allison, 2004: 15). By arguing for discursivity, Kant was 
breaking with this heritage of viewing the intellectual and sensible faculties as each, taken in 
isolation, capable of yielding kinds of experience (Pippin, 1982: 37) (A271/B327). It entailed 
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that the sensible faculty, taken alone, is incapable of yielding any experience whatsoever 
(Pippin, 1982: 39). 
What then is the faculty of the understanding for Kant? Why must it be invoked in 
any account of cognition? I think that it is productive to approach this question indirectly: 
namely, by showing why sensibility alone does not suffice for cognition. Approaching the 
understanding via this circuitous route allows us to, (a) undertake a closer inspection of the 
nature of intentional cognition, which allows us to, (b) clarify precisely why cognition cannot 
be purely sensible, which allows us to, (c) define the role of the understanding ‘by remainder’. 
(c) will however, be left for Chapter five. Consider Kant’s assertion that: 
“…a manifold’s combination as such can never come to us through the senses; nor, 
therefore, can it already be a part of what is contained in the pure form of sensible 
intuition” (B129-130) 
“…nothing composite can as composite be given to us – rather, the composition of the 
manifold is something we ourselves must always produce” (Corr: Letter to Beck, July 
1792, 421) 
This claim, that sensibility cannot compose or that composition cannot be simply received, is 
among Kant’s most famous. Despite this however, it is far from transparent what it means. I 
think that this composition claim can be illustrated by reference to a sensory array of the kind: 
Figure 4. 
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Were sensibility capable of yielding intentional experience, then such experience could be 
thought of as essentially imagistic in this fashion.81 That is, a relation to an object would be 
established by the imagistic nature of our experiential states or representations. This is 
essentially what Hume supposed.  
There are insurmountable problems with this idea. One especially troublesome 
problem concerns individuation. If relation to an object is somehow established by the 
imagistic nature of the relevant states, then, necessarily, it must be possible to isomorphically 
map images to intentional states. That is, if intentional states are iconic, it must be possible to 
individuate images as finely as intentional states. Yet this is precisely what is not possible. 
Specifically, this possibility is foreclosed by a simple, yet powerful point: images are ipso 
facto non-intensional. For example, the president of the United States is the first black 
American president. Nevertheless, despite being co-extensional, attributing to someone a 
state with the intentional content ‘the president of the United States’ is distinct from 
attributing to them a state with the content ‘the first black American president’, i.e. they are 
intensional states. It follows from this that if images are to be individuated so as to 
correspond isomorphically to intentional states, an image of the president of the United States 
must be distinct from an image of the first black American president.82 However, no such 
distinction is available. For example, consider the above image. Does it have the content ‘the 
first black American president’ or that of ‘the president of the United States’? The answer is 
either: neither or both. 
This claim needs some unpacking. It is natural to suppose that determining whether 
the content of an image is that of ‘the president of the United States’ or of ‘the first black 
American president’ depends upon the intrinsic properties of the image in question. As such, 
it might be pointed out that while perhaps the above, rather impoverished image makes no 
such distinction, this does not preclude richer images doing so. However, to think this is to 
misunderstand the claim, which is, at its core, a principled one regarding the nature of iconic 
representation. Take any image, all the way from the impoverished one above to a far richer 
one which resembles the president of the United States a great deal, and ask: is it an image of 
the president of the United States or is it an image of the first black president of America? As 
should be clear, responses to this question do not turn at all upon the particulars of the 
                                                           
81
 This is clearly something of an oversimplification since not all sensations are visual sensations, and Kant 
certainly recognises this (B44). Nevertheless, visual sensations have a central role here, so I will use images as 
the central point of reference in this discussion.  
82
 That is, there must be a way of distinguishing the intentional content of the images. 
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image(s) considered. Rather, for any image at all, whether it resembles the president of the 
United States a great deal or very little, if it resembles the president of the United States, then 
it also resembles the first black American president and vice versa. In turn, if an image does 
not resemble the president of the United States, then it does not resemble the first black 
American president either, and vice versa. What this shows is that iconic representation 
leaves no space for the representation of an object under distinct co-extensional 
characterisations. Images are not fine-grained enough to distinguish co-extensional 
descriptions (Fodor: 2007; Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 85; Landy, 2008). Yet, given that 
intentional states are this fine-grained, this forecloses individuating images so as to 
correspond isomorphically to intentional states. 
Consider another example. There is a difference in being in an intentional state about 
my wife and being in an intentional state about Judy’s daughter, even where my wife is, as a 
matter of fact, Judy’s daughter: these are intensional states. Now, suppose I own a portrait of 
her. Evidently, it would be nonsensical to insist that it is a portrait of my wife but not of 
Judy’s daughter. The picture makes no such distinction. If it resembles my wife then it also 
resembles Judy’s daughter. Yet clearly things do not stop here. If it is a picture of my wife 
then it is also a picture of a doctor who works at a Newcastle hospital, a picture of Emma’s 
sister etc. In other words, images badly underdetermine intentional states. It is not merely that 
images cannot *quite* be individuated as finely as intentional states: they are poles apart. 
What this shows is that were relations to objects established by images, if the 
intentional content of our experiential states were iconic, there would be no intensionality. 
Our intentional states would be as fine-grained, or rather, as coarse-grained as the objects at 
which they are directed (Allison 2008: 111). Since however, this is not the case, sensibility 
alone cannot be capable of yielding intentional experience, which, for Kant at least, is 
fundamentally intensional. 
It is worth noting that this problem is exacerbated when the relevant sensory array is 
extended over time, comprising successive states of the subject. Landy (2008) offers the 
example of a person raising his hand. Simplifying the perceptual manifold which would be 
involved somewhat, we could analyse this in terms of three successive sensory manifolds:  
 
 
103 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
Suppose that the man raising his hand is asking a question, such that ‘the man raising his 
hand’ and ‘the man asking a question’ are co-extensional. Despite this, clearly there is a 
difference between intentionally representing the man as raising his hand, or as asking a 
question (one could be in an epistemic position to grasp the former but not the latter). Given 
this, does the above sequence of manifolds represent the man as raising his hand or as asking 
a question? Evidently, the state of affairs here is no different from the previous iconic 
examples. Given that these descriptions are co-extensional, if the sequence resembles the man 
raising his hand then it also resembles the man asking a question. The image leaves no space 
for representing one, but not the other.  
As it is sometimes said then, there is a difference therefore between a ‘mere’ sequence 
of representations (as above) and the representation of a sequence of representations as a 
sequence. Insofar as intentional states are intensional, temporally extended sequences of 
representations are represented as sequences in the sense that they are determined according 
to some characterisation or description e.g. a man raising his hand, or a man asking a 
question. Yet a mere temporal sequence of manifolds falls short of this. Again this shows that 
there is no prospect of individuating images, or in this case, series of images, as finely as the 
relevant intentional states. 
To tie this back into Kant’s ‘composition talk’, it should be clear that this 
individuation problem can be understood as a problem of composition. For Hume, simple 
impressions and ideas fit together spatially and temporally to compose complex impressions 
and ideas respectively; they are individuated on this basis. However, what the foregoing 
observations show is that no such notion of spatial or temporal composition could ever 
suffice to individuate images finely enough to map them isomorphically onto intentional 
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states. As Kitcher says (1990: 79), spatio-temporal contiguity is too ‘promiscuous’. 
Consequently, the composition exhibited by experiential states cannot be given or received: it 
cannot be a function of the sensibility. 
 
There is a separate argument against sensibility being sufficient for experience. 
Examples of sensations which Kant offers include, taste and colour (A28), heat and sound 
(B44) and weight (A169/B211).  In other words, sensations or ‘presentations’ are sensory 
qualities: visual qualities, tactile qualities etc. A multitude or manifold of these qualities is 
always necessarily apprehended under the sensible forms of space and time. Now, crucially, 
Kant thinks that there is a logical gap between receiving sensations of this kind and relating 
them to objects or being in intentional states. 
“We have within us presentations of which we can also become conscious. But no 
matter how far this consciousness may extend and how accurate and punctilious it 
may be, they still remain forever only presentations, i.e. inner determinations of our 
mind in this or that time relation. How is it, then, that we posit an object for these 
presentations; or how is it that in addition to the subjective reality that they have as 
modifications [of the mind], we also attribute to them who knows what sort of 
objective reality. Their objective significance cannot consist in the reference to 
another presentation… For otherwise the question returns: how does this other 
presentation, in turn, go beyond itself and acquire objective signification in addition to 
the subjective one that it possesses by being a determination of the mental state?” 
(A197/B242) 
According to Kant, it is possible to separate or isolate the reception of sensations from their 
being related to an object. For instance, he speaks of sensibility yielding a ‘stream’ of 
subjective states (A107), comprised of arrays of sensations. The idea seems to be that the 
mere operation of sensibility can be paraphrased as ‘now, sensory qualities AA’, ‘now 
sensory qualities AB’, ‘now sensory qualities BB’ etc. That is, merely receiving sensory 
representations amounts to no more than a stream or inter-play of subjective states. No 
connection to an object is forged. Similarly, Travis (Ms.: 11) asserts that sensibility, taken in 
isolation, keeps us locked in our own inner world. In other words, it is possible to attribute a 
capacity for receiving sensory representations without this entailing the attribution of a 
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relation to an object.83 This connection to an objective domain which exists independently of 
being represented is a further cognitive achievement.  
 Kant’s claim can, I think, be formulated in what are perhaps more attractive terms. 
Sensations for Kant, recall, are modifications or determinations of the subject: no more than 
imprints left upon us, the purely passive recipients, by external objects. As such, another way 
of formulating his claim is that there is a logical gap between being determined in certain 
respects, and those determinations relating to objects. His claim is that the mere capacity for 
receptivity does not, in itself, account for the possibility of intentional experience. 
Representations being intensionally directed upon objects which exist independently of being 
so represented is not something which falls out simply from the capacity to be affected by our 
environment. Interestingly, this marks a repudiation of Kant’s pre-critical position outlined in 
the Inaugural Dissertation. According to this earlier position, relation of representations to an 
object is explained by the subject being affected by the relevant object: that is, sensations 
represent an object insofar as they are the effects of objectual causes. This causal relation is 
said to explain how a modification of our mind can represent something or have a relation to 
an object (see, Longuenesse, 1998: 18-19). In repudiating this view, Kant is denying that 
intentionality can be accounted for in causal terms.84 
Furthermore, Kant rightly believed that the difference between receiving sensory 
presentations and relating them to an object could not be explained by appeal to association.  
“But suppose that I inquired more precisely into the reference of given cognitions… 
and that I distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the relation in terms 
of the laws of the reproduction imagination (a relation that has only subjective 
validity).” (B141) 
                                                           
83
 Interestingly, this contrast shows up in Frege also. Frege distinguishes the ‘inner world’ of sense impressions - 
imagination, moods, inclinations – from thought. Sense impressions “alone do not disclose the outer world to 
us… To have a visual impression is not to see things… Having visual impressions is certainly necessary for 
seeing things but not sufficient. What must be added is non-sensible. And yet this is just what opens up the outer 
world for us” (1956: 308-309). Of course, Frege’s non-sensible ingredient which unlocks the world for us – a 
thought from the ‘third realm’, is very different from Kant’s response (Bell, 1979: 122). Moreover, there is good 
reason to think that appealing to non-psychological, ontological propositional entities in order to explain the 
objectivity of experience, as Frege does, is destined to fail (see King, 2009). Unfortunately, this issue takes me 
too far afield to justify proper consideration here.  
84
 For this reason, I think Kant would be highly critical of the ‘causal theories’ of intentionality which are 
commonly espoused nowadays. Crucially, this is not to say that he considers causality to be irrelevant. 
Discursivity states that intentionality requires both the understanding and the sensibility, and since the latter 
yields, essentially, causal effects of objects, he absolutely has a place for causality in his account. Nevertheless, 
Kant’s concern with intentionality only makes sense in the context of the claim that causality does not suffice 
for intentionality. As such, although he can grant the necessity of causality to intentionality, the notion of a 
‘causal account’ of intentionality would be a misnomer to him.   
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Once the logical gap between a sensory stream and relating representations to objects is 
admitted, association does nothing to close it. Why would the fact that certain representations 
become associated explain how they acquire relation to an object? The law of association 
serves to move the mind from one kind of representation to another with which it has been 
constantly conjoined, for example, from the impression of weight to the representation of a 
body. It is tempting to think that in forging a connection between representations, association 
is forging an intentional state such as: 
• Bodies are heavy 
However, this is only plausible insofar as the respective representations are already assumed 
to bear a relation to an object. If certain representations relate to bodies, and certain 
representations relate to the objective property of weight, then perhaps it is reasonable to 
suppose that their association will amount to, if not at least be the grounds for, the objective 
state ‘bodies are heavy’. In this case however, association is not explaining the relation to an 
object, but presupposing it, and thus begging the relevant question. By contrast, if this 
relation to an object is not presupposed, there is no reason to think the association of the 
relevant representations could establish it. It would result only in a descriptive generalisation 
about my subjective state: 
• {impression of weight, representation of a body} 
That is, ‘whenever I feel the impression weight, I also have the representation of a body’. 
This evidently falls short of objective experience. 
Although commentators have widely recognised that Kant is critical of the role 
allocated to association in the work of many of his predecessors (e.g. Fodor, 2003: 93), this 
criticism has seldom been related to the central issue of intentionality. In fact, occasionally 
this connection has been actually denied outright. For instance, Longuenesse (1998: 186-7) 
considers and promptly rejects understanding Kant’s critique of Humean association in this 
way. The reason, she says, that Kant’s critique of association is not that it cannot explain the 
possibility objective cognition over and above merely subjective cognition is that “of course, 
Hume does have a story to tell about how we come to believe that our impressions and ideas 
represent properties of the objects “whatever the state of the subject””. Longuenesse is right 
that Hume has a relevant associational story to tell. What Longuenesse omits to mention, or 
fails to recognise, is that this story is a comprehensive failure and tacitly presupposes what is 
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in need of explanation, as discussed in Section 2.2. In fact, far from showing that objective 
experience can be explained in terms of association, the failure of Hume’s account seems to 
confirm the impossibility of such an explanation. Hume utilises association subtly and with 
considerable clarity of thought, and so the fact that he was unable to plausibly show how it 
might yield objective experience suggests that the shortcoming lies not in the detail of his 
account, but with the idea of association itself.  
Kant’s conviction is that objective cognition could not arise simply from a sensory 
array or, alternately, that a purely sensory array could never be objective. No matter how 
often sensory representations are given to the subject in specific patterns and configurations, 
this could not account for how they are taken to relate to an object. It is worth emphasising 
that it follows from this that sensibility is not only insufficient for veridical experience, it is 
also insufficient for illusionary experience: 
“…truth and illusion are not in the object in so far as it is intuited” (A293/B350) [my 
emphasis]  
In both veridical and non-veridical experience, representations or presentations ‘go beyond 
themselves’ (A197/B242) in purporting to represent an object other than themselves. Kant’s 
claim is that sensibility alone cannot account for this.  
 “The basic contrast with which Kant operates in both the Analytic of the first 
Critique and the corresponding segment of the Prolegomena is between perception 
and experience. Merely having a series of perceptions is not equivalent to having 
experience.” (Allison, 2008: 206) 
Consequently, experience is not possible merely through our receptivity to the world alone, 
but must necessarily depend upon the contribution another faculty also: the understanding. 
This insight entails a qualitative distinction of the functions of the sensibility and of the 
understanding, and is widely influential to this day:  
 “…to identify something as an impression is to place it in a logical space other than 
the one in which talk of  knowledge – or, to keep the general case in view, talk of 
world-directedness, knowledgeable or not - belongs” (McDowell, 1994: xv) 
“…the possibility of thought depends upon the idea of objective truth, of there being a 
way things are which is not up to us. I do not see how any causal story about the 
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sequence of stimuli reaching an isolated creature can account for this feature of 
conceptualisation or intensionality.” (Davidson, 2004: 141) 
None of this is to deny the importance of sensibility. On the contrary, Kant insists that 
sensation is necessary for any experience: 
“Now, there are two conditions under which alone the cognition of an object is 
possible, first, intuition, through which it is given, though only as appearance. (A92-
93/B125) 
The challenge is to explain how by means of given sensory data, we come to represent an 
objective order: an objective order that is not identical with the relevant sensory data (B234-
235). Relating representations to objects is the characteristic activity of the understanding 
(Allison, 2004: 173). Again borrowing Travis’ formulation (Ms.: 11), it is the contribution of 
the understanding which serves to ‘unlock’ the objective world for us. 
 
 
4.4. Global experience  
Perhaps because the most profound and revelatory consequence of the discursivity thesis is 
that sensible representation alone is insufficient for experience, there has been a prevailing 
tendency to portray Kant’s topic as being primarily, if not entirely, that of perceptual 
cognition (e.g. Bird, 1962: 82). After all, prima facie, it certainly seems plausible that one can 
be in a perceptual state, one which is marked by intentional content and therefore amounting 
to experience, without any involvement of a non-sensible faculty. As a consequence, since 
discursivity denies this prima facie attractive thesis, the focus has tended to reside primarily, 
if not exclusively, with perceptual experience. Kant’s challenge is thus commonly understood 
solely in terms of determining what perception presupposes over and above what the 
sensibility can provide. Moreover, this emphasis upon perception has been reinforced by the 
way in which ‘experience’ is used in ordinary language. Kant’s transcendental investigation 
is said to concern the a priori conditions for the possibility of experience. Yet, ‘experience’ is 
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a term generally used to denote perceptual apprehension of the world. For instance, ‘having 
an experience’ might refer to jumping out of a plane or tasting an exotic food.85  
 However, given that ‘experience’, for Kant, denotes any intentional mental state, the 
identification or restriction of experience to perception does not appear viable. After all, 
perceptual states are clearly not the only kind of mental state which exhibit intentionality. 
Contemporary philosophers generally recognise a wide range of intentional states or, so-
called, ‘propositional attitudes’: thinking, believing hoping, desiring, etc. (Searle, 1983). 
Relative to perception, what unites all these postures of the mind is that (a) they are 
intentional and (b), they are not perceptual; they do not directly involve any sensory manifold. 
As such, they represent an object in absentia. 
It is clear that Kant does take experience to extend beyond perceptual states. For 
instance, he speaks of cognition of the inhabitants of the moon: 
“That there could be inhabitants of the moon, even though no human being has ever 
perceived them, must of course be admitted.” (A493/B521) 
Given that in the eighteenth century there was little prospect of perceiving inhabitants of the 
moon, the fact that Kant finds it possible to think of or speak about such inhabitants, shows 
that objective cognition is not limited to perception. Similarly, Kant also speaks of events 
which occurred at a time prior to one’s own existence (A495/B523), which obviously raises 
the same issue. In other words, Kant accepts that there is such a thing as non-perceptual 
experience (Kukla, 2011; Pendelbury, 1995: 779; Pereboom, 1988: 340-1; see, Melnick, 1993, 
for a critique of Kitcher’s neglect of this point). Nevertheless, Kant makes no attempt in CPR 
to sub-divide non-perceptual experience into anything like the rich classifications of 
propositional attitudes so prominent in contemporary philosophy, so I shall speak only of 
non-perceptual experience generally. Following, Kukla (2011), non-perceptual experience 
will be called ‘global experience’. Borrowing Kant’s terminology then (A320/B376-377), 
experience in general is the genus, under which stands both perceptual experience and global 
experience.86 Consequently, insofar as the transcendental method is concerned with the a 
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 Though ‘cognition’, which commentators use interchangeably with ‘experience’, lacks these strong sensible 
or perceptual connotations. 
86
 This division is, I think, what Kant has in mind when he says that: “…it is empirical cognition if the object is 
given in the senses’ representation (the latter includes both sensation and sensation bound up with consciousness 
i.e. perception); it is a priori cognition if the object is given, but not given in a representation of the senses.” 
(Corr: Letter to Beck, Jan. 1792, 400) 
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priori conditions of experience, this encompasses the conditions for both perceptual and 
global experience. 
It might be objected that global experience is in tension with Kant’s discursivity thesis. 
Specifically, discursivity entails not only that all experience involves the understanding, but 
also that it requires the sensibility. Yet, defining global experience in contradistinction to 
perception seems to amount to a denial that there is any sensible element inherent to the 
former. However, this tension can be dispelled by consideration of some of Kant’s 
formulations of discursivity: 
“… all thought, whether straightaway or through a detour, must ultimately be related 
to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensations, since there is no other way in which 
objects can be given to us” (A19/B33) 
“The postulate for cognizing the actuality of things requires perception… - not 
immediate perception of the object itself the existence of which is to be cognized, but 
still its connection with some actual perception.” (A225/B272) 
In these formulations, discursivity is stated so as to be consistent with the possibility of non-
perceptual experience. Kant posits that experience can relate directly to sensations or relate to 
sensations indirectly: either route is said to satisfy discursivity. Yet, this seems to be exactly 
what is required for global experience. Specifically, global experience can be distinguished 
from perception by not relating to sensations directly, but can nevertheless satisfy discursivity 
insofar as it relates indirectly to sensations. Of course, at this point we do not know what this 
‘indirect’ relation amounts to, but the mere fact that Kant postulates such a relation is 
indicative of a distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual experience. 
Finally, it is worth guarding against a possible misapprehension. Just because Kant 
grants that there are non-perceptual, experiential states, this clearly does not entail that all 
mental states are intentional or constitute experience. This is certainly not Kant’s view 
(Longuenesse, 1998: 66; see Section 5.3 for discussion). Rather, he is simply committed to 
the view that the states which are intentional or experiential extend beyond those of 
perception. 
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Chapter 5. Rules and Normativity 
 
The preceding chapter concerned the nature of experience: how it is understood in terms of 
intentionality, its role within Kant broader transcendental philosophy, and why it is not 
reducible to sensibility but requires also the contribution of the understanding. However, 
beyond gesturing towards this intellectual faculty, nothing was said of how Kant seeks to 
account for or explain intentional experience in a positive fashion. This account is the central 
topic of this chapter; it can be broken down into three tightly connected claims: 
1. Experience is essentially rule-subjecting. 
2. Rules presuppose a capacity for judgement. 
3. Judgements exhibit a finite number of forms. 
The first two claims are very intimately related, so much so that while (1) is introduced in 
Section 5.1, it can only be fully developed and explicated in the context of (2): the topic of 
Section 5.2. Section 5.3 clarifies the position by addressing some potential problems and 
complications. Finally, Section 5.4 is concerned with (3); specifically, how we should 
understand, or what the significance is, of the forms exhibited by judgements.  
 
5.1. The normativity of the intentional 
“…our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of 
necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our 
cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily... insofar as they relate to an 
object our cognitions also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e. they 
must have that unity in which the concept of an object consists.” (A104-5) 
How are we to understand Kant’s claim that experience “carries something of necessity with 
it”? Evidently, this necessity cannot be equivalent to the epistemological necessity of a 
prioricity, for this would entail that no experience could be justified a posteriori: something 
Kant certainly does not accept. On the contrary, far from being dichotomous with the a 
posteriori, Kant stresses that this type of necessity is exhibited by empirical, and therefore, 
contingent, experience (B142) (cf. Bird, 1962: 116-7 & 143). Rather than being an 
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epistemological notion, Kant is referring to a different type of necessity, that of being 
somehow “non-arbitrary”. All intentional experience is said to exhibit this latter type of 
necessity.  
In order to try and explicate what Kant has in mind here, consider the distinction 
between a purely descriptive law and a normative law. The latter describes how things should 
be, whereas the former describes certain regularities in the order of things. The difference 
resides in the opposing directions of fit between the laws and the facts they range over. A 
descriptive law is valid only insofar as the facts it ranges over conform to it. If there is a 
violation of the law, we adjust it to accommodate the facts. In contrast, a normative law 
remains binding even when it is violated. For example, the force of ‘you ought to prepare for 
your philosophy tutorials’ is not weakened or undermined by the persistent flouting of it. 
Accordingly, normative laws demand or necessitate conformity from that over which they 
range. It is this idea of being subject to a normative law or a rule which Kant means by 
cognition carrying ‘something of necessity’ (see, e.g., Allison, 2004: Chpt. 7, fn. 42).  
“Suppose that we inquire what new character is given to our presentations by the 
reference to an object, and what is the dignity that they thereby obtain. We then find 
that this reference does nothing beyond making necessary the presentations being 
combined in a certain way and being subjected to a rule.” (A197/B242-3) 
“Even if the rule does not leap to the eye, one must still represent the object as in 
accordance with a rule in order to conceive that it represents something, that, is which 
has a certain place and function among its other determinations.” (Kant, Reflexionen: 
in Guyer, 1987: 74) 
One of Kant’s master ideas is that for representations to relate to an object or for experience 
to be intentional, is for it to be rule-subjecting: that is, it subjects the experiencer to rules.87 
This is what representational purport amounts to for Kant. It is to attribute to experience the 
normative ‘necessity’ of subjecting one to rules. Given this, and given that, as was noted 
earlier, Kant defines the role of the understanding as that of bringing representations into 
relation with an object, it is no surprise that the understanding is defined as the faculty of 
rules (A133/B172 & B197-8). Further, since Kant also speaks of the understanding as the 
faculty of concepts, it follows that concepts simply are rules:  
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 I shall speak of experience being ‘rule-subjecting’. This should be taken as shorthand for experience 
subjecting the subject to rules. 
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“All cognition demands a concept, though that concept may, indeed, be quite 
imperfect or obscure. But a concept is always, as regards its form, something 
universal which serves as a rule.” (A106) 
As such, the following equivalences hold for Kant:  
Faculty of the understanding = Faculty of concepts = Faculty of rules 
Unfortunately, despite its importance, Kant offers little detailed discussion of how experience 
is rule-subjecting.88 Most of this section is devoted to developing this idea with some 
precision, with reference to examples (a tool Kant himself employs with notorious 
infrequency). Having a clearer picture of what the rule-subjectingness of experience amounts 
to in hand, I shall return to Kant’s master idea that the intentional is essentially normative at 
the end of the section. 
Consider first, rule-subjectingness with respect to perceptual experience. The starting 
point for perceptual intentionality, as discussed in Section 4.3, is a succession of inner 
determinations of our mind, manifolds of sensibility, in this or that time relation. The 
challenge is to say how in addition to their reality as subjective modifications, they come to 
have objective signification. There is a significant distinction between two different kinds of 
perceptual experience which needs to be drawn from the outset. Kant points out that while a 
manifold, as a modification of the subject, is always successive, the objective signification of 
a manifold is either successive or sequential (A182/B225). For example, take the perception 
of a house ‘standing before me’. In such a case, it is likely, or at least possible, that the 
relevant sensations be apprehended sequentially. The order of my apprehension could run 
from the roof of the house to the bottom, or from the left of the house to the right, or even be 
spread over a considerable time as, say, I walk slowly around the house surveying it. The 
crucial point is that many such sequences of sensations are possible: there is no particular 
successive order to which they must adhere for the perceptual experience to be that of a 
house. The order in which the relevant sensations are apprehended is inessential to the object 
of perception itself. By contrast, consider the perception of a boat floating down river. Just as 
in the house example, there is a succession of sensations: boat upstream-boat downstream. 
Yet, unlike the house case, the particular successive order of these sensations is essential to 
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 The limited discussion of the matter in CPR itself has received little elaboration in the secondary literature. As 
Landy (2009: 27) notes, the question of what Kant really means by ‘rules’, and by the claim that experience is 
rule-subjecting, has generally not been a major topic of interest for commentators.  
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the object of perception. If what was perceived was instead: ship downstream-ship upstream, 
one would be perceiving a different object altogether: namely a ship floating upstream. In 
other words, by this successive-sequential distinction, Kant means to underline the difference 
between the perception of an event and non-eventive perception. This presents a puzzle 
because in both cases, what is apprehended is merely a sequence of sensations, A-B: so, this 
cannot account for how in event perception this sequence is taken to be determined in the 
object as successive i.e. an event. Something else must secure this difference. It is important 
not to conflate these kinds of cases because Kant ultimately wants to say that there is a 
difference in how they are rule-subjecting which accounts for the difference. Nevertheless, 
they are similar enough that I shall discuss the rule-subjectingness of perception primarily 
with reference to sequential or non-eventive perception, subsequently amending, or rather, 
extending, the account as required for successive or eventive perception.89    
In the perception of a house, says Kant, the manifold is synthesised according to a 
concept or rule: that of ‘house’. Our sensory impressions are brought under this rule. 
According to Kukla (2011: 134), we should understand this rule in terms of what can be 
encountered in ‘investigative behaviour’, and I think there is something correct about this. 
Any perceptual experience, whether it be temporally extended or only a time slice, will be 
from a certain perspective or vantage point, in the sense that it implies an array of 
investigative, behavioural possibilities for modifying the experience. For example, if I 
perceive the front of a house, I can walk around to the back of the house; if I perceive the 
screen of my laptop, I can close my laptop; if I perceive a cup of tea on a table, I can taste the 
tea. In each case, the perceptual experience implies behavioural or investigative possibilities 
for changing the experiential state.90 It seems reasonable to suppose that any perceptual 
experience will imply investigative possibilities of this sort. Of course, there may be physical 
impediments which constrain their realisation. However, what is relevant here is not the 
realisation of such investigative possibilities, that the behaviour is actually performed, but 
rather, beliefs regarding these possibilities. For example, if I perceive the front of a house, I 
may believe that were I to re-position myself in a certain way, I would perceive the back of 
the house; if I perceive the screen of my laptop, I may believe that were I to close my laptop, 
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 Bird (1962) contains a very lucid discussion of this matter (see pp. 154-167).  
90
 Describing this behaviour as ‘investigative’ is potentially misleading insofar as it suggests that the behaviour 
must concern a particular object or set of objects which are investigated: the tea is investigated by tasting it, the 
house is investigated by circling it. Although such examples best illustrate the notion of investigative behaviour, 
such behaviour need not be directed upon a particular object in this way. If I am enjoying a panoramic view, an 
investigative possibility could be simply how the view would change if I changed my position. Here, there is no 
object which is ‘investigated’, but I would still describe this as an investigative possibility.  
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I would perceive only the outer shell; if I perceive a cup of tea I may believe that were I to 
raise it to my lips, I would taste tea, rather than water or bleach. Notice that these are all 
conditional beliefs, in which the performance of certain investigative behaviour is specified 
as the antecendent.91 The beliefs are about what would ensue under the condition of certain 
investigative behaviour. Call these investigative beliefs.  
Investigative beliefs are relevant to how perceptual experience is rule-subjecting 
because part of what it is for perception to be rule-subjecting makes essential reference to 
such beliefs (Landy, Ms.: 13; Bennet, 1966: 126). Specifically, perceptual experience is rule-
subjecting insofar as to be in a perceptual state is, inter alia, to be committed to certain 
investigative beliefs. For example, to have a perceptual experience of a cup of tea is, amongst 
other things, to be committed to, for instance, the investigative belief that if the tea is sipped, 
what is tasted will be tea. A perceptual experience of the screen of a laptop commits one to 
the investigative belief that if the laptop is closed, only the outer shell will be perceived.92 
The idea here is that it is not simply an incidental effect of perceptual experiences that they 
commit the subject to investigative beliefs in this way, but that this is essential to the 
perceptual experience being experiential at all. It is part of what marks the difference 
between a mere manifold and perception. A mere interplay of sensations does not commit the 
subject to any investigative beliefs. This commitment only arises once concepts are applied, 
and this is, in part, why concepts are rules. Every concept is a perceptual rule insofar as its 
application to a sensory array commits the subject to certain investigative beliefs. Of course, 
for any given concept, the range of investigative beliefs it may commit one to is very broad 
and possibly not finite,93 and almost certainly going to be a rather uncertain matter; 
attempting to specify or enumerate this range even for a single concept is probably a hopeless 
task. However, this task is tangential to the present concern which is simply the claim that 
subjecting a manifold to a concept will necessarily involve a commitment to some set of 
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 I am speaking of investigative beliefs, yet it is plausible that perceptual experience implies other attitudinal 
states besides beliefs e.g. expectations. It seems to me that beliefs are primary – but this should not be taken to 
prejudice the question of perceptual experience implying other attitudinal states besides.  
92
 Notice that it is the subject of a perceptual experience which is committed in these ways. It is, evidently, 
nonsensical to speak of the experience being committed or the perception being committed; it is the bearer or 
subject of the experience which is committed. This is far from trivial because it entails that if perception is 
essentially rule-subjecting in this fashion, then perception essentially makes reference to a subject capable of 
being committed in this way. This connection between rules and a subject of experience is actually the key node 
in Kant’s account of apperception: rules and self-consciousness are interdependent and arise together: neither is 
prior to the other. 
93
 Consider, for instance, how investigative beliefs can be stated disjunctively i.e. where the consequent is 
disjunctive. 
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investigative beliefs. To say that perceptual experiences essentially involve commitments to 
certain investigative beliefs is part of what it means to say that perception is rule-subjecting.94 
Some clarifications of this thesis are in order. Firstly, as has already been stressed, the 
claim is not that the perception of a house, or indeed, any perceptual experience, demands or 
requires investigative behaviour: that I am, for example, required to verify that my experience 
is of a house by inspecting it from different angles.  Rather, the claim concerns investigative 
beliefs: what my experience would be were I to undertake certain investigative behaviour. 
Secondly, while the claim does pertain to beliefs, it does not concern the course of one’s 
psychological states or attempt to describe the path they will follow according to some 
psychological model. The claim is not that, for example, whenever I have a perceptual 
experience of a cup of tea, I will subsequently think, ‘if I drink the tea, I will taste tea’. This 
would be to draw a descriptive generalisation, one which does not require the notion of a rule 
at all, but, perhaps, only the postulation of a Humean law of association operating on the 
constant conjunction of past impressions of the sight of tea and the taste of tea (see 
Longuenesse, 1998: 49-50). Instead, the claim is that if I perceive a cup of tea then I ought to 
accept that if I drink the tea, then I will taste tea. This is quite different from claiming that 
such a conditional will always be thought subsequent to any perceptual experience of tea. The 
claim is a normative one, not a descriptive one. Thirdly, while the claim does concern what 
ought to be believed, this does not pertain to occurrent beliefs. To say that a perceptual 
experience, E, commits one to certain investigative beliefs,  B1…, Bn, is not to say that 
whoever is in state E, should think B1…,Bn, but instead that it is incorrect to be in state E, and 
to deny any of the investigative beliefs B1…, Bn. It is in this sense that experience is rule-
subjecting. It subjects the subject of experience to rules regarding what ought to be believed 
and what ought not to be believed. To say that someone is committed in certain ways is to say 
that they are subject to rules.  
 So, a concept is a rule for perceptual experience insofar as its application to a 
manifold essentially commits the subject to investigative beliefs. This is not all however: the 
normative reach of concepts extends beyond investigative beliefs, to what I will call ‘non-
investigative’ or ‘direct’ beliefs. Investigative beliefs are always conditional: if certain 
investigative behaviour, then P. Nevertheless, perceptual experience also involves 
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 While I am arguing that perceptual experience commits the subject to investigative beliefs, this three-place 
relation could plausibly be cast in different (though always normative) terminology. Instead of commitment, it is 
possible to interpret this relation in terms of prohibition or permissibility (Landy, 2009: 18). Nevertheless, 
univocality has its advantages, and I will speak only of commitment.   
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commitments to beliefs which are not conditional in this fashion: not dependent upon a 
condition of investigative behaviour. For example, to perceive a house is to be committed to 
certain existential beliefs about houses: namely, that there is at least one such object. 
Similarly: 
“… in the case of the perception of something outside of us the concept of body 
makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of 
shape etc.” (A106) 
The concept of body ‘makes necessary’ these representations not in the sense of requiring 
that one think impenetrability, shape, etc., but in the sense of committing one to certain 
beliefs regarding them, and prohibiting others. For example, to perceive a body is to be 
committed to the belief that what is perceived is impenetrable.  
Notice that the two examples provided of normative relations to direct beliefs are, for 
Kant at least, analytic and so underpinned by the rules of logic. In the house instance, the 
move can be understood as a straightforward existential generalisation. The body example 
requires some conceptual decomposition, but granted that, the relation can be stated in 
similarly tautologous terms. Clearly however, not all normative relations to direct or non-
investigative beliefs need to be of this sort. To perceive a house may, for example, commit 
one to the belief that someone lives in it, or to perceive a cup of tea may commit one to the 
belief that someone brewed it, yet there is no sense in which these relations are undergirded 
by logic. Following Sellars (1953), call this the difference between formal and material 
commitments. This is a vital distinction because it marks a difference of normative force. To 
say that a perceptual experience, E, formally commits one to a belief, B, is to say that E 
supplies one with an all-things-considered reason, Ra, to accept B: that is, there is no 
mitigating or extenuating circumstance which could render Ra an insufficient reason to accept 
B. If I perceive a body, then irrespective of whatever else may be the case, I have a sufficient 
reason to accept that there exists at least one thing which is a body: to have a reason of this 
sort is what it means to be formally committed. On the other hand, many commitments – 
material commitments - do not supply reasons of this sort. To say that a perceptual 
experience, E, materially commits one to a belief, B, is to say that E supplies one with a pro 
tanto reason, Rp, to accept B, in the sense that there are mitigating or extenuating 
circumstances which could render Rp an insufficient reason to accept B. For example, to 
perceive a cup of tea is to be, inter alia, committed to the belief that someone brewed it. 
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Nevertheless, it is conceivable, albeit wildly improbable, that no one brewed it, but that the 
tea fell from the sky into the cup. In these circumstances, i.e. where one believed that the tea fell 
from the sky into the cup, the reason to accept that someone brewed the tea supplied by 
perceptual experience of the tea, would not be a sufficient reason to accept that someone 
brewed the tea; as such, it is only be a pro tanto reason: to have a reason of this sort is what it 
is to be materially committed. 
Since this ‘committed how’ distinction between formal and material commitments 
cuts across the ‘committed to’ distinction between investigative beliefs and non-investigative 
beliefs, it is possible to tabulate the rule-subjectingness of sequential perception as follows:  
Table 1. 
Committed-how Committed-to 
Formally committed (all-things-considered reason) Investigative beliefs 
Material commitment (pro tanto reason) Direct or non-investigative beliefs 
It is an interesting question whether there is such a thing as a formal commitment to an 
investigative belief (all of the examples, I discussed earlier are, I think, examples of material 
commitments). Possibly there are not, but I set this issue aside. 
So far, I have discussed only sequential perception. The account provided is largely 
applicable to successive perception also, for, like sequential perception, successive perception 
essentially involves both formal and material commitments to investigative and direct beliefs. 
Nevertheless, this account needs to be augmented in the case of successive perception. Why 
is it that in successive perception, the order of sensations is taken as determined in the object, 
whereas in sequential perception it is not? According to Kant, the difference resides in the 
nature of the rules applied in the respective cases:  
“…in the perception of an event, there is always a rule that makes the order in which 
the perceptions follow upon one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) a 
necessary order.” (B238) 
In other words, subsuming a manifold under certain rules, “compels us to observe this order 
of perceptions rather than some other order” (A196/B242), and it is in the sense that the order 
is taken to be determined in the object itself (A192/B237-8). The idea here is fairly 
straightforward. Basically, certain concepts are ‘event concepts’ insofar as their application to 
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a manifold invokes special commitments, absent in the case of ‘non-event concepts’. These 
commitments concern counterfactual beliefs of the form: ‘if the order of sensations had been 
different, the object perceived would have been different’. For example, to apply the concept 
‘float downstream’ to a manifold is, in part, to be committed to the counterfactual belief that 
had the order of my sensations been other than what they were e.g. boat downstream-boat 
upstream instead of boat upstream-boat downstream, the object perceived would have been 
different also i.e. a boat floating upstream. Here, the antecedent of the counterfactual belief 
makes essential reference to the order of my sensations: this is the condition for the 
perceptual experience being of what it is, so call these beliefs ‘counterfactual sensory beliefs’. 
By contrast, to bring a manifold under the concept ‘house’, while essentially involving a 
range of commitments, none of these concern counterfactual sensory beliefs which refer to 
the order of my sensations. As such, it is not an event concept.  
Given this, all concepts can be divided into event concepts and non-event concepts. 
For example, some instances of the former include: ‘float downstream’, ‘hit’, ‘fall’, ‘raise’ 
‘lit’ etc. Some instances of the latter include: ‘house’, ‘car’, ‘green’ etc. With this division in 
hand, the account of perceptual experience described might be depicted as follows: 
Figure 6. 
 
From the perspective of rule-subjectingness, the move from perceptual experience to 
global experience is a non-trivial one. Specifically, whereas perceptual experience is marked 
by the presence of a sensory manifold, global experience is marked by its absence. To think 
that there might be inhabitants of the moon is perfectly intentional or experiential, yet there is 
no sense in which this could involve subsuming a sensory manifold under rules! Still though, 
insofar as global experience is experiential, i.e. objective, intentional etc., it must involve 
concepts, rules. Similarly, discursivity requires that, despite the absence of a sensory 
manifold, sensibility must also play a role in such experience. Kukla (2011: Chpts. 4 & 5) 
offers an articulated account of how global experience is rule-subjecting and although I think 
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that it is flawed, it nevertheless contains an important insight into how the matter ought to be 
understood. 
According to Kukla, the representation of spatially or temporally remote state of 
affairs, i.e. global experience, involves the claim that it is encounterable.95 Specifically, 
“cognition of unperceived objects requires representation of a possible sequence of 
experiences connecting one’s current perceptual states to the remote object.” (Kukla, 2011: 
150) Experience of unperceived objects is possible insofar as one can represent a series or 
sequence of possible perceptions, beginning from one’s present perception, which would 
terminate in the immediate perception of the relevant object. In this way, global experience 
refers to a possible intuition, thereby upholding discursivity. For example,  
“…my representation of the Nishitama district in Tokyo is the thought of a possible 
procedure (or experiential route) by which I can advance to that district from my 
current perceptions” (Kukla, 2011: 151) 
Rules enter into this picture insofar as, for Kukla, rules for global experience just are 
procedures stipulating series of perceptions of this type. That is, concepts or rules are 
procedures for ‘getting somewhere’ or ‘getting to something’ from one’s current perceptual 
position. They are necessary for global experience insofar as cognition of a remote object 
presupposes precisely this kind of procedure. Simply put, I can think about something which 
is not here insofar as I have a concept which tells me how I could advance to the immediate 
perception of it i.e. a concept which links me to a possible perceptual state of the of the right 
kind. This ensures the encounterability of the object.  
The obvious problem with this view is that aside from in a very small number of cases, 
no such procedure is available. For example, I can represent a procedure for returning home 
from my present state: follow the road for ten minutes and then turn right. However, in 
general, even for quite familiar locations, I often cannot represent such a procedure. Worse, if 
the account is problematic for familiar locations, it seems to foreclose the objective cognition 
of objects never previously encountered altogether. I certainly cannot represent a procedure 
for advancing from my present position to the immediate perception of the tallest man in the 
world. Yet, since global experience of such a remote object is precisely the kind of actuality 
                                                           
95
 For the purposes of simplicity I will discuss only spatially, not temporally remote objects here, though 
Kukla’s account purports to explain both possibilities. The reason for this is that, as I shall argue, Kukla’s 
account fails even for spatially remote objects, and this failure can be generalised without difficulty to 
temporally remote objects also. 
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Kukla is seeking to explain, it cannot be that it presupposes such a procedure. This seems to 
demand far too much. 
Kukla attempts to evade this difficulty by adopting an extremely loose notion of a 
‘possible procedure’. Rather than constituting a finite list of concrete steps for advancing to a 
perceptual state of the right kind, a possible procedure is far less onerous: 
“Even if a distant corner of the universe lies outside the reach of any technological 
device, including the most advanced space telescopes, we can still think of a possible 
procedure by which to be brought into its perceptual vicinity.” (Kukla, 2011: 151) 
Evidently, no one is able to represent a series of concrete steps for advancing to distant 
regions of space, especially when it is stipulated that the regions lie outside the reach of any 
technology. But then, in what sense can we, nevertheless, represent a ‘possible procedure’ for 
being brought into its perceptual vicinity? Well, certainly it is possible to conceive of being 
so brought. It is conceivable that a suitable space ship could be built or a sufficiently 
powerful telescope could be designed which would serve this purpose. At the limit, this is all 
Kukla seems to mean by the notion of a ‘possible procedure’ and as such, it is surely correct 
that they are available for any global experience. All global experience seems to entail the 
conceivability of being brought to perceptual contact with the relevant object. However, the 
problem with this is that we have completely lost sight of the sense of which global 
experience is rule-subjecting. On Kukla’s view, possible procedures amount to quasi-
imaginative capacities: capacities to conceive of the possibility of being brought into 
immediate perceptual relations with objects. Yet there is nothing normative or ‘ruleish’ about 
this. Despite equating concepts or rules with such possible procedures it is clear that this 
cannot account for the sense in which global experience is rule-subjecting.96  
Although Kukla’s account is flawed, I think that it nevertheless contains an important 
insight: that objects being encounterable is central to global experience. This is because it 
secures the connection to sensory manifolds or, at least, possible sensory manifolds which 
seems to be required by Kant’s discursivity thesis. The problem is that Kukla combines this 
idea with the view that concepts are procedures for advancing to remote objects. This 
                                                           
96
 Indeed, it might be pointed out that even the more robust notion of a ‘possible procedure’, a concrete list of 
steps for advancing to an intuition of an object, is not a rule in the normative sense of the term, or, at least, it 
need not be. There is nothing inherently normative about representation of a possible sequence of experiences 
connecting one’s current perceptual states to the remote object. In my view, despite his emphasis on concepts 
being ‘rules’ for Kant, the root of the shortcomings of Kukla’s account is that he fails to properly grasp the sense 
in which Kantian experience is normative. I discuss this issue further at the end of Section 5.3. 
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bleaches concepts of their normative core and so fails to explain how global experience is 
rule-subjecting. By contrast, my view is that non-perceptual experience is rule-subjecting 
insofar as it commits us to certain beliefs. That is, despite lacking a sensory manifold, the 
sense in which global experience is rule-subjecting can be understood in fundamentally the 
same terms as the rule-subjectingness of perceptual experience: all global experience 
involves concepts or rules which function so as to commit the subject to certain beliefs.  The 
most obvious kind of belief global experiences commit one to is what I have labelled ‘direct’. 
For example, fairly trivially, any global experience concerning the inhabitants of the moon 
commits one to the belief that there are inhabitants of the moon. Just as with perceptual 
experience, commitments to such beliefs can be either material or formal. I do not think that 
non-perceptual experience involves commitments to either investigative beliefs or 
counterfactual sensory beliefs. It is difficult to see how they could. Nevertheless, it does 
involve commitments to a special class of direct beliefs. Specifically, global experience of an 
object essentially commits the subject to a belief of the form: 
‘There is some spatio-temporal point such that, were it occupied, one would immediately 
perceive the relevant object’97 
Call such beliefs ‘direct sensory beliefs’. In committing subjects to beliefs of this form, 
global experience essentially involves reference to a possible intuition. It commits one to the 
possibility of a sensory manifold of the object of the experience, i.e. there is some spatio-
temporal point which is such that were it occupied, one would immediately perceive the 
relevant object. As such, commitments to these beliefs satisfy the requirement that global 
experience is encounterable. Importantly, in contrast to the idea of a ‘possible procedure’, 
there is no requirement that subjects be capable of representing a procedure for advancing to 
the relevant intuition from their present perceptual state. Rather, subjects of global experience 
must simply be committed to the possibility of such a sensory state. 
 
With this detailed discussion of the kinds of rules experience subjects one to, we are 
in a better position to understand what I earlier called one of Kant’s ‘master’ ideas. This is 
that apprehending rules and moving in a normative space is not something built upon an 
independently given, intentional experience of the world. Rather, experience essentially 
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 I am classing these beliefs under the heading of ‘direct’ rather than ‘investigative’ or ‘counterfactual sensory’ 
for the obvious reason that they are categorical in form rather than conditional. 
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presupposes such a normative capacity from the outset.98 It requires rules of the kind I have 
outlined.  
“For Kant, the aboutness characteristic of representing is a normative achievement.” 
(Brandom, 2002: 23) 
Kant’s master idea is that if one ‘stripped away’ the normative element of experience, its 
rule-subjectingness, the sense in which it commits the subject to certain things, one would be 
stripping away its relation to an object (see Allison, 2004: 181; Bird, 1962: 80). What would 
remain would be manifolds of sensation, streams of phenomenal consciousness in one 
configuration or another. Of course this ‘remnant capacity’ for manifolds could still 
constitute a significant form of intelligence; it may still enable one to navigate one’s 
environment ably.99 Yet, it would not amount to experience. It is only with the addition of 
rules that we are able to ‘get outside of our own heads’ in the sense in which Kant both 
assumes is possible, and is interested in accounting for transcendentally.  
“…man is a creature not of habits, but of rules. When God created Adam, he 
whispered in his ear… “When you cease to recognize rules, you will walk on four 
feet.”” (Sellars, 1967: 298) 
Crucially, as I have described the position, nothing has turned upon any rules in 
particular. Although I outlined the kinds of rules applicable to perceptual and non-perceptual 
experience respectively, the specific rules discussed, e.g. ‘house’, ‘floating downstream’, are 
evidently not of any special significance. As should be clear, the thought has been that 
experience must subject one to some rules, but not any particular rule, involve some 
commitments, but not any particular commitment. In this sense, the idea has been that 
experience must simply operate within a normative space.100  
                                                           
98
 There are contemporary philosophers who defend positions similar, at least prima facie, to the one I am 
ascribing to Kant - that intentional states are essentially normative. Indeed, Wedgwood (2009) is entitled ‘The 
normativity of the intentional’. Also, Nick Zangwill (1998; 2010) contends that at least some intentional states 
are essentially normative. However, the difficulty with connecting or comparing Kant’s position to such 
contemporary theses in any robust sense is that the latter are founded upon a crucial theoretical distinction 
unrecognised and, arguably, inimical to Kant: the distinction between act and content or what Sellars’ called the 
“ing/ed” distinction. For example, Zangwill’s thesis (1998) is that propositional attitudes, as opposed to the 
contentful objects of these attitudes, are essentially normative. Insofar as Kant fails to recognise the distinction 
of act and content altogether (cf. Rodl, 2009), it is difficult to compare his view to contemporary analogues. 
99
 See Section 5.3 
100
 In the end, Kant argues that there are a special, circumscribed class of rules which are necessarily applicable 
to all experience (see Sections 5.4 - 6.4). However, this comes later in the dialectic, and for now what matters is 
a more basic and minimal claim that experience is always rule-subjecting in one way or another. 
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The claim that operating within this normative space is integral to the objectivity of 
cognition strikes me as compelling. It seems plausible that did experience not commit the 
subject in certain ways, relation to an object would be lost. We would be stranded with our 
own mental presentations: bereft of any conception that our own presentations ‘go beyond 
themselves’ (A197/B242). At the very least, this claim strikes me as sufficiently interesting 
and plausible to pursue its implications, a topic which the remainder of this thesis is primarily 
orientated towards (though some objections are considered in Section 5.3). 
Before turning to this however, there is one final observation regarding the rule-
subjectingness of experience which warrants attention. To this point, I have limited myself to 
describing rules in terms of commitments holding of the subjects and certain beliefs. 
Nevertheless, we could speak just as easily of requirements, prohibitions, permissions (Landy, 
2009: 18). Importantly, these normative relations are all alike in being intrinsically 
universalisable and inter-subjective. To grasp the idea of being committed to something, it is 
necessary to grasp the universalisability of the commitment: I can recognise that I am 
committed to something only if I recognise that any rational being in relevantly equivalent 
circumstances would also be so committed. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for 
prohibitions, requirements etc. Consequently, insofar as I take other rational creatures to be in 
relevantly equivalent circumstances, I am obliged to treat a commitment of mine to be a 
commitment of theirs also. We insist that if they are valid for us, they are valid “as well for 
everyone else” (Prol: §18, 45). As such, these normative relations are inherently inter-
subjective. Insofar as objective experience is essentially rule-subjecting, it follows that it 
implies inter-subjectivity and universalisability:  
“Objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everyone) are exchangeable 
notions.” (Prol: §19, 45) 
The intersubjective nature of rules is significant because it serves as a very useful test for 
whether something is rule-subjecting. That is, it constitutes a criterion by which we can 
determine whether something is rule-subjecting or not. Roughly, we can ask, is it such that it 
commits the subject to requiring certain things of others? Does it, in this sense, exhibit 
universal validity? For example, it is possible to determine that the objective state ‘the boat is 
floating downstream’ is rule-subjecting because the subject is obliged to demand that others 
must agree. In other words, the intersubjective nature of rules is a criterion by which we can 
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establish whether something is rule-subjecting or not. This will be important in the next 
section.   
 
5.2. The priority principle 
Any adequate discussion of Kantian concepts must make reference to judgement, for one of 
Kant’s most well known theses is that judgement takes priority over concepts:  
“…the only use that the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by 
means of them” (A68/B93) 
“[Concepts are] predicates of possible judgements” (A69/B94) 
However, while commentators agree that judgement is prior to concepts for Kant, there is no 
agreement on how this ‘priority’ ought to be understood. Heis (forthcoming) lists eight 
distinct interpretations of the principle which have been suggested in the literature. In my 
view, all of these interpretations either fail on exegetical grounds, or are inadequate to the 
task at hand: that of substantiating the relevant notion of priority. However, rather than 
engage in the lengthy undertaking of refuting each of these in turn, I shall instead simply 
strike out with my own account which is, to my knowledge, original and so stands or falls on 
its own merit.  
In order to understand the priority principle, it is first necessary to understand what 
Kant means by ‘judgement’. Unfortunately, this presents a challenge in its own right for Kant 
offers numerous definitions of judgement. Although Longuenesse (1998: 81) urges that these 
definitions can be shown to be equivalent, the proofs she offers of this are not at all trivial. 
Rather than engaging in a comprehensive review of all of Kant’s definitions of judgement 
then, I want instead to underline what is at least a central element of his conception of 
judgement: their conceptual composition.  
“In every judgement the given concepts can be called logical matter (for the 
judgement).” (A266/B322) 
“…thus in the judgement ‘all bodies are divisible’, the concept of the divisible… is 
here applied in particular to the concept of body” (A68-69/B93-94) [my emphasis] 
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As Longuenesse (1998) emphasises, for Kant all judgements involve the combination or 
relation of concepts (see also, Hanna 2001: 60-63). This point is also underlined by an 
inspection of Kant’s table of the forms of judgement. Although I do not discuss this table 
fully until Section 5.4, suffice to say that according to Kant, all judgements must be 
composed of at least two concepts since all judgements are either categorical, disjunctive or 
hypothetical in form (A70/B95).  
 The mere fact that judgements are conceptually constituted does not have any direct 
implications for the priority principle. In particular, the mere fact that judgements are 
composed of concepts does not entail that they are prior, in any substantive sense, to concepts. 
A pad of paper is composed of individual sheets, but that does not render the pad logically 
prior to the sheets. Nevertheless, I do think that the conceptual constitution of judgements 
suggests a conjecture which, if shown to be correct, would substantiate the priority principle. 
The conjecture is as follows: what if concepts only exist as the constituents or components of 
a composite whole. That is, what if concepts are only concepts insofar as they have been 
combined or composed with other concepts. Call this the composition conjecture. Recall that, 
for Kant concepts are rules, so the conjecture here is that rules only exist insofar as they have 
been composed with other rules. Were this conjecture correct it is fairly clear how this might 
substantiate the priority principle. Basically, since judgements just are compositions of 
concepts, if concepts only exist in such compositions, this would raise the possibility of 
concepts only existing as the constituents of judgements. This certainly would amount to the 
priority of judgement over concepts.  This is clear enough to warrant an investigation of the 
composition conjecture.  
In my view, there is good reason to think that the composition conjecture is correct. 
Consider the following judgements: 
• Birds fly  
• All bodies are divisible 
As Macfarlane (2002: 36) says, despite these judgements not being grammatically 
prescriptive, i.e. they are not imperatival, they nevertheless “imply prescriptions”. To judge 
that birds fly is to be committed to certain beliefs, and as such, such compositions of concepts 
exist in “a network of various normative relations: commitments, prohibitions, permissions, 
etc” (Landy, 2009: 18). For example, ‘all bodies are divisible’ commits one to the belief that 
‘there is nothing which is a body and is not divisible’. Again, this is not a prediction or 
127 
 
 
 
hypothesis about the flow of one’s psychological states. Rather, it establishes a web of 
obligations. It establishes what one is correct in doing and incorrect in doing, and so renders 
the subject responsible or assessable in certain ways. As such, it is perfectly natural to speak 
of the constituents of these judgements as rules. For example, substituting ‘lions’ for ‘bodies’ 
in the composition ‘All bodies are divisible’, commits the subject very differently. It follows 
that in each case, whoever so judges is subject to distinct rules.  
 Furthermore, these judgements are valid universally and necessarily. If I judge that 
‘all bodies are divisible’, I require that other peoples’ judgement be consistent with my own 
(Heis, forthcoming: 20). Crucially, this does not entail that other people must assert ‘all 
bodies are divisible’, but simply that they must not contradict it. I am committed to other 
rational creatures finding things as I find them, and where this is not the case, I am committed 
to seeking reasons for this divergence. In this sense, judgements are inter-subjective and 
universalisable. By contrast, consider the constituents of the above judgements in isolation: 
• ‘Bird’ 
• ‘Body’ 
, or a list of these constituents: 
• {Body, divisible, bird, fly} 
In neither case of thinking these constituents is the subject committed to anything. For 
example, just because I think at one moment {body, divisible, bird, fly}, this does not render 
the subsequent thought {mind, simple, mammal, swim} incorrect or a mistake. The mere fact 
of thinking such representations does not demand anything of the subject (Corr: Letter to 
Beck, July 1792, 420). Nor is there any sense to be made of the idea that these representations 
prescribe anything which is valid universally and necessarily. There is nothing inter-
subjective about thinking ‘bird’: such thinking does not compel the subject to, for example, 
demand that others think alike. Indeed, the idea is faintly absurd. What this suggests is that 
rules only exist in the context of, or as constituents of, judgements: it suggests that the 
composition conjecture is correct. 
Importantly, it is not the case that all compositions of concepts are such that the 
constituent concepts are rules. For example: 
• Red bus 
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• Bus red 
In these examples, the concepts ‘bus’ and ‘red’ are hierarchically composed, as indicated by 
the asymmetries in their meanings: a red bus is a bus that is red whereas bus red is a red 
characteristic of buses. Nevertheless, despite being compositions in this sense, these 
representations do not commit the subject to anything anymore than the uncomposed 
examples above. As such, there are no rules here. A consequence of this qualification is that 
judgement needs to be understood more precisely as those combinations of concepts in which 
the concepts are rules. I think this is what Kant has in mind when he says: 
“I have never been able to accept the interpretation which logicians give of judgement 
in general. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation between two concepts. I 
do not here dispute with them as to what is defective in this interpretation-that in any 
case it applies only to categorical, not to hypothetical and disjunctive judgements... I 
need only to point out that the definition does not determine in what the asserted 
relations consists.” (B141) 
Kant does not deny that judgements are compositions of concepts here, but insists that this is 
not specific enough. A more precise definition would be that judgements are those 
compositions of concepts in which the concepts are rules. Judgements are the minimal units 
of responsibility. Brandom (2009: 32-33) sums the picture up well: 
“What distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient 
creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they 
are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. Judging and 
acting involve commitments. They are endorsements, exercises of authority. 
Responsibility, commitment, endorsement, authority-these are all normative notions.” 
Insofar as the composition conjecture has been established, a strong version of the priority 
principle follows. Quite simply, judgements are prior to concepts insofar as concepts only 
exist in the context of a judgement. 
This discussion implies that when I spoke in the previous section of concepts as rules, 
I was oversimplifying the matter in a crucial respect. Namely, I was eliding the fact that rules 
only arise in the context of a judgement. All concepts, insofar as they are rules, are 
constituents of judgements. For example, consider the sensory array: 
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Figure 7. 
 
As has been discussed, in order to amount to perceptual experience, such a deliverance of the 
sensibility must be subsumed under rule(s). However, since rules only exist in the context of 
a judgement, this subsumption must necessarily involve a judgement. For example, judging 
that the tall man is next to the small man would amount to bringing this manifold under rules. 
Yet no fragment of this judgement would suffice in this respect. This is why Kant calls the 
power of judgement “the faculty of subsuming under rules” (A132/B171). Sensory 
representations are brought under rules by means of judgement (Allison, 2008: 8; Davidson, 
2004: 138). 
 A terminological complication follows from this priority principle. Notice that in the 
above cases where the constituents of judgements are isolated or listed in abstraction from 
any judgemental context, it is natural to say that what are being so isolated are concepts. 
Indeed, I have spoken of ‘uncomposed concepts’ and compositions of concepts which fall 
short of a judgement e.g. ‘bus red’. Nowadays, concepts are generally supposed to have their 
identity conditions irrespective of their composing any judgemental wholes. Indeed, the idea 
of composition implies as much. For example, a chair may be composed of various parts; yet, 
the existence of these parts does not depend upon their entering into the mereological 
relations constitutive of a chair. Despite this however, it should be clear that if the priority 
principle, that rules only exist in the context of a judgement, is correct, talking of concepts in 
abstraction from judgemental wholes is, strictly speaking, precluded on Kant’s account. This 
is because, for Kant, concepts just are rules. If a concept does not compose a judgement then 
it is not a concept.   
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This is not inconsistent with viewing judgements as composed of concepts, but it does 
necessitate an alternative conception of composition. Kant distinguishes between two kinds 
of mereological involvement: constituents of a whole are either juxtaposed 
(Zusammensetzung) or unified (Verknüpfung) (B201). As Bell (2001) underlines, in the case 
of juxtaposition, the relations constituents stand in are external or contingent in the sense that 
neither the identity nor the existence of the constituents depends in any way upon the 
relations. By contrast, in the case of unity, the relations constituents stand in to each other are 
essential to their identity and/or existence. In the former case, the whole is merely an 
aggregation of the parts whereas in the latter, the parts are abstractions from the whole. The 
mereological relations constitutive of judgement are those of unity, not juxtaposition; in a 
judgement, concepts compose a unity (Bell, 2001: 11). Consequently, concepts are 
abstractions from judgements.  
“There is no description of what it is for a concept, as an entity, to have the capability 
of representing things mediately by itself. For Kant these are the capabilities not of 
concepts but of understanding, capabilities exercised in acts of judgement. Kantian 
concepts are best viewed not as entities which represent on their own, but as 
abstractions from these cognitive capabilities exercised in judgement: they are rule-
like modes by which acts of judgement can be made.” (Pereboom, 1988: 328) 
There is an extremely significant consequence of Kant’s priority principle: it entails 
that the capacity for judgement is central to the possibility of experience. In the previous 
section I outlined how, according to Kant, all experience is essentially rule-subjecting. In this 
section, I have argued that the priority principle should be understood as the claim that all 
rules are possible only as constituents of a judgement. It follows from this that experience is 
essentially judgemental. In other words, in the context of Kant’s transcendental investigation, 
a consequence of the priority principle is that it moves us from the claim that experience is 
essentially normative to the claim that experience is essentially judgemental.  
1. Objective experience requires concepts. 
2. Concepts only exist as the constituents of judgements. 
3. Therefore, all objective experience is judgemental. 
This argument chimes with some of Kant’s most famous pronouncements regarding 
judgement. Recall that I earlier noted that Kant offers numerous definitions of judgement. 
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Some of these refer to the conceptual composition of judgements which I have already 
discussed. Others however, define judgement in functional terms. 
“A judgement... [is] a relation that is objectively valid, and so can be adequately 
distinguished from a relation of these same representations in which there would be 
only subjective validity, e.g. in accordance with laws of association.” (B142) 
“[Judgements are] act[s] by which given representations first become cognitions of an 
object” (Meta: 145-6, fn. 3) 
Anderson (2008: 102) sums up this function well when he says: 
 “Stripped of Kantian jargon, the thought seems to be that a judgement, by contrast to 
a mere psychological association of ideas, relates its constituent representations in 
such a way that they represent things as being a certain way.” 
Taken in isolation, the ascription of this function to judgements appears puzzling. After all, 
this ascription is clearly non-trivial and prima facie, it might be wondered what justifies the 
claim that judgement is so integral to relation to an object?101 Given the foregoing account of 
the priority principle however, a justification is readily available: concepts are integral to 
relation to an object; judgement takes priority over concepts; therefore, judgement is integral 
to relation to an object. Moreover, that the priority principle is capable of rationalising what 
appears to be a distinct Kantian thesis – the connection between judgement and relation an 
object – in turn lends credibility to the interpretation of the priority principle I have defended.  
In light of this, it is possible to extend the earlier noted identification of the faculties 
of the understanding, of concepts and of rules:  
 “We can trace all acts of the understanding back to judgements, so that the 
understanding in general can be represented as the capacity to judge.” (A69/B94) 
So: 
Faculty of the understanding = Faculty of concepts = Faculty of rules = Faculty of judgement 
   
                                                           
101
 Indeed, although this connection between objectivity and judgement is accorded a position of considerable 
prominence in much of the secondary literature, I know of no explanation of it.  
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5.3. Objecting to Conceptualism: concepts and schemata 
The foregoing account of experience is a version of Conceptualism: the view that all 
intentional content requires the application of concepts.102 However, Conceptualism is not 
without its critics, and the position has been the topic of considerable debate in recent years 
(Ginsborg, 2008; de Sa Pereira, 2013). A major problem for Conceptualism is that it seems to 
over-intellectualise experience. Is it really plausible that all experience – any mental state 
bearing intentional content – requires an intellectual apparatus as sophisticated as that of 
concepts? This problem is surely most troubling with respect to perceptual experience, and 
many commentators have argued it is possible to explain the nature of perception without 
invoking concepts (e.g. Dreyfus, 2007; Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013). While somewhat 
compelling, this rather sweeping problem is closely related to a more specific objection 
which concerns both animal and infant cognition. Both animals and infants, so goes the 
objection, enjoy perceptual experience: they encounter the world perceptually. Given this, the 
conceptualist is compelled to ascribe concepts to them. However, especially when the 
normative and holistic character of concepts is underlined, along with their essential 
dependence on the capacity for judgement, this ascription does not appear viable (see, Hanna, 
2011: 330-1). We want to be able to grant animals and infants perceptual experience without 
burdening them with such a rich intellectual capacity, but this entails the renunciation of 
Conceptualism.    
In this section, I address these worries, even if not dispelling them altogether, by 
drawing upon the first chapter of the Analytic of Principles, the Schematism. I argue that 
although Kant certainly is a conceptualist, he has the philosophical resources to both do 
justice to the broad ‘anti-conceptualist intuition’ with respect to perception – that concepts 
are not needed to explain perception - and more importantly, meet the specific challenge from 
infant and animal cognition.  
In the Schematism, Kant is occupied with the issue of concept application, or 
equivalently, the subsumption of intuitions under concepts. Specifically, Kant thinks that 
there is a problem regarding how it is that sensory states are recognised as instances of 
                                                           
102
 That Kant is a conceptualist is the dominant view in the literature. Indeed, expositions of Conceptualism 
commonly take Kant’s observations in CPR and elsewhere as a point of departure, treating him as perhaps the 
first major advocate of the thesis (see, e.g. McDowell, 1994). Admittedly, this exegetical view is not universally 
accepted. Hanna (2005) argues that Kant can be understood as the father of Non-conceptualism also! My own 
view is clearly that Kant is a conceptualist – this is entailed by the account I have attributed to him. My concern 
in this section then is not with the exegetical question of Kant’s Conceptualism but with its philosophical 
credibility. 
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concepts: how the former are subsumed under the latter or how the latter are applied to the 
former. One way of understanding Kant’s worry here is to recall his discursivity thesis: 
experience involves two irreducible and qualitatively distinct stems, the understanding and 
the sensibility. While emphasising the distinctness of these two faculties has its advantages, a 
puzzle inevitably arises with respect to their interaction. In particular, how is it that concepts, 
as the denizens of the understanding, can be known to apply to intuitions which, as products 
of sensibility, play a wholly distinct cognitive function? How could concepts, which are 
qualitatively non-sensible, specify the sensible conditions of their realisation? Quite generally, 
concepts, as general functions, seem far too abstract to determine whether particular sensory 
states count as instances. This is a worry Kant raises as early as the A Deduction, hinting 
there also at a solution: 
“The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary 
connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of 
the imagination.” (A124) 
This transcendental function of the imagination Kant calls a figurative synthesis, or synthesis 
speciosa. Although at this point in the A Deduction it is not yet clear in exactly what sense 
the understanding and sensibility require ‘mediation’, the suggestion is that there must be a 
mediation and that this is supplied by an act of imaginative synthesis. The issue of mediation 
receives its full hearing in the Schematism, where this is explicated as the challenge of how 
concepts are applied to intuitions.103 Here, the figurative synthesis of the imagination is called 
a schema. It is by being connected to a specific schema, that concepts are known to apply to 
intuitions: schemata are the basis of all perceptual use of concepts, whether they be pure 
sensible (i.e. geometrical) concepts, pure intellectual concepts or empirical concepts 
(A140/B180).104  
 “Even less is an object of experience… ever adequate to the empirical concept; rather, 
that concept always refers directly to the schema of the imagination, this schema 
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 For the connection between the A Deduction and the Schematism, see Hanna (2001: 53) and Longuenesse 
(1998: 116). 
104
 It has been contended that Kant’s problem in the Schematism involves only the application of pure concepts, 
i.e. categories, and excludes the application of empirical concepts since these are sufficiently ‘homogenous’ 
with sensible intuition so as to require no intervening schema (Guyer, 1987). In places Kant certainly suggests 
as much. Nevertheless, I agree with Pendelbury (1995) that the balance of assertions in the Schematism makes it 
clear that the problem extends also to pure sensible and empirical concepts. The application of the categories is 
simply a special or particularly challenging instance, of a more general problem regarding concept application 
tout court. 
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being a rule determining our intuition in accordance with such and such a general 
concept. The concept dog signifies a rule according to which my imagination can 
delineate universally the figure of a four footed animal without being limited to any 
particular figure, such as experience or any possible image which I can represent in 
concreto, actually presents.” (A141/B180)105 
Basically, the thought is that we know how to apply concepts to intuitions, only if the latter 
have already been configured by an act of synthesis performed by the imagination: a schema. 
Now, there is perhaps no idea which Kant utilises more persistently in CPR than that of 
synthesis. Indeed, given the profusion of syntheses in CPR, coupled with Kant’s assertive 
prose and eschewal of examples, explicating a schema as a kind of synthesis is liable to 
obscure rather than clarify matters. At the limit however, a synthesis, for Kant, denotes 
simply the combination of a manifold in some determinate way. 
“Now since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions 
therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they 
cannot have in itself, is demanded. There must exist in us an active faculty for the 
synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty, I give the title, imagination.” (A120) 
Schemata combine manifolds in some determinate fashion: group stimuli according to certain 
templates. One never encounters a pure un-discriminated perceptual manifold. Rather, a 
manifold is always organised or differentiated into distinct qualities of varying salience and 
significance (Hanna, 2001: 52). In this sense, every manifold is riddled with internal contours 
which cut either one way or another; even our most primitive confrontations of the world 
exhibit a structure of this kind. According to Kant, this is the result of a mere sensory 
manifold being taken up and synthesised according to schemata. Most fundamentally then, a 
schema is simply a capacity for sensory discrimination.  
It follows from this that a schema is also a capacity for recognising generic identities 
and differences across distinct manifolds. If a schema combines a manifold, m1, as so and so, 
and combines at a later time, a distinct manifold, m2, as so and so, this amounts to the (partial) 
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 There is a puzzle regarding this quote. Although from the context it is clear that Kant means to assert that 
empirical concepts, such as ‘dog’, require schemata for their application, it is odd that he says that the concept 
of dog “signifies” an imaginative synthesis, for this synthesis is a schema, not a concept. Allison (2004: 208) 
contends that Kant here simply “misstates his own position, referring to the concept of dog, when he clearly 
means the schema”. Alternatively, Kant statement here might be interpreted as saying that the concept ‘dog’ 
signifies, in the sense of being linked or connected to, a schema of the imagination (this seems to be 
Pendelbury’s view (1995: 789)). 
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identification of the respective manifolds. For example, if m1 is synthesised according to the 
schema, ‘dog’, and so is m2, the manifolds share a certain affinity: namely they have both 
been organised according to the schema of ‘dog’. In other words, in synthesising particular 
manifolds a schema amounts to a capacity for recognising generic identities and differences 
across distinct manifolds,106 and so serves to establish similarity classes of manifolds. As 
Longuenesse (1998: 62) puts it, schemata yield ‘series’ of intuitions.  
Having ascribed these functions to schemata, it is, I think, relatively easy to state how 
being connected to a particular schema explains how concepts can be known to apply to 
intuitions. Essentially, a concept applies to an intuition insofar as that intuition has already 
been synthesised according to the schema with which that concept is connected. The concept, 
‘dog’, applies to an intuition if that intuition has been synthesised according to the schema, 
‘dog’. This explains how intuitions are subsumed under concepts. In this sense, from the 
perspective of the problem of concept application, schemata do all of the ‘heavy lifting’: 
concepts just need to be in a one-to-one relation with them and the conditions of their 
application are secure (Longuenesse, 1998). 
Although this illuminates the function of schemata, it does little to specify their 
categorical nature. Kant emphasises that the schema of a concept is not simply an image, 
though schemata may yield images (A140-1/B179-180). The reason for this seems to be that 
images are too specific to specify the sensible conditions of concept application. For example, 
any image of a dog will necessarily be specified with respect to certain qualities, e.g. colour, 
size, which will inevitably exclude certain dogs from its range.107 Instead of images, Hanna 
(2001: 52) argues that schemata correspond to what are known as prototypes or exemplars in 
contemporary literature. However, while Kant does describe examples as “leading strings” 
(A134-5/B174), he does not equate schemata with prototypical exemplars of the sort Hanna 
suggest (cf. Allison, 2004: 205-208). Sellars (1978) suggests that to synthesise a sensory 
array according to a schema is to token a complex demonstrative phrase e.g. ‘this brick with a 
red and rectangular facing surface’. There is no predication and no judgement here. Instead, 
schemata yield subject terms for these judgements. This view is also problematic however, 
insofar as it portrays schemata as ‘quasi-conceptual’ (Allison, 2004: 188). The notion of a 
subject is a conceptual matter if anything is, so to say that schemata yield subjects for 
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 The notion of ‘recognition’ relevant here is evidently not, or at least need not be, a conscious one.  
107
 This echoes Hume’s own observations regarding the impossibility of an image which is not specified with 
respect to certain qualities. The difference however, is that since Hume saw no alternative to the view that ideas 
are images, he was forced to adopt a highly convoluted account of abstract ideas (see fn. 24). 
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judgements is to say that they are, in and of themselves, a kind of conceptual operation. It is 
difficult to reconcile this with the stated function of schemata as enabling concept application: 
insofar as concept application is a problem, it cannot be solved by postulating ‘another’ class 
of conceptual operations. I agree with Pendelbury (1995: 787) that it is best to interpret 
schemata as dispositional properties. Insofar as schemata serve to classify or discriminate our 
intuitions according to certain similarity classes, this can be understood dispositionally: 
dispositions to respond to stimuli in similar ways. On this view, to recognise the general in 
the particular then, is to be disposed to react to the particular in a manner similarly to how 
one reacts to other particulars of the same kind.  
Ultimately perhaps, the precise categorical character of schemata is not too important. 
After all, as Pendelbury (1995: 786, fn. 18) points out, within a few pages (A140-7/B179-
186), Kant describes schemata variously as representations, rules, products of the 
imagination, syntheses, phenomena of agreement and sensible concepts. So it is unlikely that, 
from an exegetical perspective at least, a conclusive view of what schemata are is possible. 
Instead, what really matters is the function or role schemata play. As I have described it, 
schemata actually perform a three-fold function: 
(a) Synthesise manifolds in determinate ways. 
(b) Establish similarity (and non-similarity) classes of manifolds. 
(c) Specify the conditions of concept application.  
Notice that while (a) and (b) are inextricable from each other, they could, in principle at least, 
be detached from (c). This is important for what follows.  
Even as compared with other equally difficult and relatively obscure sections of CPR, 
the status and reputation of the Schematism amongst commentators is especially contentious. 
As Allison (2004: 202) notes, the chapter is unusual in being sometimes viewed as 
completely superfluous. For example, Warnock (1948) dismisses the Schematism as 
altogether misconceived, arguing that Kant’s “peculiar language” lures him into pursuing a 
nonsensical problem. The charge against the Schematism is that the central issue upon which 
the chapter turns, how concepts are applied, is simply confused. In asking how it is that 
concepts are applied or how intuitions are subsumed under concepts, the Schematism is 
premised upon the separation of concept possession from concept application: there can be no 
‘problem’ of concept application if possession of a concept is, at least in part, constituted by 
knowing how to apply it. The charge against the Schematism is that this premise is false: no 
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such separation of concept possession and application is possible. To have or possess a 
concept is to know how to apply it, or in Kant’s terms, concepts are their own schemata. This 
is why, according to Warnock, Kant is pursuing a nonsensical problem (for a related view, 
see Bennett, 1966). After all, it is only on the basis of concept use that we ascribe concept 
possession to others. If someone was unable to correctly sort a collection of dogs and sweet 
wrappers into dogs and non-dogs, we would certainly not attribute to her the concept of a dog. 
Indeed, it is far from clear that we can even conceive of what it would be like to possess the 
concept of a dog, without being able to recognise instances of dogs (and therefore, also, non-
dogs). 
This Warnockian critique is far less persuasive however, if we turn from 
commonplace concepts such as ‘dog’, to less familiar ones. For example, consider the 
concepts of ‘tadpole’ and ‘bone marrow’. I certainly know some things about tadpoles and 
bone marrow. Tadpoles are the larval form of frogs, and bone marrow is the kind of thing 
which can be transplanted in an operation and produces red blood cells. In this sense, I 
possess these concepts, even if they are relatively impoverished. However, I would be 
completely hopeless at recognising either tadpoles or bone marrow. While I would have little 
trouble classifying some things as not-tadpoles, e.g. book cases and elephants, there would be 
a good number of non-tadpoles I would fail to distinguish from tadpoles proper, similarly 
with bone marrow. For less familiar concepts, it seems that we can separate concept 
possession from knowing how to apply it. Ironically, the Warnockian critique of the 
Schematism stems largely from the inadequacy of Kant’s own ‘dog’ example. By focusing 
instead upon less familiar concepts, the distinction between concept possession and 
application is apparent.   
 Still though, it might be questioned just what this establishes. It may be admitted that 
it is possible to conceive of possessing a concept without being able to apply it. Nevertheless, 
why does this necessitate the postulation of a ‘third thing’ mediating between concepts and 
intuitions? That is, even if we admit the coherence of the problem of the Schematism, in what 
sense is the postulation of schemata a solution to it? True, as syntheses of the imagination, 
schemata are supposed to be ‘both’ intellectual and sensible (A138/B177), but it unclear how 
much philosophical weight this claim can withstand. More importantly, rather than 
addressing the problem of the Schematism, the postulation of schemata, at best, seems merely 
to re-locate it. The problem of concept application was how to determine whether a concept 
applies to a particular sensory state. The proposed solution is to say that every concept is 
138 
 
 
 
connected to a schema which determines whether it [the relevant concept] applies to a 
particular manifold or not depending upon whether the manifold has been synthesised 
according to that schema. Yet, far from being a true solution to the problem, it seems that this 
simply shifts the problem from concepts onto schemata. That is, the problem of concept 
application can be re-formulated as the problem of schemata application. How do we 
determine that a particular manifold falls under one schema rather than another? Insofar as 
this is a problem for concepts, why shouldn’t it be a problem for schemata also? Perhaps the 
difference has to do with the different categorical nature of concepts and schemata or perhaps 
schemata are devoid of the kind of answerability to particulars which concepts exhibit. 
However, such a suggestion is difficult to substantiate given Kant’s vagueness on the types of 
things schemata are. It does seem that once we admit that there is a problem of concept 
application, it is hard to deny that the postulation of schemata is not afflicted by the same 
problem. As such, even granting that the problem of the Schematism is coherent, it is far from 
clear that the postulation of schemata can solve it (Bennett 1966: 150). 
 I think that this objection to the Schematism is plausible. Consequently, were the 
distinction between concepts and schemata motivated solely on the basis of the problem of 
the Schematism, it would, at least arguably, not be justified. Equivalently, were the function 
of schemata exhausted by or limited to that of determining concept application, their 
postulation would stand on thin epistemic ground. Crucially however, - and it is at this point 
that we need to move away from the Schematism - this is not the case. It is possible and 
necessary to speak of schemata in abstraction from the specific problem of concept 
application; they play a much broader role in Kant’s philosophy. Firstly, notice that there is 
no incoherence in possessing schemata in the absence of any corresponding concept. For 
example, Travis (Ms.: 17) notes that of the two following questions it is possible to be able to 
answer (1) without being able to answer (2): 
1. ‘Which things (hereabouts) are pigs?’ 
2. ‘What cases of something’s being as it is would be (count as) a case of something 
being a pig?’ 
The generalisation, ‘listen for the grunters’ is an answer to (1); it serves to discriminate pigs 
from non-pigs.108 Yet, imparting such a schema to someone unfamiliar with pigs would not 
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 That such a schema would occasionally lead one to inaccurately discriminate pigs, i.e. there clearly could be 
pigs that do not grunt, is irrelevant since the notion of accuracy is itself conceptual. 
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provide them with the means to answer question (2): one could have the means for 
recognising certain generic identities or similarities – namely, the similarity of everything 
which grunts - without having the concept of ‘pig’, or knowing anything about pigs. Put this 
point another way. When Pia recognises a pig by sight, she is presumably sensitive to the 
presence of certain visual features. This sensitivity amounts to a perceptual schema of pigs 
insofar as it provides Pia with the ability to recognise that the distinct perceptual episodes, X 
and Y, resemble each other and so can be grouped together. However, such a sensitivity does 
not amount to the concept of a pig. Pia may be able to discriminate X and Y, on the one hand, 
from Z, on the other, without knowing what X and Y are: without possessing any concept 
which X and Y fall under. This is what Pendelbury (1995: 787) driving at when he says:  
“[Schemata] yield discriminating responses rather than articulate, classificatory 
judgements; and significantly, they do not involve the capacity to make analytic 
judgements, like Every triangle is a closed figure and No completely green square is 
red, on the basis of reason, or the capacity to make synthetic judgements, like Some 
red things are not squares and No horse is a cow, on the basis of experience. There is 
therefore good reason to regard schemata as more primitive than concepts.”  
In other words, concepts and schemata are doubly dissociable. Not only is it possible to 
possess concepts without possessing corresponding schemata, it is also possible to possess 
schemata without possessing any corresponding concepts (cf. Davidson, 2004). This is very 
significant. If it is possible to possess schemata in the absence of any corresponding concept, 
then the postulation of schemata can be detached from the issue of concept application: their 
postulation need not be justified by recourse to this problem. Rather, it is possible for their 
postulation to be justified on the basis of non-conceptual work they perform. In other words, 
this confirms what I hinted at earlier, that of the three-fold function schemata perform for 
Kant: (a) synthesising manifolds in determinate ways, (b) establishing similarity (and non-
similarity) classes of manifolds, and (c) specifying the sensible conditions of concept 
application, it is possible to isolate the first two functions, which make no essential reference 
to concept application, from the third, which does.109 
Indeed, we find Kant employing schemata to perform non-conceptual, philosophical 
work. This shows up in the three-fold synthesis of the A Deduction where Kant is undertaking 
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 As I outline, I think that there is good evidence that this was Kant’s view. At the limit however, my claim is 
that the distinction between concepts and schemata provides Kant with the resources to adopt this view and that 
he should do so. 
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his ‘encirclement’ of the empiricist position. Kant begins by noting that it is an “empirical 
law” that representations which are constantly conjoined become associated (A100), a fact 
well familiar to readers of Hume. He then suggests however, that this association presupposes 
certain conditions.  
“Suppose that cinnabar were now red, then black, now light, then heavy; or that a 
human being were changed now into this and then that animal shape; or that on the 
longest day of the year the land were covered now with fruit, then with snow and ice. 
In that case my empirical imagination could not even get the opportunity, when 
presenting red colour, to come to think of heavy cinnabar.” (A100-1) 
This seems straightforward enough: were properties never constantly conjoined, but instead 
conjoined only randomly, our powers of association would never be exercised, remaining 
concealed as a “dead and unknown faculty” (A100). However, this constant conjunction itself 
presupposes certain conditions. That is, association, in presupposing constant conjunction, 
presupposes also the power of recognising generic identities and differences across distinct 
manifolds. Roughly, if A and B are to be constantly conjoined, it is necessary to be capable of 
discriminating across distinct manifolds As and Bs. There must, in some sense, be 
recognition that any particular A is the same as As which have gone before and mutatis 
mutandis for any particular B. Were this not the case, every conjunction of A and B would be 
a ‘new’ conjunction, and there would be no constancy to speak of.110 This is clear enough and, 
for Kant, this power is, of course, a type of synthesis, a schema: 
 “The generic identity of the empirical intuitions reproduced by associative 
imagination is shown to be the generic identity of the acts of successive synthesis 
which in turn generates each of these particular empirical intuitions “as” specific 
unities of a manifold.” (Longuenesse, 1998: 47) 
It should be clear that schemata are doing ‘non-conceptual’ work here. After all, association 
is an empirical law which holds also of animal psychology. However, animals lack concepts 
and so while association presupposes schemata, it cannot presuppose concepts.   
Separating schemata and concepts in this way seems to be plausible. Indeed, 
interestingly, it has a contemporary analogue, if not an outright correspondence, to the one 
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 This is far from being a complete account of the notoriously nebulous three-fold synthesis of the A Deduction. 
Nevertheless, it serves to show that schemata lie at the heart of it (see, for discussion, Longuenesse, 1998: 116, 
fn. 29). 
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drawn by Hinzen and Sheehan (2013: Chpt. 2) between percepts and concepts. A percept is 
understood to play the same role as a Kantian schema: it serves to unify “a mass of 
environmental stimuli” (2013: 78) according to certain classifications: a dog’s skin, a piano 
playing, etc. It groups stimuli according to such abstract classes.111 However, percepts do not 
yield experience; they are non-intentional; they do not move in the space of reasons, and the 
question of truth and falsity (and error) does not arise for them.112 Instead, all of this 
presupposes the possession of concepts which are understood as distinct, though related, 
intellectual capacities: intentionality, intensionality and concepts “arise together” (2013: 
82).113  
The reason why this distinction of concepts and schemata is important, indeed, the 
reason why I have gone such lengths to develop it is that it serves to defuse the objections to 
Conceptualism outlined earlier. Consider the objection from animal and infant cognition; the 
distinction of schemata and concepts affords a response here. Specifically, although animals 
and infants lack concepts, they can still possess schemata. Indeed, this is exactly how Kant 
characterises the matter:  
“The door is something that does, it is true, belong to the stall and can serve as a 
characteristic of it. But only the being who forms the judgement: this door belongs to 
this stable has a distinct concept of the building, and that is certainly beyond the 
power of animals.” (FS: §6, 103) 
Kant grants animals the capacity to distinguish amongst their representations and recognise 
generic identities and differences. Although this statement is found in a pre-critical (1762) 
text, Kant asserts the same point in Logic (Intro., VIII, 71) where he distinguishes being: 
(1) “…acquainted with something, or to represent something in comparison to other 
things, both as to sameness and to difference” 
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 Hinzen and Sheehan claim that pre-conceptual perceptual categories have a kind of semantics. I would prefer 
to say that there is no semantics here since there is no intentionality (indeed, Hinzen and Sheehan themselves 
want to deny percepts intentionality). Instead of ascribing percepts a semantics, it is better to understand 
perceptual categories dispositionally, in the same way which I have suggested schemata ought to be understood.  
112
 Hinzen and Sheehan do not postulate, at least not explicitly, any relation of dependence between truth-
evaluability and moving in the space of reasons. Nevertheless, as should be clear from the earlier sections of this 
chapter, for Kant these are intimately related.  
113
 This is a little misleading insofar as I have left out what, for Hinzen and Sheehan, is the key component: 
grammar. They argue that intentionality etc. arises only with grammar. Although I agree, I have left this element 
out for now since it evidently goes beyond Kant’s own position. Nevertheless, Chapter seven of this thesis is 
orientated towards showing how Kant’s position can be updated or augmented along these lines.   
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and, 
(2) “…understand[ing] something i.e. to cognize something through the understanding by 
means of concepts” 
Kant asserts that (1) applies to animals, but (2) does not: they make sensory discriminations 
but do not cognize objects. In other words, they possess schemata, but not concepts. 
Interestingly, Davidson adopts precisely this view of animals:  
“A creature does not have a concept of a cat merely because it can distinguish cats 
from other things in its environment. For all I know, mice are very good at telling cats 
apart from trees, lions and snakes. But being able to discriminate cats is not the same 
as having the concept of a cat” (Davidson, 1999: 8; cf. Davidson, 2004) 
This distinction between discriminatory powers and conceptual powers vitiates the 
objection from animal cognition. Just because animals lack concepts, it is not the case that 
Kant is obliged to regard their mental lives as a ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’. On the 
contrary, animals can be seen to possess sophisticated mental powers, schemata, enabling 
them to categorise their environment and navigate it ably. In other words, it is possible to 
account for the rich encounters animals appear to have with the world without ascribing them 
concepts. Of course, this thesis does still assert a radical discontinuity between the (non-
conceptual) mental powers of animals and those of humans. Despite ascribing animals 
discriminatory capacities, Kant must deny that they enjoy experience, for this presupposes 
concepts. Perhaps the non-conceptualist may insist that this is unacceptable: animals possess 
not only discriminatory capacities but have fully intentional experience. But now the 
objection looks far less forceful and it is unclear why the conceptualist needs to accept this. 
On the contrary, although I certainly do not want to undertake a review of the comparative 
cognition literature here, it is worth noting that the cognitive discontinuity of humans and 
animals has been prominently defended in recent years on the basis of empirical 
considerations (Penn et al, 2008; see Section 7.3 for discussion). 
This response can be extended without complication to infants also. That is, while it is 
certainly true that infants enjoy sensory encounters with the world, plausibly this can be 
construed in wholly schematic terms. For example, it is well established that pre-linguistic 
infants discriminate amongst objects according to abstract kinds such as ‘box’, ‘car’, ‘toy’, 
‘cat’ (Xu, 2005). Yet, insofar as ascribing schemata to infants is potentially sufficient to 
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account for the ways in which they interact with their environment, Kant can deny that they 
have experience and therefore need not ascribe them concepts.  
As well as the animal and infant objection, at the outset of this section I mentioned 
also an anti-conceptualist ‘intuition’ regarding perception: namely that it can be accounted for 
without recourse to concepts. I call this an ‘intuition’ rather than an objection proper 
principally because it is not, at least as stated, an argument at all. Rather it is just the assertion 
of a non-conceptualist intuition and so is unlikely to impress the conceptualist. Nevertheless, 
even here I think that Kant’s distinction of concepts and schemata can go some way towards 
addressing, and even doing justice to this intuition. According to Kant, concepts are known to 
apply to particular intuitions via the mediation of schemata. However, as I have shown, this 
pre-conceptual figurative synthesis of a manifold can be isolated and separated from its role 
in concept application in both developmental terms and comparative terms. Developmentally 
and comparatively, it is possible to distinguish the sensory discrimination and apprehension 
which is secured by schemata, from experience, which presupposes also concepts. Given this 
however, - and this is the crucial point – why think that in the case of mature human adults, 
the synthesis of a manifold according to a schema always result in concept application? Why 
not think that manifolds are sometimes, perhaps often, schematised without the further step of 
subsumption under a concept being taken? As Longuenesse points out, not all representations 
are conscious for Kant and furthermore, not all representations we are conscious of are 
thought or amount to experience. 
“…it is plausible to think that a great number of our representations involve acts of 
mere apprehension and reproductive associations of the same type as those animals 
are capable of, and the apprehension/reproduction/recognition leading to concepts-
that is, to thought [experience] – is at work in only a small part of them” 
(Longuenesse, 1998: 66) 
Kant talks of representations which are not representational (Kitcher, 1990: 66; Hanna, 2001: 
59). The natural way to interpret this claim is that just as in a developmental and comparative 
context we need to distinguish sensory apprehension undergirded solely by schemata from 
experience requiring also concepts, this distinction needs to be extending or applied to mature 
human adults also. That is, there may be sensory forms of awareness (perhaps in the sense of 
Travis, Ms.) in humans which are non-conceptual, but are merely schematic. 
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Insofar as Kant can admit this possibility,114 he goes some way towards addressing the 
non-conceptualist intuition that there is a kind of sensory awareness which does not involve 
concepts. Of course, insofar as this sensory awareness is non-conceptual, ipso facto it cannot 
be properly called perception in the Kantian sense, for this is essentially experiential, 
objective. Nevertheless, this does not preclude it being called ‘perception’ in ordinary 
language; it may just be that ordinary language is insensitive to a technical difference 
between experiential perception, where manifolds are subsumed under concepts, and purely 
schematic sensory awareness. Despite his Conceptualism then, Kant’s distinction between 
concepts and schemata affords him considerable room for manoeuvre here. It enables him to 
admit of the possibility of a non-conceptual form of sensory awareness. His conceptualism is 
consistent with it.  
Where the distinction between concepts and schemata has been neglected, the 
Schematism has inevitably been rejected as redundant. There is however, another less noticed, 
though equally inevitable, interpretive consequence of neglecting this distinction: concepts 
are ascribed the discriminatory role Kant attributes to schemata. Indeed, often this 
discriminatory role is taken to the primary function of concepts.  For example Kukla (2011: 
134) speaks of how a Kantian concept, “guides and regulates investigative behaviour and 
serves to inform the subject’s procedure for determining whether the object of representation 
is a house or something else” [my emphasis]. The picture, according to Kukla, is that what is 
received via the sensibility is consistent with being perceived in a number (perhaps an infinity) 
of different ways. The function of concepts is to privilege certain connections of sensible 
representations over others i.e. a concept serves to connect representations in X-way rather 
than Y-way. For example, Kukla (2011: 93) points out that the sensible representation of a 
house is often contiguous to the representation of the ground. Nevertheless, he says, we 
discriminate them perceptually and this is because we apply the concept of ‘house’, which 
does not extend to the ground. Kukla is by no means the only commentator to construe 
Kantian concepts in this way: as rules for connecting representations (e.g. Bird, 1962: 64; 
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 This is, surely, controversial. Kant is normally understood as claiming that all perception is essentially 
conceptual. On the view I am advancing by contrast, while concepts are certainly required for perceptual 
experience, i.e. that which exhibits intentionality in Kant’s sense, there is a distinct form of ‘sensory attunement 
to the world’ which is purely schematic and non-conceptual, and which, in ordinary language at least, would be 
called ‘perception’. It seems to me that this is a natural way to interpret Kant’s claim that not all representations 
need be or are brought to concepts. At the limit however, as I have already stressed, my claim is primarily that 
(a) Kant’s distinction of concepts and schemata provides him with the resources to take this view, and (b), given 
that this view deflect the objections to Conceptualism, Kant should take this view. Whether this can be truly 
regarded as a live exegetical option is ultimately a different matter.  
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McLear, 2011: 2). Pippin (1982: 91) describes concepts as the means by which we 
“apprehend and discriminate the world”, and Allison (2004: 187) suggests that Strawson 
adopts this view also. The problem is that these apprehension and discrimination locutions 
apply not to concepts, but, for Kant, to schemata. As Allison (2004: 210) stresses:  
“it [a schema] functions to process the sensible data in a determinate way, thereby 
giving one a sense of what to look for or expect on the basis of certain perceptual 
clues.” 
Crucially, this function of apprehension and discrimination is not one which requires rules or 
any reference to normative relations and so by identifying concepts with this function, the 
‘rulishness’ of concepts inevitably disappears. This consequence is not obvious in Kukla 
(2011), since despite assigning concepts this discriminatory function, Kukla persists in 
describing concepts as ‘rules’. However, a close inspection of the function assigned to 
concepts shows that there is nothing essentially normative about them on Kukla’s account:  
 “the activity of perceiving the house is guided by a rule informing us of what we 
should or ought to detect in the course of scanning it…it is this temporally extended 
activity of perceiving, in the sense of looking over, that is unified by guidance from a 
rule” (2011: 96) 
It is clear that what Kukla here labels a ‘rule’ is nothing other than a mechanical procedure: a 
series of steps which determine whether a manifold is X-way or not. Yet there is nothing 
normative about a mechanical procedure. Computing a function of this sort does not require 
normative language; no commitments need to be invoked. Therefore, despite Kukla’s 
repeated references to the normativity of concepts, if this is the role concepts perform, there 
is no good reason to construe them in normative terms at all; they are not rules.  
 The reason why this interpretive error, assigning concepts the function of schemata or 
equivalently, bleaching concepts of their normative aspect, is significant is that it renders 
concepts far less capable of performing the philosophical work Kant requires of them: 
securing the objectivity of experience. 
“To subject such [sensory] states to rule-governed connections is to produce a 
coherent and predictable system of ever-changing inner state, which strikes me as 
required for [merely] representing them as states of the body” (Kukla, 2011: 129) 
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In attributing to concepts the role of schemata – roughly, that of bringing order to an 
undiscriminated spatio-temporal manifold - Kukla is unable to understand how the 
application of concepts achieves anything other than producing a “coherent and predictable 
system of the ever-changing inner state”. That is, he is unable to understand how the 
application of concepts is important in the way Kant claims: integral to bringing 
representations into relation with an object. In fact however, in misunderstanding Kant’s 
notion of a concept, Kukla fails to engage with Kant’s view at all. True, possessing a 
mechanical procedure for discriminating amongst one’s representations could not yield 
representation of an object, but since this is not what possession of a concept amounts to for 
Kant, Kukla is in no position to assess Kant’s claim that concepts are required for objective 
experience. It follows from this that distinguishing concepts from schemata is not only 
essential to overcoming the objections to Conceptualism, it is also inextricable from one of 
Kant’s most fundamental theses: that intentional experience requires concepts.  
 There is one more conclusion which warrants brief mention. Recall that I earlier 
agreed if the distinction between concepts and schemata is assessed solely as a response to 
the problem of the Schematism, the problem of concept application, then the distinction, 
arguably at least, collapses and the postulation of schemata as distinct theoretical objects is 
not justified.  However, if the distinction is motivated on independently given grounds, as I 
have argued, it is much more reasonable to assume that schemata will be central to concept 
application. That is, insofar as the postulation of an independent sensory (or imaginative) 
capacity to discriminate amongst intuitions is required irrespective of any issue concerning 
concepts, it is reasonable to suppose that insofar as there is a problem regarding concept 
application, this capacity is likely to be part of the solution. Of course, this does not amount 
to an account of how this should proceed: a difficult matter still and one I shall not pursue 
here. Nevertheless, the suggestion is programmatic and makes better sense of the Schematism. 
In other words, the key to the Schematism is not to begin with the problem of concept 
application and then move to the postulation of schemata, but rather, to begin with the 
antecedently justified postulation of schemata and then move to the problem of concept 
application. Only in this case does the dialectic appear promising. 
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5.4. At the crossroads: meta-concepts 
I want to begin this section with a brief overview or summary of the philosophical thread 
which has been traced from the beginning of Chapter four to the present point. The original 
premise of this thread was that there is experience or objective cognition, understood in 
intentional and intensional terms. Adopting the transcendental method, the question became 
whether such experience presupposes a priori conditions for its possibility. It was observed 
that sensibility alone is insufficient for experience, and that the contribution of the 
understanding is required. The precise nature of this contribution was established to be that of 
concepts or, more to the point, rules. In turn it was argued that rules are only rules in the 
context of a judgement. This thread can be condensed into the following claims: 
1. There is such a thing as intentional experience. 
2. Intentional experience is necessarily rule-subjecting. 
3. Rules require the capacity for judgement. 
Now, in my view, there is one remaining claim to be added to this philosophical thread: one 
which concerns the existence of meta-concepts. To this point, with the exception of the 
distinction between event concepts and non-event concepts, I have spoken indiscriminately of 
concepts as rules, without drawing any distinctions or classifications within this class. The 
claim has been that experience presupposes concepts, but no particular concepts have been 
singled out as of special significance. Nevertheless, in this section I want to suggest the 
existence of just such a class of concepts: what I shall call ‘meta-concepts’.  
According to Kant, judgements exhibit certain forms, which he organises into the 
follow table:115   
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 It may reasonably be wondered at this point where this table of forms comes from. What are the epistemic 
grounds for postulating this list of judgement forms rather than another, or indeed, none at all? Since my 
primary concern in this chapter is with the role Kant assigns to the forms of judgement, I shall not dwell upon 
the particular forms Kant postulates, or the method for their postulation. Instead, this latter topic is addressed in 
Chapter Seven. 
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Table 2. 
 Quantity  
 Universal  
 Particular  
 Singular  
Quality  Relation 
Affirmative  Categorical 
Negative  Hypothetical 
Infinite  Disjunctive 
 Modality  
 Problematic  
 Assertoric  
 Apodeictic  
 
There are two issues regarding Kant’s judgement forms which need to be addressed at this 
stage. Firstly, what is a form of judgement? What criterion need be satisfied for something to 
count as a judgement form? Macfarlane (2000: 90) is instructive in this respect: 
“Kant thinks of this normative aspect of concepts and judgements – their rulishness – 
as their form.” 
Just like concepts, judgement forms, for Kant, are rules. For instance, consider the following 
judgements: 
(1) ‘All men study Philosophy’ 
(2) ‘One man studies Philosophy’ 
(3) ‘One man does not study Philosophy’  
For Kant, these judgements differ, in part, in virtue of realising different forms: whether they 
are universal or singular (1 vs. 2 & 3) and whether they are affirmative or negative (1 & 2 vs. 
3). It is clear that these differences have direct implications for the normative or inferential 
profile of the respective judgements. For Kant then, the normative profile of any judgement is 
a function of (a) first-order concepts and (b) its form (A266/B322). In this sense, it makes 
perfect sense to think of these forms as rules: they serve to configure a subject’s normative 
commitments.  
149 
 
 
 
Despite being rules however, Kant clearly means to distinguish judgement forms from 
other concepts. This brings us to the second point regarding the forms of judgement. 
According to Kant, every judgement realises one form from each of the four headings of his 
table: one form of quantity, of quality, of modality and of relation.116 According to Kant then, 
there are a limited number of rules, some selection of which any judgement whatsoever must 
realise: and these rules he calls ‘forms’. More specifically, Kant believes not merely that 
judgements exhibit certain forms, but that there are a limited and complete number of forms 
which all judgements must exhibit (A79/B105). My present concern is not with the precise 
catalogue of these forms postulated by Kant, but rather with the role or function we ought to 
assign to such forms. That is, assuming Kant is correct in believing that there are a certain 
number of judgement forms, a certain number of rules which must be realised by any 
judgement, what is their philosophical significance?  
I will address this question via a somewhat circuitous route. It has already been 
established that experience presupposes concepts. In turn, it has been established that 
concepts are only concepts (rules) in the context of a judgement. But now, suppose Kant is 
correct that all judgements presuppose certain forms. It would follow that the ability to apply 
these forms is presupposed by the use of any concepts. As such, we can label these forms 
‘meta-concepts’, capturing both the rulishness of these forms, and their foundational relation 
to all other concepts. Furthermore, these meta-concepts cannot be known via experience since 
that would require the formation of a judgement which did not already invoke them: a posited 
impossibility. Consequently, these meta-concepts must be known a priori.  
As a priori conditions of concept use however, it seems to follow that the 
philosophical significance of these meta-concepts is very great indeed. In fact, at this point, it 
seems that we are in a position to comprehend Kant’s astonishing claim that the intellectual 
conditions of experience can be derived, “almost by a single conclusion from the precisely 
determined definition of a judgement in general” (Meta: 145-6, fn. 3). Since all objects are 
grasped under some conceptual description, and all concept use presupposes the forms of 
judgement, these forms are intellectual conditions for the possibility of objective cognition: 
foundational for any relation to an object. To the extent that there are a limited number of 
judgement forms, the intellectual conditions of experience can indeed be derived from “the 
precisely determined definition of a judgement”. 
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  This is clearly something of an oversimplification since, for example, hypothetical judgements can have 
antecedents and consequences with different qualities and/or quantities.  
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“If we want to make them [representations] universally valid, [then] the representation 
is determined in one or the other of the forms of judgement; for example, I can myself 
think of motion and rest in succession, but if I say: “The motion follows on the rest,” 
then it is determined in the object and must be valid for everyone.” (Kant, Metaphysik 
Volckmann, in Guyer, 1987: 126) [my emphasis] 
It is worth stressing that there is no threat of a regress here. If the argument was that 
grasping a concept necessarily presupposes the grasp of a foundational ‘meta-concept’, then a 
regress would indeed loom: in absence of some good reason to the contrary, it seems that the 
argument could be re-applied to the relevant meta-concept and so on, ad infinitum. However, 
this is not the argument. It is, I suppose, a conceptual possibility that there be no judgement 
forms, but that each judgement be merely a linear string, of some arbitrary length, of first-
order concepts or rules: ‘green car fast’, ‘soon hit chair’ etc. The claim is not that there is 
some philosophical mistake involved in supposing the possibility of such formless 
judgements, it is instead simply that according to Kant, judgements are not formless, they 
always exhibit certain forms, and that insofar as concepts are only rules in the context of a 
judgement this validates the status of the relevant forms as meta-concepts. 
Furthermore, not only is there no regress, it is possible that the forms of judgement 
are explanatory primitives, not admitting of any deeper account or rationale. While it is 
natural to ask why judgements exhibit the specific forms that they do, there might just be no 
answer to this. It might be that we can no more explain why judgement exhibits certain forms 
than we can explain why space and time are the forms of intuition (B145-6).117 Insofar as we 
are willing to reconcile ourselves to this possibility, the account of experience which has been 
developed in this chapter would ‘bottom out’ with the forms of judgement: it would be as 
deep we can go. Equivalently, the existence of certain judgement forms would amount to the 
final point of Kant’s transcendental investigation: the culmination of the deduction beginning 
with the modest premise ‘there is such a thing as intentional experience’. As such, we could 
append to the claims: 
1. There is such a thing as intentional experience. 
2. Intentional experience is necessarily rule-subjecting. 
3. Rules require the capacity for judgement. 
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 It is worth noting the parallels between this idea and Wolfram Hinzen’s suggestion that grammar constitutes 
an ‘anomaly’ in nature, in the sense that it is not reducible or explicable in non-grammatical terms. This 
comparison is significant since in Chapter Seven I argue that the table of the forms of judgement is grammatical. 
151 
 
 
 
, the following steps: 
4. There are a limited number of judgement forms. 
5. Judgement forms are meta-concepts. 
Therefore: The forms of judgement are a priori conditions of experience.  
This argument is more or less described by Stevenson (1979: 353):  
“Walker informs us that as time went on, Kant got increasingly clear about how the 
argument should go. Not only does the notion of judgement come to the fore in B [the 
B edition of CPR], but … in 1786 he had suggested that it could be carried out almost 
in a single step from the definition of judgement. So, Walker suggests, the essence of 
the argument in just this: all experience involves making judgements; the categories 
are the fundamental forms of judgement; therefore, all experience involves the 
categories.” 
In my view, this is a plausible and attractive argument: one which, at the very least, ought to 
be taken seriously. Unfortunately - and this is a not a minor complication – it is one which 
Kant himself does not accept. To be precise, the final step of the argument is not one Kant 
takes. To continue the above quote from Stevenson: 
“To make the second premise uncontroversially true [that the categories, the 
intellectual conditions for the possibility of objective cognition, are the fundamental 
forms of judgement], the categories must here be understood as… the mere logical 
concepts of negation, disjunction, and generality etc., not the more full-blooded… 
categories such as substance and causation.” [my emphasis] 
Specifically, although Kant does ascribe the forms of judgement an important role, they are 
not, in and of themselves, considered to be of transcendental significance. In the next section 
I examine Kant’s conception of the forms of judgement and the function he ascribes to them 
in detail. 
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Chapter 6. The Forms of Judgement 
 
This chapter breaks with the foregoing discussion of Kant in a decisive respect. Up to this 
point, I have sought to outline a largely positive appraisal and reconstruction of Kant’s views, 
forming something of a philosophical narrative, culminating in the summary of the previous 
section. By contrast, the present chapter is devoted to a critique of a central component of 
Kant’s philosophy: his conception of the forms of judgement. I begin by locating Kant’s 
conception of the forms of judgement in the context of the argument of the Metaphysical 
Deduction, since it is here that this conception is explicitly stated and philosophically invoked. 
The subsequent three sections are orientated towards illustrating the problems with this 
conception. I shall conclude that Kant’s conception of the forms of judgement is mistaken, 
and that these forms ought to be instead understood in the terms outlined in the previous 
section (5.4). In a sense then, this chapter might be understood as an attempt to deal with a 
philosophical aberration of Kant’s, and return us to the view of the forms of judgement 
already proposed. 
 
6.1. The guiding thread of the Metaphysical Deduction 
Although Strawson (1966: 82) famously pronounced of the Metaphysical Deduction that it’s 
results were not merely meagre, but so meagre as to render pointless detailed consideration of 
it, the argument has received renewed attention in recent years. Of particular importance has 
been Beatrice Longuenesse’s Kant and Capacity to Judge, in which she argues that: 
 “[N]either the argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories… nor the 
System of Principles of the Pure Understanding, can be understood unless they are 
related, down to the minutest details of their proofs to the role that Kant assigns [in 
the Metaphysical Deduction] to the logical forms of our judgements.” (Longuenesse, 
1998: 9) 
Kant begins the Metaphysical Deduction with the observation that judgements exhibit a 
limited number of forms and promptly codifies these forms into a table, as outlined in the 
previous section. Any judgement realises a certain selection of forms from this table. Now, 
the central claim or argument of the Metaphysical Deduction is that these judgement forms 
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provide the ‘clue’ or ‘guiding thread’ to a different body of rules. The claim is that taking 
these forms of judgement as a premise, it is possible to derive or “systematically generate” 
(A80-81/B106) what Kant calls the categories. 
“...there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of the understanding… as, 
in the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible 
judgements. For these functions specify the understanding completely, and yield an 
exhaustive inventory of its powers. These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call 
categories.” (A79-80/B105) 
‘Category’ is Kant’s term for a concept which applies to any object simply in virtue of being 
an object. Specifically, it denotes those rules to which objects must conform in order to be 
apprehended as objects: rules which must be applicable in order for cognition of objects or 
experience to be possible. Since such a concept cannot be founded upon experience, but, as a 
condition for the possibility of cognizing an object, is presupposed by experience, a category 
must be known a priori (A51/B75). In other words, categories are the intellectual conditions 
for the possibility of experience, corresponding to the sensible conditions, space and time, 
established in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Just as objects must be intuited spatially and 
temporally, categories denote whatever concepts objects must conform to in order to be 
thought. And just as Kant sometimes speaks of space and time not merely as the forms of any  
empirical intuition of an object, but as, themselves, constituting a pure intuition of an object 
(A20-1/B34-5), Kant similarly says that categories constitute a pure thought of an object 
(A55/B80). That is, categories delineate the contours of the pure thought of an object, absent 
any empirical component. Emphasising their transcendental significance, Kant labels the 
complete compendium of categories a ‘transcendental logic’: “a science of pure 
understanding… whereby we think objects completely a priori” (A57/B81). Transcendental 
logic comprises the rules according to which we must cognize objects. Given this, no 
cognition can contradict transcendental logic without losing all relation to an object (A62-
3/B87).  
As should be evident then, the categories occupy a position of paramount importance 
in the context of Kant’s broader transcendental undertaking. The claim of the Metaphysical 
Deduction is that the forms of judgement provide a clue to the categories: scrutinising these 
forms can unlock transcendental logic for us.  
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Figure 8. 
 
There is a complication which lurks beneath this simple depiction. The Metaphysical 
Deduction contains no proof of the existence of categories: this comes later in the 
Transcendental Deduction and the System of All Principles of Pure Understanding. Hence, it 
is widely agreed by commentators that, notwithstanding Kant’s occasional suggestion to the 
contrary, talk of the categories in the Metaphysical Deduction ought to be understood as 
‘anticipatory’ (Guyer, 1987: 98-102).  
“…hence we might well find it appropriate to distinguish also between pure and 
empirical thought of objects. In that case there would be a logic [i.e. transcendental 
logic] in which we would not abstract from all content of cognition.” (A55/B79-80) 
[my emphasis] 
Kant’s talk of categories in the Metaphysical Deduction is ‘anticipatory’ insofar as he is 
making a claim about what must be the case if a certain possibility – that categories exist – 
turns out to be an actuality. That is, if there are such things as categories (a matter to be 
addressed elsewhere), then we are entitled to assume that they will correspond isomorphically 
to the forms of judgement (see Allison, 2004: 153). The claim is that although the existence 
of categories cannot be deduced simply by inspecting the forms of judgement, if there are 
categories then it is possible to enumerate them on the basis of the forms of judgement. 
 Even in this more qualified form, the central claim of the Metaphysical Deduction 
faces significant challenges. In precisely what sense do the forms of judgement provide the 
guiding thread to the categories? What justifies the derivation of one from the other? Clearly 
Kant considers there to be some connection here. Yet, it is not at all transparent what exactly 
this connection is and the matter receives little explicit attention in CPR. In the Prolegomena 
(§39, 71-72) Kant states that he simply “referred these functions of judging to objects in 
general… and there arose pure concepts of the understanding”. It is therefore no surprise that 
the purported connection has been subject to considerable criticism (e.g. Bennett, 1966). 118 
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 Moreover, it is unsurprising that commentators have defended incompatible accounts of how this derivation 
is supposed to proceed: compare, for example, Guyer (1987: 98) and Allison (2004: 156).   
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However, while the validity of the claim of the Metaphysical Deduction, - that the 
forms of judgement provide a clue to the categories - is a contentious and interesting matter, 
my concern here lies not with this claim per se, but with what it presupposes. Specifically, 
how must the forms of judgement be understood in order for the idea of a guiding thread or 
clue to be so much as coherent? Well, fairly trivially, this idea presupposes that the forms of 
judgement are not themselves categories: to say that the former can guide us to the latter 
entails that they are, in the first place, distinct, that they are disjoint domains.119 And indeed, 
Kant’s table of forms and table of categories are comprised of, apparently, quite different 
concepts. However, if the forms of judgement are not categories, not a priori concepts of an 
object, how should they be understood? The only alternative seems to be that they are a priori 
non-objective concepts. This is precisely Kant’s view; they concern, 
“…the form of discursive activity regardless of the object to which it may apply” 
(Longuenesse, 1998: 73) 
This is reinforced by Kant’s declaration that the forms of judgement constitute a general 
logic. In contrast to the transcendental logic the categories are said to comprise, a science of 
the pure thought of an object, Kant defines general logic in precisely dichotomous terms. It,  
“abstracts from all content of cognition i.e., from all reference of cognition to its 
object. It examines only the logical form in the relation that cognitions have to one 
another, i.e. only the form of thought as such.” (A55/B79) 
Kant’s view is that bringing representations under the forms of judgement does nothing to 
secure a relation to an object and so, that these forms constitute only a general logic. While 
general logic contains “the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which the 
understanding cannot be used at all” (A52/B76), these rules concern only the well-formedness 
of a judgement, where being well-formed is one thing and relation to an object is another; it is 
only by applying a separate body of rules, the categories, that this relation is secured. At the 
heart of the Metaphysical Deduction then, is a fundamental dichotomy between, on the one 
hand, a priori non-objective or formal rules, the forms of judgement, which determine ‘well-
formedness’, and on the other, a priori ‘object rules’, the categories, which establish a relation 
to an object. This dichotomy is integral to the argument of the Metaphysical Deduction. Not 
only does the notion of a ‘guiding thread’ presuppose a distinction of this kind, but also, it 
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 In other words, they are not intellectual conditions for the possibility of experience, as suggested in the 
previous section. 
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lies at the heart of what makes the argument provocative and interesting: namely, that a body 
of rules which are not, in and of themselves, of transcendental significance, the forms of 
judgement, can inform us of a body of rules which are of transcendental significance: the 
categories.  
“…even while Kant makes extensive use of the “logical” forms of judgements… he 
also must distinguish categorical formality from what he calls merely “logical” 
formality” (Pippin, 1982: 90) 
As such, the argument of the Metaphysical Deduction enshrines and fixes the view that the 
forms of judgement, in contrast to the categories, are not concerned with the relation of 
representations to an object, but are merely formal, non-objective, determining only the well-
formedness of the judgement and nothing more. Hence, the argument presupposes that the 
conception of the forms of judgement proposed in the previous section (5.4), where these 
forms are understood to be, in and of themselves, of direct transcendental significance, is 
false.  
 My aim in the remainder of this chapter is to show that Kant’s conception of the 
forms of judgement as merely formal in this sense is mistaken. It is worth stressing from the 
outset then that despite the apparent terminological entailment, that the forms of judgement 
are formal is anything but tautologous for me. Rather I take it to be a substantive view: one 
which I shall be denying. I begin in the next section by discussing a traditional objection to 
Kant’s table of forms which appears unrelated to this issue. However, as I shall show, 
unravelling this objection leads inexorably to the question of the formality of the judgements 
forms. 
 
6.2. Reappraising the forms of judgement 
A prominent objection to the argument of the Metaphysical Deduction has centred upon the 
purported ‘completeness’ of the table of forms from which the categories are to be derived. 
Kant emphasises that his table of forms is complete, describing it as “an exhaustive inventory 
of the powers of the understanding” (A79/B105). The claim is that each form is fundamental 
or primitive in the sense that they cannot be reduced to or replaced by another or some 
combination thereof. This is an important claim since, as Strawson (1966: 79) highlights:  
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“Given a certain indispensable minimum equipment of notions, the logician can, if he 
chooses, distinguish indefinitely many forms of propositions, all belonging to formal 
logic. If we allowed a category for each form, we should have indefinitely many 
categories.”  
In other words, the table must contain only indispensable or primitive logical forms if it is to 
constitute the general logic from which the categories are to be derived.  Yet this claim of 
indispensability has been subject to considerable criticism.  
Firstly, many of the logical forms Kant includes in his table do not appear to be 
primitives. For example, Kant designates both ‘hypothetical’ and ‘disjunctive’ as distinct 
moments under the Relation heading. However, these forms are interdefinable, with the help 
of negation, in modern logic and so they cannot both be indispensable. Furthermore, Kant 
includes ‘infinite’ as a logical form, alongside ‘affirmative’ and ‘negative’ under the heading 
of Quality. This form concerns judgements such as ‘the soul is nonmortal’, i.e. where the 
predicate is negated. Yet this is clearly redundant, as Kant himself seems to admit when he 
says that it is only in transcendental logic, but not in general logic, that the infinite form must 
be distinguished from the affirmative (A73/B97). Yet, given that the thread of the 
Metaphysical Deduction is supposed to run from general logic to transcendental logic, to 
include the infinite form in the former on the basis of the latter is circular.  
Secondly, setting aside reservations regarding the particular forms enunciated by Kant, 
there is a potentially far more damaging criticism of the table, one influentially pressed by 
Strawson. This is that the very idea of a complete table of logical forms involves a confusion: 
there could be no such thing. The reason for this is that:  
“…as far as logical forms are concerned, the logician’s choice of primitives is a 
choice” (Strawson, 1966: 80) 
In classical logic, there is no distinguished set of logical primitives because forms are inter-
definable. For example, the same inferences can be modelled, with the help of negation, by 
utilising either disjunction or the conditional: neither is indispensable. Similarly, the 
existential quantifier and the universal quantifier can each be defined in terms of the other. 
Consequently, no system of logic – that is, a system of rules governing inferential relations 
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between truth-evaluable wholes – need take any particular form as primitive.120 At most, 
Strawson argues, there may be certain primitive logical ideas: quantification and truth 
functional composition. Yet neither of these appears to be suitable for deriving any 
substantive categories for the pure thought of an object from. In sum, the objection to Kant’s 
table of forms is not simply that it is incomplete – many of the forms being dispensable -, but 
that the very idea of a complete and exhaustive inventory of logical forms is flawed.  
The reason this completeness objection is important is that it has, in more recent years, 
prompted a reappraisal of Kant’s conception of judgement forms. The completeness objection 
assesses Kant’s table of forms in light of modern logic, and this evidently presupposes that 
the former is, in the relevant sense, intellectually continuous with the latter. If it is not then it 
is a mistake, at least in the absence of further argument, to critique the possibility of a 
complete table of forms from the perspective of contemporary logic. This is precisely what 
has been recently claimed by some commentators:  
“…it must be insisted that the modern conception of logical form cannot be seen 
simply as a replacement for the Kantian conception and, therefore, cannot be appealed 
to in order to undermine the feasibility of Kant’s own project” (Allison, 2004: 146) 
Kant’s enumeration of the table of judgement forms and contemporary logic do not constitute 
a single intellectual endeavour, but are separated by a “radical gulf” (Allison, 2004: 146). The 
claim is that while both concern the inferential properties of judgements, the notion of logical 
form which encodes for these properties is very different.  
“Today we call “form” the structural features of the proposition that are relevant to 
truth-preserving inference and are expressed in the language of a logical calculus. In 
many ways Kant’s “formal” logic is even further from such a model than Aristotle’s 
Prior Analytics… His conception of logic is closer to that of the Port-Royal logicians, 
for whom logic was the exposition of “the reflections men have made on the four 
main operations of their mind-conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering”.” 
(Longuenesse, 1998: 74) 
In contemporary logic, assigning a logical form to a judgement is correct just in case it 
adequately captures the relevant inferential profile of the judgement. The task of the 
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 This point is not limited to classical logic. For example, in modal logic since necessity and possibility 
operators are inter-definable the logician can choose which to use (Cresswell, 2001).   
159 
 
 
 
philosophical logician is to devise systems which adequately encode for these inferential 
properties. Insofar as multiple logical forms can capture the same inferential profile of a 
judgement, neither is any more correct than the other: which is assigned is generally 
determined by meta-theoretical, pragmatic considerations (Quine, 1970). Accordingly, the 
logical form of a judgement does not purport to reflect any unique structure of the judgement 
itself, but is simply a regimentation or codification of certain inferential properties (cf. Borg, 
2004: 62-73).  
By contrast, commentators have argued that Kant conceives of logical form rather 
differently. Kant’s table of judgement forms lists “forms of mental activity” (Longuenesse, 
1998: 5) or “universal rules of discursive thinking” (Allison, 2004: 146) or a “depth grammar 
of thought and judgement” (Hanna, 2001: 79). The idea is that these forms are not simply 
regimentations imposed upon, or assigned to, judgements, but, in some sense, essential or 
intrinsic to judgements themselves. There is some fact of the matter as to whether a 
judgement has a particular logical form, even if there are other logical forms which are 
equally capable of capturing the inferential properties of the judgement, relative to some 
logical calculus. As such, Kant’s notion of a judgement form is not continuous with that 
found in contemporary logic. In fact, it is arguably closer to the notion of logical form found 
in contemporary linguistic theory, where each sentence is taken to have a unique ‘deep 
structure’.121  Reappraising Kant’s forms of judgement in this way serves to vitiate the 
completeness objection earlier described. Just because there could be no complete table of 
forms from the perspective of contemporary philosophical logic, this does not undermine the 
possibility that there could be a complete table of the ‘depth grammar of judgement’ (Hanna, 
2001: 81).  
In my view, this reappraisal of Kant’s forms of judgement has significant implications, 
extending well beyond those relating to the completeness criticism. Specifically, it raises a 
problem for the thesis that the forms of judgement constitute a general logic. It opens up the 
possibility of their dissociation. Consider again how Kant describes general logic: 
“As general logic, it… deals with nothing but the mere form of thinking.” (A54/B78)  
“General logic, as we have shown, abstracts from all content of cognition i.e., from all 
reference of cognition to its object.” (A55/B79) 
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 Though nothing pivotal hangs upon this observation at this stage, the connection between Kant’s forms of 
judgements and contemporary linguistic theory is developed in detail in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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Kant asserts that the forms of judgement constitute a general logic in this sense. That is, the 
forms of judgement are said to be a purely formal body of rules: they abstract from all 
relation to an object. Now, for the modern reader, this notion of a purely formal set of rules is 
perfectly familiar. Logic textbooks often open with the pronouncement that it is the form of 
an argument, rather than its content, which is at stake.  
“Logic, whether classical or extra- or anti-classical, is concerned with form.” (Burgess, 
2009: 2) 
It is clear what notion of ‘form’ is relevant here. Modern logics stipulate rules for symbol 
manipulation, irrespective of what model theoretic interpretation is assigned to them. In this 
sense, any modern logic draws a principled distinction between form or syntax on the one 
hand, and content or relation to objects on the other. Given the success modern logicians have 
enjoyed in regimenting many of the inferential properties of language/thought according to 
such formal rules, it is natural that readers should find Kant’s declaration that the forms of 
judgement abstract from all relation to an object and so constitute a general logic 
unproblematic. That is, even if there are problems with the details of the table, the basic idea 
that the forms of judgement are ‘merely’ formal is perfectly acceptable and uncontroversial 
when viewed through the prism of contemporary philosophical logic. Indeed, of all the major 
elements of the Metaphysical Deduction, the formality of the judgement forms is perhaps the 
only one which has not been called into question. Worries have been raised with regards to 
the existence of transcendental logic, the relation between the table of judgement forms and 
transcendental logic, and, as has been discussed, the purported completeness of the table of 
forms. Yet, the formality or non-objective nature of the forms of judgement, that the forms of 
judgement constitute a general logic, - clearly a presupposition of the argument - is 
something which has never, to my knowledge, been critiqued. Rather this is generally 
accepted unquestioningly (e.g. Hanna, 2001: 78) and I am aware of no critical discussion of 
the issue.  
However, a consequence of the reappraisal of Kant’s conception of judgement forms 
advanced by Allison and Longuenesse is that this uncritical acceptance is founded upon a 
mistake. Insofar as this reappraisal is sound then it is wrong to view Kant’s judgement forms 
through the prism of contemporary logic. Judgement forms are not simply regimentations of 
the inferential properties of a judgement, but stipulate “laws of the mind” or a “depth 
grammar of thought”. In this light however, the assertion that these laws are formal, non-
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objective, is clearly not one which can be simply waved through. The scant recognition this 
point has received from commentators is perhaps partly attributable to the perceived absence 
of any alternative, or the belief that the assertion is essentially tautologous i.e. that it is a fact 
of language that judgement forms are formal. In the context of this thesis however, an 
alternative readily presents itself since I have already described it in Section 5.4: they are of 
transcendental significance. They are meta-concepts, applicable to all objects in virtue of 
being cognised as objects. 
In sum, understanding Kant’s table of forms through the prism of modern logic has 
shielded it from the question of whether these forms are formal; yet the reappraisal of Kant’s 
conception of judgement forms renders this untenable.  In other words, while the reappraisal 
may refute the completeness objection, stressing the ‘radical gulf’ between Kant’s table of 
forms and contemporary philosophical logic comes at a cost. It entails that far from being 
something which can be nodded through uncritically, the assertion that the forms of 
judgement are formal, that they constitute a general logic, is one which needs justification 
and demands attention. As Macfarlane (2000: 56) argues, the claim that there are rules for 
thought as such, without any regard to objects, is a nontrivial claim, one which needs to be 
justified. 
Interestingly, although this issue has been neglected by commentators, there is reason 
to think that Kant himself could not have been similarly oblivious to it. This is because, as 
Macfarlane (2000; 2002: 44-46) has persuasively argued, Kant’s postulation of a general 
logic was an innovation and marked a significant break with how his predecessors had 
understood logic: “he self-consciousness adopts it, against the current of his time” 
(Macfarlane, 2000: 80). In particular, logic had not been conceived of as purely formal, but 
rather, as concerning, at least to a degree, the objective realm: 
“I do not mean the logic of the [Scholastic] Schools... I mean instead the kind of logic 
which teaches us to direct our reason with a view to discovering the truths of which 
we are ignorant.” (Descartes, 1644: 9) 
“By logic or the art of reasoning I understand the art of using the understanding not 
only to judge proposed truth but to also discover hidden truth.” (Leibniz, 1696: 463) 
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In other words, even if the modern reader is likely to accept uncritically the notion of purely 
formal rules, such acceptance was not something Kant could have been assured of. His 
attempt to secure this acceptance is a matter to which I now turn. 
 
6.3.Why Kant needs judgements of perception 
In the Prolegomena, Kant draws a distinction between judgements of perception and 
judgements of experience. 
“Empirical judgements, so far as they have objective validity, are judgements of 
experience; but those which are only subjectively valid I name mere judgements of 
perception.” (Prol: §18, 45) 
This distinction has long attracted interest because it appears to be inconsistent with the 
claims of the CPR (outlined in Section 5.2), in which judgement is defined specifically as: 
“…a relation that is objectively valid, and so can be adequately distinguished from a 
relation of these same representations in which there would be only subjective validity” 
(B142) 
This definition seems to flatly contradict the possibility of judgements which are only 
subjectively valid i.e. judgements of perception. Given that Kant does not mention perceptual 
judgements in the CPR, it has been common to dismiss the distinction as involving a 
terminological confusion (Bell, 2001: 7-8), or as being at odds with the arguments of the CPR 
(Guyer, 1987: 101). Even where the distinction has not been rejected however, it has seldom 
been ascribed any special significance or seen to do any substantive philosophical work for 
Kant. Defences have generally been limited to showing that, contrary to appearance, the 
distinction is consistent with Kant’s primary commitments in the CPR. For example, it has 
been common to subsume the distinction under the much broader critical dichotomy between 
subjective unity and objective unity (Bennet, 1966: 132-3), and attribute any residual surface 
tension between the definitions in the Prolegomena and the CPR to the differing aims and 
methodological constraints operative in the texts respectively (Allison, 2004: 178-182). At 
best though, such defences show that Kant is able to consistently draw the distinction, not 
that he ought to or need do so. By contrast, my contention is that the distinction between 
judgements of perception and of experience is crucial to Kant’s broader philosophical 
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position. Specifically, it is integral to the claim that the forms of judgements are purely 
formal or non-objective i.e. constitute a general logic, and as such, it is integral to the 
argument of the Metaphysical Deduction.   
Consider first how Kant describes judgements of perception in the Prolegomena. 
They are said to be “valid simply for us, namely, for our subject” (§18, 45). That is, they do 
not demand that others agree with us or find things to be the same. Since, as has already been 
discussed, such universal necessity is the mark of objectivity for Kant, this entails that 
judgements of perception are not objective. Instead, they reflect only the perceptual state of 
the subject. “They only express a reference of two sensations to the same subject, namely, 
myself, and that only in my present state of perception, and are not therefore valid of objects” 
(Prol: §19, 46). In other words, judgements of perception do no more than reflect the ‘mere 
stream of impressions’ which experience is distinguished from and contrasted with. Instead, 
only judgements of experience are said to be objectively valid and, therefore, experiential. 
The similarities between this division of judgements and the broader critical 
distinction between a merely subjective unity of impressions and an objective unity are 
striking. It is therefore not surprising that commentators have often viewed the judgemental 
division as a straightforward extension of the latter distinction. Nevertheless, it is critical to 
resist such an equation. The judgemental division is uniquely significant, over and above the 
more general theme of subjective versus objective unity because it entails the dissociation of 
objectivity from the forms of judgement. Critically, despite being ‘merely’ subjective, 
judgements of perception, like judgements of experience, are well-formed, in the sense of 
realising moments from the table of judgement forms (Longuenesse, 1998: 172). For instance, 
all of the examples Kant offers of judgements of perception are either categorical or 
hypothetical. As such, judgements of perception are marked by two properties: they are 
governed by the rules catalogued in the table of forms and they are subjectively valid:  they 
lack any relation to an object. From this, we can derive an important conclusion: 
“…although the logical forms of judgement can be employed in the former 
[judgements of perception], they do not suffice for the latter [judgements of 
experience]” (Guyer, 1987: 100) 
But this seems to be exactly what Kant needs with regards to the argument of the 
Metaphysical Deduction. Specifically, it justifies the assumption which, in the previous 
section, I argued requires justification: that the forms of judgement are formal. Insofar as 
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judgements of perception are bound by the rules of the table of forms, and yet make no 
objective claim, those forms must fail to inform us of the objective realm. Such forms must 
be purely formal. In turn, this entails that in the case of judgements of experience, something 
of transcendental significance must be “superadded” (Prol: §18, 44) over and above the mere 
connection of representations according to forms found in judgements of perception; this 
‘something’ must, of course, be the categories. In other words, the existence of judgements of 
perception entails that the forms of judgement constitute only a general logic, separate from 
transcendental logic proper. 
  This connection between the argument of the Metaphysical Deduction and 
judgements of perception has been almost universally neglected in the literature. Bird (1962: 
106) comes close to recognising it when he notes that the postulation of judgements of 
perception shows that Kant would not have accepted the identification of judgement forms 
with the categories. But even here, there is no recognition on Bird’s part, or at least no 
expression, of how judgements of perception are needed in order to preclude this 
identification: that this identification looms as a threatening spectre over the Metaphysical 
Deduction and that Kant needs judgements of perception in order to dispel it.  
In sum, I understand the matter as follows. If there are judgements of perception, then 
the assumption of the Metaphysical Deduction that the forms of judgement are formal is 
secure. No less significantly though, if there are no judgements of perception, this would 
drastically undermine the idea that the forms of judgement are purely formal. Very simply, if 
wherever there are forms of judgement, there is objectivity, i.e. if all judgements are 
judgements of experience, then there is reason to believe that the forms of judgement are not 
formal, but are of transcendental significance.  
 
6.4.There are no judgements of perception 
There are two main questions which can be asked of judgements of perception: 
(a) Does Kant need judgements of perception? 
(b) Are there judgements of perception? 
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I have already given a strong affirmative answer to (a), and this evidently makes (b) all the 
more pressing.122 This section is devoted to (b). The first part of the discussion will be limited 
to examining and assessing Kant’s own examples of judgements of perception. Subsequently, 
the issue will be considered more generally. 
Kant offers a number of examples of judgements of perception in the Prolegomena. 
Many of these examples can be grouped together as those involving the predication of a 
secondary quality: ‘the room is warm’, ‘sugar is sweet’, ‘wormwood is unpleasant’. These 
judgements, says Kant, are “only subjectively valid” and so are merely perceptual judgements. 
The evidence Kant offers in favour of this view is that “I do not at all expect that I or any 
other person shall always find it as I now do” (Prol: §19, 46). Such evidence is stressed also 
by Longuenesse (1998: 172), who points out that we do not take such secondary quality 
judgements to “be valid at all times, for every empirical subject, in any circumstances”. 
Kant’s and Longuenesse’s assertions here are surely correct: we do not consider the 
judgement ‘the room is warm’ to be valid at all times, for every empirical subject, in any 
circumstances. While being correct however, this observation is also completely irrelevant, 
and certainly does not constitute evidence for the judgements being perceptual. The reason 
for this is that no judgement, with the exception of a necessary truth, satisfies such a criterion. 
After all, to say that a judgement is valid in all circumstances is to say that there are no 
circumstances which could render it false i.e. it is a necessary truth. As such, if we take this 
criterion seriously, the distinction between judgements of perception and of experience 
collapses into the distinction of judgements which are necessarily true from those which are 
not. Since this is certainly not what Kant intended, we had better not take the criterion 
seriously.  
If these secondary quality judgements are perceptual, as Kant claims, then they are no 
more than ‘a reference of two sensations to the same subject’: a reflection of a stream of 
impressions. Equivalently, if they are judgements of perception then they lack any reference 
to an object; they are bereft of objectivity. Helpfully, Kant’s conception of objectivity 
provides us with a useful way to test this claim: 
“Objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everyone) are exchangeable 
notions, and although we do not know the object in itself, yet when we regard a 
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 Unfortunately, (b) has been relatively neglected by commentators. This neglect is attributable, at least in part, 
to a failure to recognise the importance of judgements of perception to Kant’s broader philosophical position; 
that is, it is largely because commentators have not answered (a) correctly that (b) has been neglected. 
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judgement as at once universal and necessary, objective validity is therewith 
understood.” (Prol: §19, 45) 
For a judgement to be objective is equivalent to it being ‘universal’ or a candidate for general 
acceptance.123 Given this, consider the following. Suppose that having walked into a room, I 
judge that the room is warm. Yet, only moments later, Julie who was sat in the room before 
my entry exclaims “this room is freezing!” Now, if ‘the room is warm’ were merely a 
reflection of sensations in me, Julie’s judgement should be utterly irrelevant to my own or, 
equivalently, my judgement should have no bearing upon her judgements. In fact however, 
Julie’s judgement is likely to prompt a range of behaviour on my part aimed at establishing 
why our judgements diverge. For example, I might check to see whether she is sitting next to 
a draughty window, or look to see whether I am adjacent to a radiator. Not only is searching 
for such explanations probable, it is, more importantly, rational in virtue of the two 
judgements we have made. Yet, were my judgement merely a reflection of sensation in me, 
making no claim beyond the incorrigibility of my own sensations, such behaviour would be 
rationally inexplicable. That this behaviour is not inexplicable, but rather, perfectly rational, 
shows that, ‘the room is warm’ is objectively valid: it is a candidate for general acceptance 
and the fact the Julie does not accept it warrants investigation of why she does not accept it. 
Encountering no radiator or draught, I might reply, “What do you mean? This room is warm!” 
At this stage, Julie can respond in one of two ways. Firstly, Julie can renege upon her 
original position, perhaps answering, “Well, I feel cold anyways”,124 in which case my 
judgement has been tacitly accepted. The second possible response is that Julie disputes my 
judgement. In this case I might show her the thermostat; point out that the temperature of the 
room is much higher than room temperature; remind her of an occasion when she was warm 
despite the temperature being lower than it is in the room. Although this would be an 
extraordinarily tedious dispute, it would be a dispute nonetheless: I am calling to her attention 
reasons to abandon her position and agree with my judgement; this clearly forecloses the idea 
that ‘the room is warm’ is merely subjectively valid.  
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 As should be clear this is a much weaker criterion than that of being ‘valid at all times, for all empirical 
subjects, in any circumstances’. Judgements can be candidates for general acceptance without satisfying this 
much more stringent criterion. 
124
 It might be pointed out that it is possible that Julie is not reneging at all, but that by her original utterance 
“this room is freezing” she meant to express not the judgement ‘the room is freezing’, but a judgement like, ‘I 
feel cold, currently’. I set this possibility aside here since I address this issue more fully below. 
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There is another test which can be applied to determine whether secondary quality 
judgements are judgements of perception. Again taking as our point of departure the 
equivalency of ‘necessary universal validity’ and objective validity, we can ask whether 
Kant’s secondary quality judgements commit the subject to anything.125 Suppose that I judge 
that sugar is sweet. This certainly seems to commit me to a whole range of beliefs. For 
example, it commits me to the belief that if a type of food contains a lot of sugar, then it will 
taste sweet.126 It would be wrong for me to judge that sugar is sweet and judge that 
strawberries are very sugary, and yet deny that strawberries are sweet.  
In sum, Kant’s secondary quality examples are not judgements of perception. Indeed, 
Kant himself appears to accept this later in Logic (§40, 119-120), where ‘the tower is red’ and 
‘the stone is warm’ are both unequivocally categorised as judgements of experience. 
However, the other examples of judgements of perception in the Prolegomena appear, if 
anything, even less promising. One example is, ‘air is elastic’, where ‘elasticity’ refers to the 
property of matter to resist penetration (Longuenesse, 1998: 174). Kant assures us that this 
judgement can be perceptual: “I only refer the feelings in my senses to one another” (Prol: 
§19, 46). Yet this seems completely baseless, and the judgement would surely fail the two 
tests for perceptual status already discussed. The same applies to Kant’s final example of a 
judgement of perception in the Prolegomena: ‘if the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm’. 
This seems to exhibit necessary universal validity if anything does. Consequently, none of 
Kant’s examples of judgements of perception appear credible.  
However, this is not the view Longuenesse takes of Kant’s examples, so it is 
important to consider her extensive discussion of the matter. Longuenesse argues that Kant’s 
examples ought to be understood in terms of, or assigned, certain ‘readings’:  
• ‘The room is warm’ should be read as ‘it feels warm (pleasant) in the room’ (1998: 192). 
• ‘Sugar is sweet’ should be read as ‘sugar tastes sweet’ (Ibid). 
• ‘Air is elastic’ should be read as ‘air feels resistant to compression’ (1998: 174). 
                                                           
125
 A persistent theme in the previous chapter (esp. Section 5.1) was that these concepts: objectivity, necessity 
(in the normative sense of the term) and universality are all deeply entangled. In this light, I take it that this 
‘normativity test’ is simply a different side of the same coin as the ‘universality test’ applied to the judgement, 
‘the room is warm’. 
126
 This is only a material commitment. It is conceivable, for example, that despite being sugary, strawberries 
also contain an acidic quality which prevents them from tasting sweet. The claim then is simply that ‘sugar is 
sweet’ and ‘strawberries are sugary’ provide me with a pro tanto reason to assent to ‘strawberries are sweet’.  
168 
 
 
 
• ‘If the sun shines on the stone, it grows warm’, should be read as ‘if the sun shining on 
the stone is among the objects I perceive at a given time, the stone getting warm is among 
the objects I perceive at a succeeding time’ (1998: 179).127 
According to Longuenesse, these readings are all judgements of perception: destitute of 
objective validity. Although this could certainly be called into question, the more pressing 
worry at this point concerns the nature or status of the reformulations themselves. What does 
Longuenesse mean by the claim that Kant’s examples ‘should’ be read in these ways? Given 
that these readings are far from self-evident, what does this claim amount to? One possibility 
is that Longuenesse is simply eliminating Kant’s examples in favour of a different set 
altogether. However, it is clear that Longuenesse considers her observations to elaborate upon 
how Kant understood the matter. Her discussion is very much founded upon and continuous 
with Kant’s own examples.128 In this case however, it seems quite mysterious as to what 
Longuenesse could intend by these reformulations. After all, ‘the room is warm’ is a different 
judgement from ‘it feels warm (pleasant) in the room’. Similarly, ‘if the sun shines on the 
stone, it grows warm’, is a different judgement from ‘if the sun shining on the stone is among 
the objects I perceive at a given time, the stone getting warm is among the objects I perceive 
at a succeeding time’. Insofar as these are different judgements altogether, how can they 
inform or establish the perceptual status of Kant’s examples? The key to this puzzle becomes 
visible when Longuenesse (1998: 174) says: 
“I may suspend at least provisionally any claim to objective validity of such a 
judgement [air is elastic], and just state how things seem to me.” [my emphasis] 
Significant here is reference to ‘stating how things seem’. This interest in the linguistic 
expression of a judgement pervades Longuenesse’s discussion of perceptual judgements (see 
also, 1998: 179, 192). The reformulations Longuenesse proposes are appropriately 
understood as containing a linguistic object on the left side of the ‘should be read as’, and a 
judgement on the right side. In other words, the point is that sometimes when we say ‘air is 
elastic’ we mean by this ‘air feels resistant to compression’. Similarly, in uttering ‘if the sun 
shines on the stone, it grows warm’, we can express the judgement ‘if the sun shining on the 
                                                           
127
 Longuenesse also uses the locution “may thus mean” (e.g. 1998: 174) in the stead of “should be read as”, in 
places. However, since these appear to be interchangeable for Longuenesse, I shall speak only of the latter for 
the sake of univocality. 
128
 For example, Longuenesse (1998: 191-2) attempts to explain away seeming inconsistencies between the 
examples of judgements of perception Kant offers in the Prolegomena and those in Logic, something which 
would be inexplicable were her ‘readings’ supposed to amount to alternatives to Kant’s examples.  
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stone is among the objects I perceive at a given time, the stone getting warm is among the 
objects I perceive at a succeeding time’. As such, Longuenesse’s central point is that the 
sentential correlates of Kant’s examples can be used to express both judgements of 
experience and (what Longuenesse at least analyses as) perceptual judgements. 
Supplementing this point, Longuenesse articulates an account of the circumstances which 
generally determine the type of judgement which such a sentence expresses. These 
circumstances concern the relevant epistemic grounds available to the subject at that point in 
time.  
“Saying ‘The stone is warm’ because I now feel it to be warm is quite different from 
saying it after the complex process that may consist of (1) relating our judgement to 
other judgements on temperature of different objects in different circumstances, (2) 
comparing variations of temperatures constructed as intensive magnitudes.” 
(Longuenesse, 1998: 191) 
The idea here is that the type of judgement we mean to express by an utterance is closely 
correlated with the epistemic grounds available to the subject.129 For example, having just 
entered a room and feeling a wave of heat hit me, my utterance of ‘the room is warm’ is 
likely to express the perceptual judgement ‘it feels warm in this room to me’. On the other 
hand, if I know that stoves produce heat and, upon entering the room, both feel warmth and 
see that the stove is lit, my utterance of ‘the room is warm’ is more likely to express the 
experiential judgement that the room is so and so (Longuenesse, 1998: 192). Similarly, 
Longuenesse says that if a subject’s epistemic ground for uttering ‘if the sun shines long 
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 In places, Longuenesse appears to take the stronger view that where a subject’s epistemic position is 
relevantly restricted, judgements of experience are actually impossible. That is, where a subject’s epistemic 
position is relevantly restricted, sentences of the form ‘the room is warm’ or ‘air is elastic’ can only express 
judgements of perception, rather than simply tending to so express: “Only after such a method [for augmenting 
one’s epistemic state] has been systematically applied can a causal connection be asserted: ‘the sun warms the 
stone’ (Longuenesse, 1998: 179) [my emphasis]. There are glaring challenges for such a view. For one thing, it 
seems to suggest that expressing a judgement which one lacks epistemic warrant for is impossible. For example, 
assuming that the judgement ‘all birds fly’ is not warranted merely on the basis of seeing one bird flying, the 
view entails that such a judgement would be impossible – as opposed to simply unjustified - as a response to 
seeing a bird flying for the first time. Were one to say ‘all birds fly’ in such a situation, one could not be 
expressing the judgement ‘all birds fly’, but necessarily something of only subjective validity. At the very least, 
this is a surprising and counter-intuitive result. Whether this is Longuenesse’s considered view is not clear to me 
– though her language sometimes suggests as much, she offers no arguments in favour of it. Either way, I set 
aside this question here since the view actually has no implications for the status of Kant’s examples. Accepting 
that where a subject’s epistemic position is relevantly restricted judgements of experience are impossible, is of 
no help in determining whether Kant’s examples are judgements of experience or judgements of perception! It 
only entails that if they are judgements of experience, then they can be formed only once certain epistemic 
conditions are met, or that if they are judgements of perception then they can be formed without such epistemic 
conditions being met. 
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enough on a body, it grows warm’ is only a limited number of a observed temporal 
successions holding of the sun shining on a body and the body growing warm, we are likely 
to mean only that ‘if the sun shining on a body is among the objects I perceive at a given time, 
then the body getting warm is among the objects I perceive at a successive time’. In order to 
express the experiential correlate of this, it is necessary to “confront the correlations already 
obtained with many more, while perhaps also using the resources of mathematical 
constructions to anticipate and test further possible empirical correlations” (1998: 179). 
Longuenesse does not offer any concrete specification of ‘how many’ correlations would be 
sufficient in this respect. As such, her account is restricted to the modest point that the 
judgements we express are, to some unspecified degree, correlated with the relevant 
epistemic grounds available to a subject. 
 The problem with all of this is that it is incapable of establishing or, as far as I can see, 
even supporting the relevant claim: that Kant’s examples are judgements of perception. 
While it is true that the utterance ‘the room is warm’ can be used to express the judgement 
‘the room feels warm’, and while it is also true that such use is likely bound up with the 
epistemic state of the subject at the time, such facts are tangential to the question of whether 
Kant’s examples are judgements of perception. All they establish is that certain utterances 
can express multiple judgements. This is a completely general phenomenon. If someone asks 
me whether I want a sandwich, I can utter ‘I have just eaten’ in order to convey or express the 
judgement that I do not want a sandwich. In other circumstances of course though, ‘I have 
just eaten’ just means I have just eaten! The extent to which utterances can express different 
judgements, the contextual factors which are relevant, and the distinctions which arise in this 
regard, is an interesting topic: one for philosophers of language (Borg, 2004). Yet insofar as 
Longuenesse’s observations are simply a particular realisation of this general pragmatic fact, 
it is hard to see how they bear upon the purported perceptual status of Kant’s examples. 
Longuenesse seems to think that because the utterance ‘the room is warm’ can express the 
apparently perceptual judgement ‘it feels warm (pleasant) in this room’ as well as Kant’s 
judgement ‘the room is warm’, Kant’s judgement must, in some sense, be a perceptual 
judgement also. But this is a non-sequitur and Longuenesse does not offer any argument in 
favour of it. Nor does Longuenesse’s epistemic account alter this picture in any significant 
way. It may well be correct that certain utterances tend to express certain judgements 
depending upon the epistemic state of the subject. There is, however, nothing particularly 
novel or surprising about this since the epistemic state of the subject is part of the context 
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which fixes pragmatic interpretation of utterances generally. Longuenesse’s account is of the 
form: in circumstances, C, an utterance, U, is more likely to express the judgement, J. No 
realisation of such a schema is capable of determining anything about the nature of the 
judgement itself.  
None of Kant’s examples of judgements of perception withstand critical scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, it may be wondered whether the argument against Kant’s own examples, only 
serves to highlight that Kant chose his examples very badly indeed. Consider again some of 
Longuenesse’s proposed ‘readings’ of Kant’s examples: ‘it feels warm (pleasant) in the 
room’, ‘if the sun shining on the stone is among the objects I perceive at a given time, the 
stone getting warm is among the objects I perceive at a succeeding time’. Rather than 
suppose that these ‘readings’ can tell us anything about Kant’s examples, why not simply 
treat the readings themselves as examples of judgements of perception? After all, ‘it feels 
warm (pleasant) in the room’ and ‘if the sun shining on the stone is among the objects I 
perceive at a given time, the stone getting warm is among the objects I perceive at a 
succeeding time’ realise moments from Kant’s table of forms and so are clearly viable 
candidates.  
It is questionable whether even these examples are only subjectively valid in Kant’s 
sense. Are Longuenesse’s readings really no more than a mere reflection of impressions in 
the subject, utterly bereft of objective validity? It is far from clear to me that this is so, or 
whether they would pass the tests already discussed for perceptual status. However, pursuing 
this line of inquiry would rely upon fine margins, possibly too fine to be decisive to any 
interesting degree, so I set this aside here. Instead, my primary reason for doubting that these 
are judgements of perception lies elsewhere. The point of departure for this doubt is a 
straightforward puzzle: why did Kant not offer these examples himself? Even if the 
perceptual status of such judgements is open to dispute, what is surely indisputable is that 
these judgements are better candidates than any of Kant’s examples. ‘It feels warm (pleasant) 
in the room’ is surely closer to being a mere reflection of sensations, being merely of 
subjective validity, than the judgement ‘the room is warm’. Similarly, ‘if the sun shining on 
the stone is among the objects I perceive at a given time, the stone getting warm is among the 
objects I perceive at a succeeding time’, is a more credible example of a judgement of 
perception than Kant’s, ‘if the sun shines, it warms the stone’.  This much is fairly obvious, 
but this obviousness makes Kant’s choice of examples perplexing. This puzzle is exacerbated 
by the fact that there is nothing unusual or unfamiliar about Longuenesse’s reformulations – 
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it is hardly credible that Kant simply failed to notice them. But then why did he ignore such 
examples, and proffer instead his own less plausible examples of judgements of perception?  
In order to understand this decision, I think it is necessary to return to the 
philosophical purpose which judgements of perception are supposed to fulfil for Kant. 
Judgements of perception are needed to establish that the forms of judgement are formal: that 
being well formed does not ensure representation of an object. 
“…the mere form of judgement is not sufficient to insure that the relation does hold of 
empirical objects” (Longuenesse, 1998: 178) 
Yet, if judgements of perception are to establish this thesis, it is not sufficient to show that 
they are about states of the subject. As well as being subjectively valid, it is necessary that 
they be subjectively valid merely in virtue of being well formed. This sounds a little odd, but 
the idea is quite straightforward. It is clear that there are a whole range of conceptual devices 
which function so as to orientate a judgement upon the subject’s own cognitive state rather 
than upon the world. For example, the phrasal adjuncts ‘it seems to me that…’ or ‘I have 
always found that…’ affixed to any judgement perform this kind of function. Similarly, the 
presence of some verbs seem to perform this function also, at least to a degree e.g. ‘taste’, 
‘feel’. As such, were the question of the possibility of judgements of perception such that it 
could be answered in a positive fashion by examples of judgements containing such 
constituents, the question would be a fairly trivial one. Crucially however, judgements 
containing such constituents cannot count as evidence for the possibility of judgements of 
perception. The reason for this is that their existence proves nothing with respect to the 
formality of the forms of judgement. Consider, granting that the judgement, ‘it seems to me 
that flowers are pretty’ is subjectively valid, what does the possibility of such a judgement 
tell us about the formality of the forms of judgement? Well, nothing: the possibility of this 
judgement is perfectly consistent with denying that the forms of judgement are purely formal, 
or that they pertain only to some abstract notion of well-formedness which has no bearing 
upon the objectivity of cognition. This is because the subjective validity of the judgement can 
be plausibly attributed to the constituent concepts of the judgement, rather than being 
anything to do with the form of the judgement. Recall that for Kant, any judgement is 
comprised of (a) first-order concepts and (b) forms (A266/B322). The point then is that the 
subjective validity of these judgements can be plausibly attributed (a), therefore having no 
implications for the nature of (b). For example, the phrase, ‘it seems to me’ clearly plays this 
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role in the judgement ‘it seems to me that flowers are pretty’: if the phrase is eliminated, the 
subjective validity of the judgement disappears with it.130 Yet insofar as the subjective 
validity of a judgement is attributable to such elements, the judgement has no implications for 
the nature of the forms of judgement. By contrast, what Kant needs to show is that 
irrespective of elements other than a judgement’s form, but simply in virtue of realising 
forms, simply in virtue of being well-formed, judgements are subjectively valid. This is what 
it means to say that judgements of perception must be subjectively valid merely in virtue of 
being well formed.  
Now, I think that the reason why Kant did not proffer Longuenesse’s readings as 
examples of judgements of perception is that they fail this requirement. In my view all of 
Longuenesse’s readings, to whatever degree they are subjectively valid, pretty clearly depend 
upon the presence of specific conceptual constituents. I won’t reconsider all of the examples 
again, but only the one which, I think, is most plausibly construed as being a mere reflection 
of impressions in the subject: 
 ‘If the sun shining on the stone is among the objects I perceive at a given time, the stone 
getting warm is among the objects I perceive at a succeeding time.’ 
Here, the relative clauses present in the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional are 
extraneous from the perspective of the judgement’s form: the judgement would realise the 
same forms from Kant’s table irrespective of their presence. Yet these constituents underpin 
the subjectivity of this judgement. If we drop them, we are left only with Kant’s example ‘if 
the sun is shining on the stone, the stone gets warm’, which I have already argued clearly 
exhibits necessary universal validity.  
Consequently, Kant’s examples are not judgements of perception, and the most 
obvious examples of subjectively valid judgements do not qualify as judgements of 
perception. Although this does not constitute a complete survey of all the possible evidence, 
the striking paucity of clear examples of judgements of perception supports the conclusion 
that there are no such things. Now, in the previous section I argued that the existence of 
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 Determining whether a judgemental constituent functions in this way is a non-trivial methodological 
challenge. For adjuncts, the test is easy: see whether the subjective validity of the judgement perseveres in the 
absence of the phrase. The matter is trickier for concepts which are necessary for the well-formedness of the 
judgement since they cannot be dropped in this way, e.g. ‘feels’ in ‘the room feels warm’. In these cases, the test 
should be to substitute for the relevant concept, other concepts with an equivalent syntactic distribution. If the 
subjective validity of the judgement diminishes where such substitution is effected, it is clear that the subjective 
validity of the judgement must be a function of the original concept. 
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judgements of perception bears critically upon the issue of the formal status of judgement 
forms. So, the conclusion that there are no judgements of perception needs to be brought to 
bear upon this issue. Kant’s view is that the forms of judgement leave us stranded with our 
own presentations: to bring representations under these forms moves us no closer to a relation 
with an object. Although realising such forms does constitute a certain well-formedness, this 
does not suffice to lay any claim to necessary universal validity. Instead, such validity 
emerges only where distinct rules, i.e. the categories, are ‘superadded’ to this well-formed 
construct. 
“All of our judgements are at first [i.e. in the sense of being merely well-formed] 
mere judgements of perception… It is only subsequently that we give them a new 
reference, namely, to an object.” (Prol: §18, 45) 
However, the absence of any clear examples of judgements of perception strongly indicates 
that this account of judgement forms is deeply mistaken. Contrary to Kant’s view, and 
specifically, contrary to the argument of the Metaphysical Deduction, the forms of judgement 
are not merely formal or non-objective. In fact, what we find is that wherever representations 
are brought under the forms of judgement, they are brought into relation with an object.131  
“Every judgement claims a certain measure of objectivity within its self-chosen 
narrower sphere, no matter how limited its subject-concept. It is never satisfied with 
establishing a mere coexistence of representations, but it erects a functional 
coordination between them, so that whenever the one content is given the other is 
taken as required. The “is” of the copula is the expression of the connection.” 
(Cassirer, 1953: 245-6) 
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 In my view, the reason why Longuenesse is so quick to uncritically accept Kant’s examples as judgement of 
perception is that she never actually doubts the existence of judgement of perception, and the reason she never 
doubts their existence is that she unquestioningly accepts that the forms of judgement are purely formal. 
“It may be objected that these judgements are in fact composed of judgements of experience… My 
view is that in order to understand Kant’s analysis of the move from judgement of perception to 
judgement of experience, we must consider not the components, but the connective in the judgement 
(‘If…then’). The question then becomes, How does the merely logical combination of perceptions 
expressed by this connective lead to the subsumption of intuition under the corresponding category.” 
(Longuenesse, 1998: 176, fn. 20) 
Longuenesse’s view here can be summed up as follows: even if we struggle to identify examples of judgements 
of perception, this matters little since all we have to do is consider a judgement merely as a ‘logical combination’ 
of representations, as realising merely the forms of judgement. That is, since the forms of judgements are formal, 
a judgement merely adhering to these forms is necessarily a judgement of perception. From the present 
perspective of course, this simply begs the relevant question: namely, are the forms of judgement formal? In 
order to address this question (one Longuenesse does not seriously contemplate), we have to investigate the 
existence of judgements of perception rather than presume it. 
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The difference between representations which exhibit no objective validity, such as a mere 
list: 
• {room, warmth} 
or a complex idea: 
• ‘the warmth of the room’, ‘the roominess of the warmth’  
and representations which do relate to an object, is that the latter conform to or realise 
judgement forms: 
• ‘The room is warm’, ‘if it is a room, then it is warm’, ‘either it is a room or is it warm’ 
This fact is utterly inconsistent with viewing the forms of judgement as formal or non-
objective or securing merely some abstract notion of ‘well-formedness’ which has no bearing 
upon relation to an object. To the extent that judgements do approach subjective validity or, 
in Cassirer’s terms, claim objective validity within an especially ‘narrow sphere’, this is not a 
function of the form of the judgement, but of optional conceptual constituents of the 
judgement:   
(i) ‘Stones are warm’ 
(ii) ‘It seems to me that stones are warm’ 
(iii) ‘I have always found stones to be warm’ 
(iv)  ‘Whenever I have encountered the impression of stones in the past, the sensation 
of warmth has been contiguous’  
Whereas Kant says that subjective validity is the default status of judgement qua realising 
judgement forms, qua being well formed, and that objective validity appears only with the 
superaddition of something else to this foundation, the reality is precisely the converse: 
moving from judgements (i) to (iv), we are trying to overcome the original objectivity 
undergirded by the judgement’s form. In other words, judgements, qua realising the forms of 
judgement, are objective. 
This conclusion has two consequences. Firstly, this conclusion has an exegetical 
ramification insofar as it is capable of illuminating certain inconsistencies in Kant’s critical 
thought. For example, consider that despite foreclosing the possibility of judgements of 
perception, Cassirer, in the quote above, is nevertheless expressing a thoroughly Kantian idea. 
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In the CPR, Kant himself claims that it is the copula ‘is’, which distinguishes the objectivity 
of representations from the merely subjective (B142). I noted at the beginning of the previous 
section that Kant says things about the possibility of judgements of perception which are, if 
not plain inconsistent, at the very least, in great tension with each other. The reason I am 
reiterating this fact here is that we are now in a better position to explain this textual 
phenomenon. We can explain it not by dissolving the tension or explaining it away, but by 
agreeing that the textual tensions are real and substantial and explaining why Kant felt unable 
to adhere to a single uniform position. Specifically, he was unable, because he felt himself 
pulled in two different directions. I have made two principal claims regarding judgements of 
perception: (a) Kant needs them (in order to establish the formality of judgement forms), and 
(b) he cannot have them (there are no such things). One exegetical possibility is that while 
Kant recognised the importance of judgements of perception to his philosophical position, in 
certain periods he doubted whether they were available (as I have argued they are not). For 
example, the expulsion of judgements of perception from the B Deduction (despite being 
published four years after the Prolegomena) may indicate such doubt. Furthermore, although 
judgements of perception do reappear in Logic, the discussion is not obviously continuous 
with that found in the Prolegomena. As already noted, in the Logic Kant claims that 
examples such as ‘the stone is warm’ and ‘the tower is red’ are judgements of experience. 
Yet both of these are predications of secondary qualities, categorised in the Prolegomena as 
judgements of perception. This variance in examples may again indicate uncertainty on 
Kant’s part: that he realises that the security of judgement forms as formal rests upon the 
existence of judgements of perception and so he is ‘reaching’ for such judgements, but he is 
nevertheless unsure as to whether he has successfully provided any examples.  
Secondly, and, in the context of this thesis at least, much more importantly, this 
conclusion amounts to the assertion (or re-assertion) of the conception of judgement forms 
proposed in Section 5.4. That is, the forms of judgement are, in their own right, meta-
concepts: a priori, foundational rules for the thought of any object whatsoever. In this sense, 
despite according the forms of judgement a prominent role in CPR, Kant actually understates 
their importance. Far from being merely formal, non-objective rules, they are of inherent 
transcendental significance. In fact, their postulation should be understood as the final step of 
the argument thread beginning from the premise, ‘there is such a thing as experience’. 
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Chapter 7. The Role of Grammar: Sketching a  
Research Program 
 
In this final chapter, I discuss how Kant’s table of forms can be updated in light of recent 
developments in Generative Grammar. The novelty of this suggestion is illustrated by 
Hinzen’s (2012: 636) claim that:  
“Introductions to the philosophy of language barely mention grammar as such, 
focusing upon words and their meanings instead.” 
Given that grammar barely features in the philosophy of language, bringing it to bear upon 
Kant’s theory of judgement forms is, at the very least, rather unexpected. My aim in this 
chapter is to rationalise the unexpected. Specifically, I argue that updating Kant’s table of 
forms in light of developments in Generative Grammar is a viable and attractive undertaking. 
In other words, my aim in this chapter is to sketch a research program. 
 In Section 7.1, I begin by explaining the relevant notion of ‘update’, explaining what 
exactly it would be for Generative Grammar to be ‘brought to bear’ upon Kant’s table of 
judgement forms. The subsequent sections, 7.2 and 7.3, concern the suitability of utilising 
developments in Generative Grammar in this way.  
 
7.1. Identifying the forms of judgement 
Recall that in Section 5.4, I outlined the following argument: 
1. There is such a thing as intentional experience. 
2. Intentional experience is necessarily rule-subjecting. 
3. Rules require the capacity for judgement. 
4. There are a limited number of judgement forms. 
5. Judgement forms are meta-concepts. 
Therefore: The forms of judgement are a priori conditions of experience.  
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In the previous chapter, I discussed how Kant denies (5), instead taking the forms of 
judgement to constitute a general logic. I argued that this denial is completely unjustified and 
that his alternative conception of the forms of judgement is not defensible. As such, I argued 
that Kant’s eschewal of the above argument fails. Given this, we can treat Kant’s failure to 
endorse this argument as an aberration, and return to it afresh.  
At this stage however, a new issue flickers into focus: namely, how are the forms of 
judgement to be identified? (4) states that there are a limited number of such forms. However, 
this is only justifiable insofar as there is a secure and settled means for identifying them in the 
first place. So far, nothing has been said regarding these means. Unfortunately, despite its 
importance, Kant is almost entirely silent on this matter. In the CPR, Kant plucks the forms 
of judgement, seemingly, out of thin air. His table of forms is presented abruptly and without 
ceremony; we are then assured that this table is complete; and that is about it. Nor does Kant 
elaborate upon the matter in the Prolegomena where he states simply that with regards to the 
table of forms, “there lay already before me the entire, although not altogether faultless, work 
of the logicians” (Prol: §39, 71).  
Despite Kant’s appeal to the work of the logicians, it has been widely remarked that 
his table of forms was certainly not a re-capitulation of logics of the day (Hanna, 2001: 79), 
and as such, the spectre of arbitrariness hanging over his selection of forms is difficult to 
dispel. Longuenesse (1998: 74-78) argues that Kant’s selection can be justified by recourse to 
the ‘pattern of dependencies’ which exist for Kant between general and transcendental logic.  
“Kant asked himself which logical forms of judgement should be considered primitive 
if the original function of judgement is to “bring given cognitions to the objective 
unity of apperception,” that is, to relate our representations to object.” (Longuenesse, 
1998: 78) 
In my view, Longuenesse’s argument cannot succeed since (a) it is unclear what justifies 
these dependencies and (b), such dependencies presuppose a clear demarcation of possible 
judgement forms which are then ‘whittled down’ once compared to the demands of 
transcendental logic. It is precisely this demarcation however, which is in question.  
Ultimately, what is crucial from the current perspective is not the exegetical issue of 
whether Kant’s catalogue of forms can be saved from the indictment of arbitrariness, but the 
philosophical one of how the forms of judgement are to be identified.  Even if there is some 
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exegetical basis for re-assessing the apparent arbitrariness of Kant’s table, it does not follow 
that Kant has a viable and plausible means for identifying the forms of judgement. Indeed, 
given that Kant has almost nothing to say about this philosophical issue, it seems reasonable 
to assume that we ought to be casting our net considerably wider.  
Admittedly, Kant’s appeal to the “work of the logicians” may inspire the idea that the 
contemporary philosophical logic is capable of identifying the forms of judgement. 
Nevertheless, considerations already outlined in Section 6.2 invalidate this idea. Specifically, 
whereas Kant’s conception of judgement form is of something inherent to judgements, 
contemporary logicians view form as something imposed upon judgements: regimentations of 
certain aspects of the inferential profile of a judgement. Of course, what is considered part of 
a judgement’s ‘inferential profile’ is itself a theory-relative matter. For example, the sense in 
which ‘it is obligatory for John to attend school’ warrants the judgement ‘it is forbidden for 
John not to attend school’ would be part of the inferential profile of the former according to a 
deontic logic, but not classical logic. The form ascribed to a judgement then depends upon 
the inferential profile the logician is interested in. In light of this however, to expect 
contemporary logicians to supply a ‘depth grammar of thought and judgement’, which is 
what Kant’s forms of judgement are supposed to amount to, is not reasonable, and is only 
likely to produce confusion.132  
Pivotal at this juncture is a comment made by Pippin (1982: 92). Pippin suggests that 
the forms of judgement are “what we would today call the forms of our language”. This 
strikes me as a fascinating, programmatic suggestion: programmatic in the sense that it raises 
the possibility of identifying the forms of judgement by recourse to theories of language. 
Although this suggestion has not, to my knowledge, ever been developed or properly 
explored against the rich background of contemporary research on language, this is precisely 
what I shall attempt in this chapter. Specifically, I shall claim that Generative linguistics is 
well placed to supply the forms of judgement. The forms of judgement can be derived from 
                                                           
132
 Admittedly, it is a topic of debate in the philosophy of logic as to whether a principled distinction, i.e. one 
which is not theory–relative or relative to certain pragmatic considerations, can be drawn between content and 
form (cf. Macfarlane, 2000; for denial see: Whitely, 1951), perhaps the most plausible candidate for such a 
distinction being invariance under permutations of a domain. However, this debate is probably not as 
philosophically profound as it appears. The reason for this is that it is premised upon intuitions about which 
components of an argument ought to be ascribed to its form, and which components ascribed to its content in the 
first place: for instance, quantifiers on one side, and colour predicates on the other. These intuitions are the 
means by which principled distinctions are evaluated. Roughly, invariance under permutations of a domain is a 
‘good’ candidate for distinguishing form from content because it maps onto our intuitions regarding what is 
form and what is content. Even if such a principled distinction is available, it is far from clear that this would 
compel us to view logical form as anything other than a regimentation imposed upon judgements.  
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our best theories of grammar. This is what I mean by updating Kant’s table of forms in light 
of contemporary linguistic theory: our best theories of grammar can be the source of these 
forms, the means by which they are identified.  
Pursuing an update of this kind is promising for a number of reasons. Firstly, and 
most obviously, it closes a rather glaring lacuna in Kant’s position. Kant requires a means for 
identifying the forms of judgement, and this is exactly what the proposal promises. In this 
sense, it rescues the forms of judgement from a certain obscurity. Of course, Kant himself 
could not have intended or envisioned the forms of judgement being supplied in this manner, 
so the proposal clearly cannot be intended as a narrowly exegetical one. Still though, there is 
no reason why this proposal cannot feature in, and so strengthen, a philosophical 
reconstruction of Kant’s position.  
Secondly, this update promises to be a naturalisation of this component of Kant’s 
philosophy. The study of grammar is a thoroughly naturalistic enterprise (Hinzen, 2006), so 
insofar as it is capable of identifying the forms of judgement, these forms are naturalistic: 
objects of naturalistic inquiry. Of course, the claim that at least parts of Kant’s transcendental 
investigation can be understood in naturalistic terms is hardly a novel one. Kitcher (1990) 
famously embraces the label ‘transcendental psychology’ for her reading of Kant’s position. 
Nevertheless, I want to stress one potentially significant difference between the kind of 
naturalisation I am proposing and that of Kitcher. One of the most prominent objections to 
reading Kant as a transcendental psychologist is that it excises from his account all traces of 
normativity. As Allison (2004: 147) says: 
“...Kant’s concern with mental acts is not to be construed in a psychological sense. Or, 
if one insists that any account of mental acts is by definition psychological, then the 
claim is that the account is not psychological in a pejorative sense.”  
This ‘pejorative psychology’, Allison continues, would be one which casts Kant as offering a 
“naturalized, empirical cognitive psychology, which undermines the essentially normative 
nature of his account of mental activity”. As should be clear, the proposed naturalisation 
would not reduce Kant’s position to that of ‘pejorative psychology’. Far from excising 
normativity, the proposal is premised upon the thesis that experience is fundamentally 
normative or rule-subjecting in character.  The proposal is that the forms of judgement or 
meta-concepts presupposed by any rule whatsoever can be uncovered by an investigation of 
grammar. 
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Thirdly, insofar as this update is successful, it has ramifications for how grammar is 
understood. In particular, I think that it is capable of informing understanding of the role or 
function of grammar. This suggestion may appear puzzling: surely the function of grammar is 
already well established? Indeed, in Section 3.2 I described grammar as a system for mapping 
or linking sound to meaning, that is, as a system of, or for, communication, so its function or 
role appears to be well determined.  
However, while it is incontrovertible that communication is a function of grammar, 
whether this is its only function, or indeed, even its primary function is far from clear. Over 
the past decade, there has been increasing interest in the conjecture that grammar has a 
functional significance over and above that of merely mapping sound to meaning.133  
“…language [grammar] is optimised for the system of thought, with mode of 
externalisation secondary” (Chomsky, 2007: 16-17) 
The claim that grammar is somehow ‘optimised’ for thought, with ‘externalisation’, that is, 
the mapping from meaning to sound, being secondary is one which Chomsky has asserted 
repeatedly and despite the generality of this claim, it has direct implications for the functional 
significance of grammar. Specifically, it implies that the functional significance of grammar 
is not exhausted by the task of sound-meaning mapping, but is bound up with enabling the 
system of thought humans have available to them. As Chomsky (2005: 4) says, grammar is 
responsible for constructing the “infinite variety of internal structures that enter into thought, 
interpretation, and other human mental acts”. More precise formulations of this idea abound. 
Gomilla (2012) argues that grammar is responsible for the systematicity and productivity, 
understood in the Fodorean sense, of propositional thought. Fitch & Hauser (2004) suggest 
that grammar underlies the processing of phrase structure computations, and so serves to 
unlock the processing of, for example, the long distance dependencies which are unavailable 
to finite state computational systems. Hinzen and Sheehan (2013) argue that that grammar is 
a system of reference, such that any referential act is grammatical in nature.134 Moreover, as 
well as being traced to ‘global’ processes such as reference and systematicity, grammar has 
also been hypothesised to underlie the processing of domain specific tasks. Katz and Pesetsky 
(Ms.) argue that the recognition of patterns of tonal tension and relaxation in music depends 
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 Although I certainly do not want to broach the issue here, it is worth noting that the renewal and sharpening 
of attention upon the functional significance of grammar has, for reasons which should be transparent, arisen 
alongside an explosion of interest in the question of language evolution (see Hauser, et al, 2002; Pinker and 
Jackendoff, 2005).  
134
 This view is explored in some detail in Section 7.3. 
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upon subjects’ grammatical competence (for a related proposal, see Mukherji, 2010, Chpts. 6 
& 7). As well as musical cognition, it has been contended that grammar may yield 
arithmetical abilities (Chomsky, 2007a), and the act analysis integral to moral cognition 
(Kirkby and Reichard, Ms.). 
The reason this taxonomy of hypothesised functions of grammar is significant is that 
it indicates that its role or function is far from being a settled or determined matter. Even 
setting aside, as I have done at this point, the credibility of these hypotheses, the mere fact 
that there is such debate regarding the matter creates the intellectual space for a novel 
hypothesis: that grammar functions so as to determine the forms of judgement, such that 
investigating grammar is the means by which the forms of judgement can be identified.135 
The reason I find this potential ramification or consequence of pursuing the proposed update 
so interesting is that it is a realisation of the kind of bi-directional relationship between 
philosophy and the sciences of the mind which originally motivated this thesis. Not only does 
the update use the empirical study of grammar to inform a philosophical issue, namely how 
the forms of judgement are to be identified, it also allows a broadly Kantian perspective 
regarding the forms of judgement to inform our understanding of the function of grammar.  
However, enumerating the philosophical consequences of this update or proposal is one thing. 
Determining whether it is plausible is another, and it is this latter matter which I now turn to. 
 
7.2. Linguistic variation 
One glaring question which must be addressed concerns linguistic variation. There can be 
little doubt that there exists considerable linguistic diversity and variation, and this appears to 
be immediately problematic for the present proposal. The proposal aims to update the forms 
of judgement in light of the forms of language. Yet, given linguistic diversity, there seems to 
be little reason to think that this would yield a single table of forms. Instead, such an update 
appears destined to yield a multitude of tables, perhaps one for each natural language, with no 
method for privileging one over the other. Indeed, I suspect the reason why Pippin’s 
programmatic suggestion that Kant’s judgement forms are what we would today consider to 
be forms of language has not been developed is due to the apparent variability of the latter.  
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 That the functional significance of grammar is far from being a settled matter, despite over half a century of 
empirical study yielding substantive results, offers a salutary lesson for how scientific inquiry proceeds (see 
Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 1, for a nice exposition of this point). 
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However, linguistic variation is an empirical matter, the precise nature and details of 
which cannot be pre-judged. Unfortunately, this fairly obvious directive has not always been 
heeded. For instance, Bennett (1966: 86) is comfortable dismissing from his armchair the 
idea that any language has means for expressing any particular kind of judgement. Although, 
he admits, language has so far been treated “glibly and superficially”, there is no reason to 
think that a more adequate account of it would support the thesis that languages universally 
encode for types of judgement. Ironically, this is exactly the kind of prejudicing of an 
empirical question which he goes on to rebuke Hume for indulging in (Bennett, 1966: 96). 
What is required is an inspection of the nature of linguistic variation; only then is it possible 
to determine whether it invalidates updating the forms of judgement by recourse to the forms 
of language.  
Prior to the inception of Generative Grammar, it was widely held that there are no 
bounds upon the variation natural languages can exhibit. Joos (1966: 228) famously declared 
that “languages differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways”. However, 
one of the most formative and important pillars of the generative tradition has been that this 
assumption of unbounded variation is empirically false. It has instead been observed that 
natural language variation is non-trivially constrained. For example, all languages are 
hierarchically rather than linearly structured, exhibit embedding and constituent 
displacement,136 and admit of fundamental distinctions such as that of heads and non-heads, 
arguments and adjuncts. Furthermore, there are implicational relations between distinct 
typological phenomena e.g. the ordering of verbs and objects, and the ordering of adpositions 
and their complements (Greenberg, 1963). Such limits upon linguistic diversity render the 
topic of linguistic variation amenable to theoretical investigation. Historically, explaining or 
accounting for the constrained variation exhibited by languages has been a central challenge 
for generative linguists (Rizzi, 1982: 117): why do languages vary in the ways that they do?  
The most influential response to this challenge within Generative Grammar has been 
that of Principles and Parameters (P&P). This model postulates that language acquisition is 
underpinned and guided by a genetic endowment for language: a Universal Grammar. 
Crucially, according P&P, this Universal Grammar consists of a number of parameters which 
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 Though, see Everett (2005). 
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are valued as part of the acquisition process.137 Consider, for example, the null subject 
parameter: 
‘Allow/do not allow finite verbs to have null subjects’ 
On the P&P model, acquisition of a grammatical competence is a matter of valuing a 
relatively small number, perhaps between thirty and forty, of such innate parameters. 
Moreover, each parameter is supposed to be binary, in the sense that only two possible values 
attach to each parameter (Newmeyer, 2005). This model is captured by the famous metaphor 
of a switchboard: to acquire a grammar is to set a pre-determined number of switches on a 
board.  
“What we expect to find then, is a highly structured theory of UG based on a number 
of fundamental principles... with parameters that have to be fixed by experience.” 
(Chomsky, 1981: 3-4) 
A consequence of this model is that the learning task faced by children in acquiring a 
grammar is simplified considerably. As such, the model has been widely viewed as a viable 
solution to ‘Plato’s problem’ or the problem of the poverty of the stimulus in the linguistic 
domain.138 Furthermore, and, from the present perspective, more importantly, this model also 
serves to account for and explain a wide range of linguistic variation. Quite straightforwardly, 
the space of possible language variation is determined by the range of parameter values made 
available by Universal Grammar. Moreover, it has been hypothesised that parameters are 
hierarchically organised, such that the valuation of one has direct consequences for the 
valuation of others (Baker, 2001). Such ‘cascade effects’ (Chomsky, 1981: 6) could account 
for implicational relations found to hold of distinct typological phenomena (as well as predict 
previous unnoticed typological clusterings).  
The influence of this Principles and Parameters model has been such that it has been 
applied mutatis mutandis to variation found in other domains e.g. moral variation (Harman, 
2008). However, despite its influence, there has been growing recognition that, with respect 
                                                           
137
 Such parameters must be distinguished from the ‘micro-parameters’ much discussed in recent literature, and 
which attach to lexical items. 
138
 This problem has been much discussed in the literature, and I will not dwell upon it here (see Pinker, 1994 
for an overview). In brief, the linguistic data children have available to them is incomplete and awash with 
sentence fragments, idiomatic usages, and performance errors or slips of the tongue (cf. Hinzen, 2006: 122-124). 
Yet, in normal environmental conditions, children progress linguistically very rapidly, systematically avoiding 
the kind of over-generalisations which would be expected of domain general learning (Crain and Pietroski, 
2005). 
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to language at least, the P&P model faces serious, perhaps insuperable, difficulties. Aside 
from a core cluster of parameters, there has been little progress in determining an adequate 
taxonomy of parameters (Haspelmath, 2008). On the other hand, it has been argued that there 
is little reason to think that relevant variation can be accounted for by a small number of 
parameters or that merely binary parameters can suffice (Newmeyer, 2005). For example, 
Manzini and Wexler (1987: 419) contend that cross-linguistic variation in pronominal and 
anaphoric binding can be accounted for only by a Governing Category parameter which can 
be valued in one of five distinct ways: 
γ is a governing category for α iff 
γ is the minimal category that contains α and a governor for α and has: 
a. a subject; or 
b. an infl.; or 
c. a tense; or 
d. a “referential tense” tense; or 
e. a “root” tense 
From the present perspective, what is significant is not criticism of the Principles and 
Parameters model per se, but with how this criticism has coincided with a radical re-appraisal 
of the challenge this model was supposed to address: that of explaining linguistic variation.139 
Traditionally, linguistic variation has been understood as, at least in part, a grammatical 
phenomenon, and as such, has been assumed to be a challenge for the grammarian, to be 
explained by theories of grammar. For instance, insofar as the P&P model seeks to explain 
linguistic variation in terms of differences in grammar parameterisation, it is evidently 
premised upon and enshrines this assumption. As Hinzen and Sheehan (2013: 301) put it: 
 “Grammar… is what has been the primary focus of the field of comparative syntax in 
the Principles and Parameters (P&P) tradition.” 
However, in recent years this assumption has been increasingly called into question. It has 
been argued that rather than treating linguistic variation as a grammatical phenomenon, and 
so a problem or challenge for grammarians, such variation is best analysed in terms of 
differences in externalisation. ‘Externalisation’ broadly refers to the morpho-phonological 
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 I do not mean to imply that problems with P&P solely precipitated this shift. Although there is, I think, a 
connection, Boeckx (2011) argues that Minimalism, which has dominated the study of language for the past two 
decades, necessitates a reappraisal of the notion of linguistic variation (specifically, it implies that narrow syntax 
does not vary) on independent grounds.  
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realisation of grammatical properties. It has long been recognised that the morpho-
phonological realisation of grammatical properties varies across languages. For example, it is 
widely agreed that nominals in English are assigned structural case. Yet, unlike many 
languages, with the exception of first and third person personal pronouns, English does not 
mark for case either lexically or morphologically. As such, there is a dissociation of grammar 
and its externalisation. The basic thought in relation to linguistic variation then, is that such 
variation can be traced to how grammar is externalised, rather than grammar itself. 
For example, head-complement order and null subjects, two prominent points of 
linguistic variation once attributed to differences in parametric valuation, have been re-
assessed as different externalisations of a common underlying grammar. Languages vary as 
to whether heads precede or follow their complement. For example, in English heads precede 
their complements: 
[read [the book]] 
[in [the room]] 
, whereas in Japanese they follow them: 
[[book] read] 
[[room] in] 
Although in the P&P model this variation was explained by citing differences in how 
grammars are parameterised i.e. X precedes/follows its complement, the consensus view 
nowadays is that linearization or word order is not a grammatical matter at all, but wholly 
restricted to how grammatical hierarchies are externalised (Berwick and Chomsky, 2011). As 
such, the relevant variation is attributable to differences in phonological spell out. Null 
subject variation concerns whether languages require overt subjects in finite clauses: for 
instance, Chinese and Italian do not require such subjects, English does. Although this 
variation has been analysed in terms of a ‘null subject parameter’, Hinzen and Sheehan (2013: 
Chpt. 5) argue that, as with head order, the existence of null subjects is not a grammatical 
phenomenon at all, and that such variation is best understood as differences in externalisation.  
Such developments raise the distinct possibility that all linguistic variation can be 
attributed to externalisation: word order, morphological operations and vocabulary insertion 
(Berwick and Chomsky, 2011; Cinque, 1999: 141). In turn, ascribing linguistic variation to 
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the non-grammatical components of language renders it highly plausible that grammar itself 
admits of no variation. It is now often asserted that, at their grammatical core, all languages 
are uniform (Chomsky, 2007a; Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: Chpt. 5). 
 “…there is only one language, Human” (Boeckx, 2011: 210) 
Returning to the original concern of this section, how can deriving the forms of 
judgement from the forms of language be possible given linguistic variation, two points can 
be extracted from the foregoing discussion. Firstly, the notion of ‘linguistic variation’ is 
insufficiently fine-grained for our purposes because it elides the difference between variation 
attributable to externalisation and that attributable to grammar. This matters because the 
forms of language targeted by the proposed update are those of grammar, those uncovered by 
generative linguists, and these must be distinguished from their morphological and 
phonological realisation. ‘Forms of language’ here means forms of grammar.140 As such, it is 
not linguistic variation tout court which threatens the proposed update, but grammatical 
variation in particular. The second point which follows from the foregoing discussion is that 
there may well be no such thing as grammatical variation. Consequently, the objection, 
properly formulated, has been nullified. 
 
7.3. Un-Cartesian linguistics 
Even if grammar is uniform, there is another major obstacle for the proposal that it supplies 
the forms of judgement. This obstacle concerns the supposed autonomy and arbitrariness of 
grammar. Since the inception of Generative Grammar in the 1950s, the orthodox conception 
of grammar has been that of an autonomous domain: comprised of rules and principles that 
can be studied in relative abstraction from cognition at large. Grammar has been understood 
according to the metaphor of a ‘mental organ’, a language faculty or module in a roughly 
Fodorean sense (Pinker, 1994). As a module, grammatical processing is isolated from and 
independent of that executed by other modules and also, crucially, independent of any non-
modular understanding: plausibly, cognition or thought, that which bears semantic properties 
(Fodor, 1983). In this sense, grammar constitutes an autonomous domain of inquiry. As 
Hinzen and Sheehan (2013: 404) put it, Generative linguists take themselves to be studying, 
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 So, although I shall continue to speak of ‘forms of language’, this ought to be understood as referring to the 
forms of grammar. 
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“not thought, but an autonomous structure that can (or must) be studied independently from 
any general ‘cognition’”.  
The notion of arbitrariness central to this orthodox conception of grammar is that of 
semantic arbitrariness. Arbitrariness of this kind follows from the autonomy of grammar. 
Essentially, if grammar is one thing and that which bears semantic properties, thought or 
cognition, is another, then grammaticality can be of no semantic significance: in this sense, 
grammar is arbitrary. 
This orthodoxy of autonomy and arbitrariness is closely connected to the role of 
grammar in mapping sound to meaning, and is perhaps best illustrated in light of how this 
mapping function has been modelled. According to linguists, grammar maps sound to 
meaning insofar as it generates a pairing of phonological information and semantic 
information:  
Figure 9. 
 
Essentially, any grammatical derivation begins with, or takes as its input, a set of unordered 
words, bundles of phonological, syntactic and semantic features, from the subjects’ mental 
lexicon: LEX. Grammar combines these words as a function of (a) their syntactic features, 
and (b) the rules of the system. Upon completion of the derivation, that is, if all the relevant 
grammatical rules have been successfully met, the result is a pairing of phonological 
information, PHON, and semantic information, SEM. These two kinds of information are 
then transferred or made accessible to ‘external’ cognitive systems responsible for 
articulating sound and those of ‘thought’ respectively.141 
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 This model oversimplifies matters slightly. In particular, it omits the fact that transfer to the interface occurs 
at the phasal, rather than the derivational level (cf. Hinzen, 2012a) 
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This model enshrines the autonomy and semantic arbitrariness of grammar. In 
explaining how grammar maps sound to meaning, linguists postulate a distinct system(s) 
responsible for meaning, thought/cognition, and a distinct system(s) for sound, sensory motor 
system(s). Grammar simply relates or mediates between these two antecedently postulated 
systems, systems which exist independently of being so mediated. In explaining how 
grammar maps sound to meaning then, linguists distinguish the mapping from that which is 
mapped, and as a consequence, guarantee the autonomy of grammar. The semantic 
arbitrariness of grammar is equally clear on this model, where meaning is ascribed to an 
‘external’ system of thought with which grammar merely interfaces. Far from grammar being 
of any inherent semantic significance, in mapping sound and meaning, grammar is taken to 
presuppose the independent availability of a domain of meaning such that it can be mapped at 
all. The rules according to which grammar pairs sound and meaning are rich indeed, yet they 
have no implications for the nature of that which is being paired. For linguists then, grammar 
is a non-semantic domain; the rules of grammar are semantically arbitrary.  
Indeed, the semantic arbitrariness of grammar was precisely what Chomsky’s (1957) 
famous example, ‘colourless green ideas sleep furiously’, purported to show. Such a sentence, 
says Chomsky, is “nonsense”, in the sense that it is not a coherent or meaningful thought. 
Nevertheless, it is absolutely grammatical for speakers of English. What this indicates is that 
the rules of grammar have no bearing upon what counts as a meaningful thought.  
The reason this is significant from the present perspective, is that accepting the 
autonomy and arbitrariness of grammar renders it incapable of supplying the forms of 
judgement. To say that grammatical operations are semantically arbitrary is to say, from a 
Kantian perspective, that they have no bearing upon the relation of representations to an 
object. As such, as long as grammar is understood to be semantically arbitrary, the proposal 
that the forms of judgement can be updated in light of our best theories of grammar is not at 
all plausible.  
Now, it is certainly true that this ‘orthodoxy’ is increasingly less orthodox, at least in 
a key respect. In Section 7.1, I outlined how it is increasingly common for the mapping from 
meaning to sound to be viewed as only a function of grammar, and perhaps a secondary one. 
The alternate functions postulated coalesce around the idea that grammar enhances the kind 
of computational processing subjects are capable of in various domains. Specifically, it is 
said to yield recursive computation, that is, the embedding of a constituent in a constituent of 
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the same category, in other domains. In current minimalist linguistics, the core operation of 
grammar is that of Merge. Merge takes two objects, X and Y, and forms the unordered set, 
{X, Y}. This set may be thus merged again with a further object Z, whereby the structure {Z, 
{X, Y}} is created.142 Merge is a simple operation. Yet, with simplicity comes computational 
power: trivially, merge is a recursive operation. As a consequence, where recursion has been 
found in putatively non-grammatical domains such as the language of thought (Berwick and 
Chomsky, 2011; Gomilla, 2012), arithmetic (Chomsky, 2007a), moral cognition (Kirkby and 
Reichard, Ms) and musical cognition (Katz and Pesetsky, Ms), this recursive computation has 
been explained by recourse to subjects possession of a grammatical competence.   
A few observations are in order at this point. Firstly, these claims amount to 
repudiations of the autonomy of grammar. Insofar as grammar has consequences for a wide 
range of cognitive domains, the study of grammar is not independent of or distinct from study 
of these domains. For example, if Kirkby and Reichard (Ms.) are correct, moral psychologists 
are studying, in part, grammar. Secondly, it is not surprising that, to the extent that grammar 
has been claimed to be non-autonomous, its significance has been traced to its computational 
ramifications. Merge aside, the computational paradigm is central to much contemporary 
theorising about grammar. Grammatical derivations are taken to be driven by the requirement 
that certain formal features attaching to lexical items, such as case and φ features (number, 
person, gender), be ‘checked’, where checking is a thoroughly computational challenge, 
bound up with such concepts as ‘search’, ‘delete’ and ‘crash’. Similarly, computational 
efficiency is widely invoked as an explanation of various grammatical phenomena, such as, 
for instance, how movement only seems occur as a ‘last resort’ (cf. Hinzen, 2012a). In other 
words, the grammatical paradigm is a computational one, and so it is hardly surprising that 
the hypothesised effects of possessing a grammar have converged upon the kind of 
computations a subject can process. 
However, while the claim that grammar underpins computational processing in 
distinct domains does vitiate a very strong modular or autonomous conception of grammar, it 
does little to enhance the plausibility of the proposal that the forms of judgement can be 
updated in light of grammatical theory. The reason for this is that the computational paradigm 
is founded upon a categorical distinction of semantics and syntax. Computational processes 
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 I am here eliding an issue which is, strictly speaking, crucial to the recursive nature of Merge: that of 
labelling or headedness. Since this technical point is not of any significance to the present discussion, I shall not 
explore this matter here (cf. Hinzen, 2006: 170-94). 
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are sensitive to the physical properties of symbols, not what they denote. Grammar may yield 
recursive computation in a number of domains, but such an effect is necessarily syntactic, and 
is of no inherent semantic significance. In other words, grammar is still semantically arbitrary. 
Yet it is precisely semantic properties which matter from the perspective of the relation of 
representations to an object. As such, if the effects of grammar are ‘merely’ syntactic, there is 
little hope for updating the forms of judgement in light of linguistic theory.  
 Crucially however, there is a striking and increasingly well developed, alternate 
conception of grammar, one which breaks with autonomy in a much more radical sense: the 
Un-Cartesian view (Hinzen, 2009, 2012; Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013; Sheehan and Hinzen, 
2012).143 This view denies the distinction of grammar and thought/cognition altogether. 
Instead, the study of grammar is the study of thought, and a forteriori there can be no 
“interface” between them (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 417).144 On this view, it is not simply 
that grammar is non-autonomous in the sense of “constraining” or having computational 
consequences for cognition (Berwick and Chomsky, 2011). Rather, grammar is non-
autonomous in the sense that there is no independent system of thought for grammar to 
constrain. Thought is inherently grammatical. 
Even this cursory description of the Un-Cartesian position is sufficient to convey its 
radical character. It has long been widely urged that language and thought must be distinct.  
Indeed, the idea that thought might be, in some sense, distinctively linguistic or grammatical 
has been commonly viewed as not merely false, but dangerously confused (Fodor, 2001). 
“…the idea that thought is the same as language is an example of what can be called a 
conventional absurdity” (Pinker, 1994: 57) 
Jackendoff (1996) summarises the reasons why language and thought must be separate. 
Perhaps the most widely cited of these reasons is that thought is immune to differences in 
language. For instance, Jackendoff notes how we do not suppose that the fact that someone 
speaks French means that she has different kinds of thoughts from that of a Turkish speaker. 
Rather, thought is independent of the language spoken, as demonstrated by the possibility of 
translation. Translation presupposes that different languages can express the same thought. 
Yet, were it the case that a French speaker not merely spoke in French, but thought in French, 
                                                           
143
 For a related proposal, the Representational Hypothesis, see Burton-Roberts, 2011. 
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 It is worth noting that this thesis renders the minimalist strategy of rationalising language design by recourse 
to the ‘legibility conditions’ imposed upon the grammatical system by separate conceptual-intentional system(s) 
largely incoherent (e.g. Chomsky, 2005).  
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mutatis mutandis, for other languages, the idea of translation would be incoherent, so goes 
the argument.    
However, from the present perspective, this argument misses its mark. As was 
stressed in the previous section, the relevant conception of language or grammar is one which 
admits of no variation. While social constructs such as French and Turkish do indeed differ, 
grammar is defined at a much higher level of abstraction, one which ex hypothesi is 
completely uniform. Consequently, language variation cannot be used to support the 
separation of grammar and thought. 
Another consideration which has been marshalled in support of the separation of 
language and thought concerns comparative cognition. Animal communication systems are 
bereft of grammatical structure (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1997). Furthermore, attempts to teach 
apes (including chimpanzees) to sign human languages have foundered most strikingly with 
respect to grammatical relations (Terrace, 2005).145 Grasping grammatical relations appears 
to lie beyond the reach of animals. Despite lacking grammatical competence however, so 
goes the argument, animals think. For instance, Jackendoff (1996) points to the ability of 
vervet monkeys to ‘reason’ about appropriate retribution. Roughly, if monkey X attacks 
monkey Y, there is a strong likelihood of Y thereafter attacking some member of X’s kinship 
group: a fact which, Jackendoff suggests, implicates some fairly sophisticated reasoning on 
the part the monkey about what constitutes appropriate retribution. Ergo, grammar and 
thought must be distinct.  
The consideration of comparative cognition is interesting because it leads naturally to 
a closer inspection of the Un-Cartesian position. It is certainly true that animals ‘think’ in the 
sense that their behaviour is, in many cases, best explained by recourse to the postulation of 
‘physical symbol systems’ (Gallistel, 2009). However, this is distinct from the conception of 
‘thinking’ relevant to the Un-Cartesian position. This is captured by the biconditional: 
Intentionality ↔ intensionality ↔ reference ↔ grammar (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 108)146 
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 As well as grammar, the vast disparity between the size of a normal human lexicon and that of even the most 
rigorously language-trained ape indicates that lexical capability is another area of linguistic discontinuity 
(Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005: 7). 
146
 Hinzen and Sheehan also include as part of this complex biconditional, the condition of ‘concepts’. I omit 
this here not because I consider this mistaken or inconsistent with the account I offer, but simply because, from 
the present perspective, it overcomplicates matters and so obscures the central point. 
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The Un-Cartesian position is that grammar is intimately related to ‘thinking’ which is 
intentional, intensional and referential. A few clarifications are in order. Firstly, what 
‘reference’ denotes over and above ‘intentionality’ eludes me, and so I take these to be 
equivalent concepts. Secondly, Hinzen and Sheehan stress that intentionality is a matter of 
states or representations being about facets of the world which exist distinctly and 
independently of their being so represented. In other words, the relevant concept of 
intentionality is bound up with the possibility of mistake or error (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 
463-4).  
The Un-Cartesian view is that thought of this kind depends upon grammar. Grammar 
functions so as to give us “different kinds of thoughts to think”: namely, thoughts bearing 
semantic properties (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 406). As a consequence, grammar cannot be 
‘mere syntax’, but is of inherent semantic significance.147 For instance, Hinzen and Sheehan 
(2013: 161) bemoan how the assumption that semantic content is independent of grammar 
has been so historically influential that “it is by now firmly institutionalised, with 
philosophers focusing solely upon ‘content’… while syntacticians are involved with ‘pure 
form’”. For the Un-Cartesian, this institutional division of labour is founded upon, and serves 
to perpetuate, an intellectual confusion.  
It is worth underlining the striking resemblance between the ‘thought’ or ‘cognition’ 
targeted by the Un-Cartesian and Kant’s conception of objective cognition or experience. In 
my view, Kantian experience and the intentional and intensional ‘thinking’ of the Un-
Cartesian overlap, in their essential elements, completely. The Un-Cartesian claim then is that 
thinking of this specific kind, objective cognition, depends upon possessing a grammatical 
competence. 
Now, while it is certainly true that animals ‘think’ in the generic sense of 
manipulating symbols computationally, compellingly, they exhibit no evidence of objective 
cognition. The most striking feature of primate calls in their natural habitats is their 
functional character. In particular, they function so as to influence the behaviour of others in 
a limited number of (identifiable) ways e.g. alarm calls, requests for food and mating cries 
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 Hinzen and Sheehan (2013: 491) point out that Chomsky’s famous example ‘colourless green ideas sleep 
furiously’, which has been almost universally interpreted as evidence in favour of a grammar-meaning divide, 
actually supports no such divide. The sentence is grammatical, but also perfectly meaningful: we can assign it 
truth conditions unproblematically. By contrast, true examples of meaningless sentences, e.g. ‘furiously sleep 
ideas green colourless’, are also ungrammatical. The domain of grammaticality and the domain of meaning 
intersect completely. 
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(Hauser, et al, 2002: 9). For example, toque macaque monkeys make calls when encountering 
an abundant food source which quickly brings their group mates to the site. Vervet monkeys 
use three different alarm calls to alert others to the presence of eagles, leopards and snakes 
(Tomasello, 1997: 250-254). This functional character is reinforced by how animal calls are 
prompted by objects or events “in the here and now” (Hauser et al, 2007: 105). It follows 
from this that we need not ascribe any semantics or referential properties to these calls; they 
can plausibly be analysed in purely functional, that is, non-intentional, terms  
This conclusion is equally viable for language-trained, signing chimpanzees. There 
are numerous cases of chimpanzees being trained to produce signs in a variety of contexts 
and these signs have often been analysed as bearing semantic properties: designating things 
in the world. However, similarly to primate calls in their natural environment, the signs that 
language trained apes produce are centred upon a narrow range of requests e.g. ‘eat’, ‘tickle’ 
and ‘drink’, i.e. attempts to influence the behaviour of the human experimenter. Indeed, of 
the productions of such chimpanzees, more than 95% of them are requests (Call and 
Tomasello, 1997: 323). Not all of the signs of a language-trained chimpanzee’s vocabulary 
are overtly functional in this way. For example Premack trained a chimpanzee, Sarah, to use 
an artificial visual language consisting of plastic chips of different colour shapes. In a study, 
Sarah would be asked “what colour?” in the presence of an apple, to which she consistently 
selected the symbol for ‘red’. Likewise, if asked “what object?” in the presence of an apple, 
she would select the symbol for ‘apple’. Crucially though, a successful answer would be 
rewarded with food. Terrace argues that there is no evidence that the symbols used by apes 
have “any function other than to request whatever food or drink its trainer could provide” 
(Terrace, 2005: 15).  Terrace contends that if the trainer stopped offering rewards, Sarah 
would simply stop answering the questions.  
It is plausible therefore that animal communicative acts do not bear semantic or 
referential properties. Rather than being ‘about’ anything in the world, they are better 
characterised functionally. In absence of referential utterances however, there seems to be 
little reason to ascribe animals intentional thought. As Terrace (2005: 18) conjectures, 
referential ability appears to be uniquely human.  
Far from comparative cognition supplying evidence against the Un-Cartesian position 
then, Hinzen and Sheehan argue that it indicates exactly the kind of negative correlation - no 
grammar, no intentionality - which the Un-Cartesian would predict. Moreover, they contend 
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that this conditional relation is further supported by the absence of grammar-intentional 
thought dissociations or selective breakdowns in humans (2013: Chpt. 8). Firstly, it is argued 
that since so-called agrammatic aphasia is best analysed as a breakdown of morpho-
phonology rather than a breakdown of grammar, there is no convincing evidence of selective 
or isolated grammatical impairment, contrary to what is widely supposed.148 Secondly, 
Hinzen and Sheehan argue that where intentional cognition is disordered, such as it is for the 
schizophrenic, this plausibly correlates with a breakdown of grammar: “where language 
fragments, [intentional] thought does too” (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 477). In sum, the 
basic picture is that where there is intentional cognition, there is grammar, and where there is 
no grammar or an impairment of grammar, intentional cognition is disrupted accordingly.   
Clearly, this does not amount to a comprehensive assessment of the Un-Cartesian 
position. Indeed, such an assessment lies altogether beyond the reach of this thesis: it is not 
something I attempt to broach here. Rather, my aim is to present the Un-Cartesian view as a 
viable conception of grammar and, crucially, underline its relation to the central proposal of 
this chapter: that grammatical theory is capable of supplying the forms of judgement. At this 
stage it is already fairly transparent that the Un-Cartesian conception of grammar, connected 
as it is with objective cognition, is likely to be conducive to and motivate the proposal that 
the forms of judgement can be derived from the forms of grammar. Nevertheless, for a 
precise formulation of this relation, it is necessary to first review another source of evidence 
for the Un-Cartesian position.  
Perhaps, the most important argument in favour of the Un-Cartesian view is that 
grammatical categories systematically correlate with semantic categories. For instance, in 
most linguistic contexts proper names must take wide scope over modal operators, strongly 
indicating that they are directly referential expressions.149  
(1) Alfred might have had a different mother. 
Nevertheless, in other linguistic contexts, proper names behave differently: 
(2) The Alfred who joined the club today was a baboon. 
(3) Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane. 
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 For instance, Jackendoff (1996) cites the purported existence of double dissociations as an argument in 
favour of the separation of language and thought. 
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 Of course, this is not uncontroversial (see, e.g. Matushansky, 2008), but since the debate regarding the 
semantics of proper names suffers from serious confusions (Kirkby, 2012), I will avoid it altogether here. 
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Burge (1973) notes how in these cases the proper name is predicative rather than directly 
referential. However, what has not always received attention is that the difference between (1) 
on the one hand, and (2) and (3) on the other corresponds to a grammatical difference also: 
[DP Alfred1 [NP t1]] might have had a different mother 
[DP The [NP Alfred]] who joined the club today was a baboon 
[DP Some [NP Alfreds]] are crazy; some are sane 
Indeed, it is possible that every grammatical distinction corresponds to a semantic one 
(Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013). However, observing systematic correlations between 
grammatical and semantic categories is one thing (Carlson, 2003; Longobardi, 2005), 
explaining them is another. It is the Un-Cartesian position which, perhaps uniquely, is 
capable of such an explanation, and this constitutes in argument in its favour. According to 
the Un-Cartesian, grammatical and semantic distinctions coincide because grammatical 
distinctions are semantic distinctions.  
“…grammar narrowly constrains the ways in which words can be used to refer, 
making available a small number of discrete options in which this can happen, 
ranging from purely predicative nominals to quantificational, to referential, to deictic, 
and finally, to personal ones” (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 211) 
By means of illustration, consider the following string of examples: 
(1) a. John is man enough to solve this problem. 
b. John is more man than boy. 
(2) John likes man. 
(3) John is a man. 
(4) John likes a man. 
(5) John likes men. 
(6) a. John is looking for men. 
b. John is looking for three men. 
(7) John is the man. 
(8) Man arrived. 
(9) John is this man. 
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In these examples, ‘man’ functions, in semantic terms, rather differently. According to 
Hinzen and Sheehan (2013: 218), it refers variously to an abstraction (1a & 1b), an arbitrary 
amount of kind (2), an arbitrary number of individual instances of a kind (6a), a set of sets 
with a particular cardinality (6b), a kind (5, 8), a property (3 & 7), a particular instance of a 
kind potentially unknown to the speaker (4) and a particular individual instance of a kind 
known to the speaker (9). The question is how to explain these semantic differences: the Un-
Cartesian explains them grammatically.  
Crucially, there is clearly something common to each of these cases: a lexical item or 
lexical root, man, which provides a certain descriptive content. The alternate option would be 
to say that distinct lexical items are being utilised in each of these examples. Yet this would 
entail an explosion in the size of a subject’s lexicon. Moreover, it would not account for the 
productivity of these examples. Any speaker of English who can comprehend one of these 
examples can comprehend the others also. So, there is a common lexical root underlying each 
of these examples, yet they also differ in their referential or semantic properties. This 
difference, claims the Un-Cartesian, is explained by the grammatical configurations the 
lexical item enters into. Specifically, the referential properties of the expression are 
determined by grammatical factors such as whether an edge is projected, whether the edge is 
light or heavy, whether the content of the interior is moved to the edge, or whether the edge is 
expanded by additional layers (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 299) 
 As should be clear, the point here is not merely that certain referential properties 
correlate with grammatical configurations. The claim is rather that these configurations 
explain the relevant semantic properties. It is the function of grammar to ‘take’ semantically 
under-determined lexical roots such as man, run, love, and fix their relation to an object 
according to a particular referential mode. In this sense, grammar constrains any act of 
reference, demarcating a space of referential possibilities which cannot be circumvented. To 
borrow a metaphor from Hinzen (2009: 128), on this view language is not the ‘dress’ of 
cognition, a mere guise or clothing in which it is presented, but the skeleton of cognition.  
Moreover, this space of referential possibilities cannot be rationalised by any non-
grammatical means:  
“One might formalize them as semantic or logical ones in some available notation – 
but this won’t change the fact that they have their basis in the structure of human 
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language [grammar], where they are empirically manifest.” (Hinzen and Sheehan, 
2013: 408) 
Why grammar imposes the constraints it does upon reference is, claim Hinzen and Sheehan, 
essentially a mystery. Specifically, it cannot be answered by recourse to some non-
grammatical domain of ‘semantics’ or logic or metaphysics. In this sense, grammar is as deep 
as it is possible to go.150 
 Now, I have here only provided a glimpse of the domain of grammatical semantics 
postulated by the Un-Cartesian, a domain which encompasses clausal distinctions as well as 
the nominal distinctions outlined above. Still though, at this stage matters are sufficiently 
clear, I think, to state precisely why the Un-Cartesian conception of grammar is so conducive 
to the proposal that the forms of judgement be updated in light of grammatical theory. The 
Un-Cartesian view is not merely that grammar is, in some generic sense, connected with or 
required for objective cognition, as noted earlier, but more specifically that it imposes non-
trivial constraints upon such cognition. Hinzen and Sheehan characterise these referential 
modes or constraints in terms of a formal ontology. They control for the type of external 
object posited (2013: 176), or provide “perspectives on reality” (2013: 141). Roughly, 
grammar configures all relations to objects in terms of a limited number of ontological 
categories.  
However, it is possible, I think, to dispense with this ontological framework and, in a 
Kantian vein, understand grammatical semantics instead simply as rules, some selection of 
which must be realised by any judgement. That is, they can be understood as meta-concepts. 
For instance, ‘John is man enough to solve his problems’ and ‘John is a man’ have different 
inferential profiles, in part, because ‘man’ in the former case refers to an abstraction (a 
gradable property), in the latter case refers to a non-gradable property. Insofar as this is a 
grammatical phenomenon, an instance of grammatical semantics, it makes perfect sense to 
say that grammar provides rules for thinking about objects. Furthermore, insofar as some 
selection of these rules must be realised by any referential act, as the Un-Cartesian proposes, 
they must be known a priori: presupposed by objective experience, rather than deriving from 
it. As such, they are plausibly a priori rules for cognition of objects; foundational rules which 
                                                           
150
 This is comparable to Kant’s view that the pure forms of intuition and of the intellect are ‘mysterious’, in the 
sense that they cannot be rationalised (B145-6). 
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must be applicable to objects insofar as they are cognisable at all. That is, the rules of 
grammar may just be intellectual conditions for the possibility of experience  
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Conclusion 
 
I said in the introduction to this thesis that rather than provide a theory of judgement, an ill-
conceived endeavour I suggested, I would concern myself with two distinct conceptions of 
judgement, seeking to (a) to locate them within the context of the relevant philosophical and 
scientific undertakings and, (b) show how they are mediately related via the problem of 
intentionality. In developing this primary thread however, I have made a number of 
‘supplementary claims’, which are philosophically significant in their own right, concerning, 
for example, the naturalistic credentials of Hume’s theory of ideas, the connection between 
Hume’s science of man and cognitive science and the status of Kant’s forms of judgement, 
and I shall recount these here also.  
Beginning with Hume’s science of man, I explained how integral to this tradition is a 
specific conception of judgement. On this view, judgement is understood as a species of 
behavioural phenomena, one which a ‘scientist of man’ needs to explain. Subjects’ 
judgements are the data-set or explananda in need of naturalistic explanation. For Hume, this 
explanation is a matter of tracing the causal genesis of the judgement back to a domain of 
primitive mental elements and relations. This prompted the question of whether Hume’s 
theory of ideas is naturalistically acceptable. I argued that, contrary to what is widely claimed, 
Hume’s science of man is perfectly consistent with his theory of ideas, and that the latter can 
be understood as the kind of ‘inference to the best explanation’ central to scientific inquiry. 
Furthermore, I elaborated upon the often made observation that Hume’s science of man is, in 
some sense, the intellectual forerunner of contemporary cognitive science. I sought to 
substantiate this observation in detail, contending, for example, that cognitive scientists adopt 
the same conception of judgement as Hume.  
However, despite the explanatory successes this conception of judgement has enabled, 
I contended that Hume encounters a major problem regarding the intentionality of 
judgements. In particular, he is unable to account for a central property of his own 
explananda: that such judgements represent the world as being a certain way. Although 
Hume does attempt to tackle this problem when he asks why it is that we form beliefs about 
bodies which exist distinctly and continuously, I contended that he never fully grasps the 
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depth and pervasiveness of the problem, and that, besides, his proposed solution is a 
comprehensive failure. 
By contrast, Kant was keenly occupied with this intentionality problem (or, in his 
terms, objective validity or objective cognition), and I begun Part II by situating this problem 
in the context of his broader transcendental enterprise. Subsequently, I discussed two pivotal 
claims made by Kant: 
1. Intentional experience is essentially rule-subjecting. 
2. Rules only exist in the context of a judgement (the priority principle). 
As I underlined, it follows from these claims that intentional experience is necessarily 
judgemental and in this sense, Kant’s conception of judgement is inherently bound up with 
the role it plays in accounting for the possibility of intentionality.  
Emphasising the centrality of judgement to intentional experience prompted the 
question of how the forms of judgement posited by Kant ought to be understood. I argued 
that although Kant is right to consider these forms to be significant, he is wrong to take them 
to comprise a general logic. Specifically Kant is wrong to think that the forms of judgement 
concern mere ‘well-formedness’ in abstraction from any relation to an object. On the contrary, 
I argued that to the extent that there are no true judgements of perception, it is necessary to 
view the forms of judgement as inherently functioning so as to secure a relation to an object: 
that is, as rules for cognising objects. 
The final issue addressed in this thesis concerned how the forms of judgement are to 
be identified. In this regard, I sought to establish the viability and attractiveness of a research 
program: one according to which the forms of judgement are updated in light of, or identified 
by recourse to, contemporary linguistic theory. I outlined the philosophical results such a 
program could deliver: a naturalisation of this component of Kant’s philosophy, a realisation 
of the kind of bi-directional relationship between philosophy and the sciences of the mind 
which originally motivated the thesis. I sought to bolster the credibility of this program by 
refuting some possible objections, and pointing out that the emerging Un-Cartesian 
conception of grammar is highly conducive to it. Indeed, whether the proposed update is 
ultimately viable or not likely depends upon the success of the Un-Cartesian view of 
grammar.   
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